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Practical Applications
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ABSTRACT: The question this paper addresses is that of how readily the principles of MM-Theory can be applied in a practical sense. We introduce the concept of "mental technologies" - the control of experiences and the invention of new ones - and speculate on what life might be like in a society that thrives on such technology, taking the most extreme cases to begin with. We also explore the principles that would underlie the practice of "hopping" - that is, the deliberate migration from one reality to another. We then explore the utility of mental technologies for the modern day world and which, if any, are within our reach. Having touched on the neurology of mental technologies, we take a functionalist perspective and, treating the brain as a computer, consider the potentials of "programming" individuals with ideologies and thought systems as well as self-programming. We argue that health ought to come before truth, and that, although truth and health usually go hand-in-hand, a society that subscribes to healthy ideas is better off than one that subscribes to true ideas. We then go through a brief list of suggested healthy ideas for society to invest in. Having covered cognitive technologies, we then move onto emotional technologies. We explore a set of techniques for controlling one's emotions and fostering flexibility in one's values. We then step back and take a much broader view, looking at history and evolution as MM-Theory would have it. We propose the possibility of guiding the direction of our evolution such that a genetic line of human beings emerges better suited to a globalized world like that of today. Specifically, we propose that we could see the advent of human beings naturally predisposed, vis-à-vis their neural wiring, to seek peaceful and healthy means by which to conduct social and political interactions on the global stage. Before concluding the paper, we address the scientific issues that would come with the inquiry into experiences and the mental technologies that would grow out of it. We show that although a science of experiences would, like the social science, not be as efficient as the natural sciences, this is a difference in degree, not quality, and as that stands, a science of experiences is certainly possible and beneficial.
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Meaning
The Essence of Realness
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It is difficult to see how an idea like MM-Theory, which is radically abstract and metaphysical, could ever be applied in a practical hands-on manner to any facet of life in the mundane world. The theory was designed to account for the enigmas of consciousness and mental life, and the approach it takes is to describe the experiences therein in as concise and accurate a manner as possible. Such descriptions yielded the three primary aspects of all experiences - their qualitative essence, the essence of realness, and their inherent meaning. Other implications were drawn out of these aspects, and a full theory resolving the mind/matter problem was derived. These implications went even further, leading us to build an entire cosmology, one that, as The Universe and "God" makes clear, could almost pass as a religion. Metaphysical and religious theories have a bad track record for yielding too few practical results that can be used towards improving human life. For the most part, they are unfalsifiable, and therefore no practical consequences are to be expected should the theory be true. So how is our theory any different? Our theory is unlike other metaphysical theories in that it is more than a grand unfalsifiable statement about the ontological way of things in the universe, more than an account of "how things are"; it is a paradigm by which it can be understood how one can change reality by the shear power of his/her own mind. If the essence of realness is really there in our experiences, in our own minds, and if we have any control over our minds, we should have some power, even if only marginally, over what's real and what isn't.
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Human Experiences
David Hume
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Our theory straddles the border between classical metaphysics and the modern scientific view of the world. It is metaphysical in the sense that its primary subject matter is experience, which, with the exception of sensations, we take to be non-physical. However, unlike the subject matter of classical metaphysics (abstract truths and ideations), experiences can be directly verified - they can, and necessarily are, felt. Everything MM-Theory asserts about experiences is drawn from our (or my) familiarity with experiences and how they feel. It is true that we extrapolate these assertions beyond the bounds of the set of familiar human experiences, but this leap of induction is something even the physical sciences are guilty of (as David Hume teaches us  ). We at least base these extrapolations on a readily accessible sample of experiences - those belonging to the human mind. As it concerns the physical sciences, the only difference between them and our theory is that the verifiability of our claims can only be demonstrated on the level of the subject's private experiences, whereas the claims of science can be verified on a public level. We will see later in this paper, however, that, given the perspective MM-Theory offers, this distinction is fuzzy at best, and if articulated carefully, can actually be described away.
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What this paper aims to show is how this "middle ground" upon which MM-Theory stands - with its quasi-metaphysical yet privately verifiable claims - is enough for it to be applied in a practical sense. We will note right now, however, that the most effective arena of application is on such a lofty level that it would require perhaps centuries of dedicated work and the committed cooperation of thinkers the world over - thinkers such as philosophers, psychologists, politicians, and the like - before its effects can be seen. Such lofty aspirations may seem hopelessly beyond our reach in a world where cooperation among its many people - philosophers, politicians, and the common citizen alike - seems dismal, and the most pressing concerns seem focused on more material and economic solutions. It is doubtful that anyone in a position of power - and such positions would be vital to the applications of MM-Theory proposed here - has time to educate people on the potential each one of us has to alter our reality (by whatever small measure we can), nor does it seem likely they would want to - it doesn't even seem likely the common citizen would care to listen. That is why the proposals in this paper ought not to be taken as an agenda intended for immediate application (although, as we will see, the state of our world seems in desperate need of the sorts of psychological and philosophical solutions outlined here - but being hasty is more likely than not to backfire); rather, the proposals in this paper are meant to stimulate discussion. It is in the spirit of open discussion amongst readers that this paper is presented. That is the best platform from which to begin the move from abstract speculation to practice. It is the same platform from which numerous intellectual movements in the past had begun, movements that sometimes took centuries before their practical applications were sanctioned by the state and thus institutionalized. The scientific movement is one example, the democratic reforms that eventually swept across Europe is another. All these movements trace their roots to intellectual discussion amongst philosophers and other thinkers of similar persuasions, and there is no reason the ideas present in this paper cannot make similar strides. I am not claiming that MM-Theory is bound to wipe out all of man's woes - I'm not even claiming it would have any significant effect in this manner - but we will never know unless its potential to do so is pondered over seriously, with care, and over a lengthy period of time - and ultimately implemented.
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We insinuated, in The Universe and "God", what life would be like for us if MM-Theory could be applied as a sort of "mental technology". This was in the section Immaterial Beings, and although the more overt message there was what life might be like for such beings (if they indeed exist), we did mention briefly that if they do not exist, they at least might be held up as a model, or perhaps a target, for what we as a species could be headed for as we progress along our social, maybe even biological, evolution. Most historians agree that this seems to be what motivated the Greeks to embark on the path of improvement, and the humanists of the Renaissance to resume the path. In both cases, the inspiration was the idea that man could improve his lot, that progress was possible. In the ancient world of the Greeks, it was the idea that man could be like the gods if he exercised his virtues (similar to what was implied in our discussion of immaterial beings), and during the Renaissance, it was the idea that man's will was powerful enough to bring about changes in the world. I maintain that there are many changes yet to be seen, and such changes begin when man understands his potential to actualize them. The aim of this paper is to establish such an understanding.
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Newton's Laws of Mechanics
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We have seen, in only the short span of three hundred years or thereabouts, how a civilization can go from the use of simple tools, the workings of which even a child could comprehend, to ones so complex and powerful, they raise us up to a level of prowess matched only by the gods in ancient myths and fairy tales. Indeed, should a typical simpleton from three hundred years ago be brought to the present time and behold the wonders of modern day technology, he/she would undoubtedly mistake us for having achieved godhood. And why not? What we have achieved in the twentieth century is what all cultures in all times before would only fathom as the workings of gods. It is certainly the caliber of power the Greeks dreamt of achieving when they looked up to their gods and wondered if they could ever be like them. It is also the caliber of power achieved by the immaterial beings described in The Universe and "God", except in that case the technology is mental in nature and it is we who look up to them. But my claim, the one underlying the theme of this paper, is that the achievement of such a form of technology, such an awesome level of power, is within our reach. It is achievable just like our physical technology many centuries ago. And like the average citizen of those bygone times, many of us today may not understand how such achievements are even possible. It is difficult to fathom such possibilities when the principles upon which they rest are not fully grasped. In the case of our physical technologies, progress in this direction could not be foreseen until Newton outlined his three principles of mechanics. Only then could the principles upon which a physical technology like what we have today be understood and foreseen. The three aspects of all experiences outlined in the Basic Theory serve the same purpose - they are the principles by which the mental technology proposed in this paper is to be achieved. Without understanding such principles, whether in the case of physical technology or mental, the possible seems impossible.
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The Essence of Realness
Projection
Real Things
Qualitivity
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Out of the three principles underlying MM-Theory, the second - namely, that all experiences contain the essence of realness and thereby project themselves as real things - is foremost the one on which the vast array of possible mental technologies is grounded. The old slogan "reality is what you make it" can be taken quite literally with the second principle, and that is precisely what makes mental technologies possible. Of course, one can't make reality anything unless he/she has some degree of control over his/her experiences. We will be getting into the deliberate manipulation of our own neural networks through the shear power of thought, arranging the connections therein into whatever configurations we want, later in this paper. Certain implications follow, according to MM-Theory, from our ability to do this - namely, that we can control our experiences and mold them into a variety of different qualities. This is drawn out of the formal correlation between mind and matter given foremost by the Basic Theory, but also by the Advanced Theory. Thus, this correlation coupled with the second principle of experiences serves as the foundation upon which the whole gamut of mental technologies is possible. The first principle - that experiences are the essence of qualitivity - and the third principle - that all experiences are meaningful - also have some applications, but not nearly as impressive as the second principle. The first principle can, for example, be followed to induce alternate experiences, the likes of which no human being has ever experienced - but only by the second principle can these experiences be taken as real. The third principle can be followed to instill a sense of spirituality grounded on the fact that the universe is truly meaningful, its very existence rooted in a fundamental universal meaning. As needed as a deep sense of spiritual connection is for our society in these secular and materialistic times, this hardly passes as a technological innovation. Even the exploration of alternate experiences - an application stemming from the first principle - is hard pressed to demonstrate some practical utility (although we will argue a case for such utility later). But the creation of novel things, even whole worlds, by the direct manipulation of one's own mind is an astonishing feat indeed, and so the second principle of MM-Theory is a powerful springboard from which to build a whole slew of potent mental technologies.
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However, it is not as though we haven't already made great strides in the evolution of mental technology. Great things had been achieved in physical technology even before the industrial revolution, even before the age of science. The catapult is a prime example. So is the chariot. What kind of mental technology have we achieved in the twentieth century? We have learnt the power of positive thinking to improve one's mood and to push one further towards the attainment of goals. We have learnt coping skills for dealing with stress and trauma. We have learnt to use mnemonic devices to improve one's ability to remember and retain knowledge. All these things are fine achievements indeed, but once through this paper, I would like to leave the reader with the impression that these examples pale in comparison to what lies in waiting for our species should we pursue such lofty aspirations as those proposed here. Today's mental technology is comparable only to the likes of the bow and arrow or the draw bridge, which are indeed advances in comparison to more primitive times, but easily laughable in comparison to the modern desktop computer or commercial jet plane.
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The science that stands behind such mental technology is a difficult one to practice. It is certainly more difficult than the physical sciences. One might even go so far as to say that we have yet to establish a formal scientific method by which mental phenomena - that is, the subjective experiences of a first-person account - can be studied and the fruits of such studies applied in a practical manner. We will show in this paper, however, how such a science can be practiced in a clearly defined manner. Although it may never meet the rigorous standards of certainty that the physical sciences seem to enjoy, there is a need for it in today's world. What we know of psychology lags far behind our knowledge of physical phenomena. This creates a major imbalance. We end up using physical technology for problems that would be better solved using mental technology - technology that we must work towards inventing. War is a perfect example, especially when it's in the name of religion. Rather than use a technology built for modifying religious beliefs on a social level, such that the source of disagreement and conflict can be rooted out or reconciled, we are driven to create bigger, more destructive weapons. We strive to eliminate the problem by eliminating the material carriers of the problem - people. We take a similar approach to the problem of crime. Rather than resolve the problem on a psychological level, we fall back on a physical solution - to lock criminals behind bars. There is nobody to blame for this, of course - there isn't much we can do when the kind of mental technology that would be most effective in these cases is eons in the future. But this is precisely why we need to invest more into the development of mental technology. We need to catch up to the physical technologies, or at least reduce the imbalance, and I'm certain that once we do so, we will see the majority of the worlds problems withered down to simple tasks demanding solutions well within our reach.
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Democracy: A Sociopolitical Technology
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Before we begin - and while we're on the subject of science - I should perhaps leave the reader with a few examples of some absolutely marvelous artifacts of mental technology that our culture has achieved in the past. The first is the scientific method - the one foremost applied to physical phenomena. Now, at base, the scientific method is a procedure for acquiring reliable knowledge about the nature of our world in a systematic and controlled manner. That is to say, it's a tool for producing knowledge. At best, some might say, it is a philosophical - and more precisely, an epistemic - technology. But any way one chooses to describe it, the scientific method is grounded on an idea - a body of thought. In one section of this paper, we will delve deep into a perspective of human thought systems as computer programs, and we will consider the prospect of "self-programming". Well, as a human thought system, the philosophy upon which the scientific method earns its justification is very much a "program" running on the computer-like brains of scientists and like practitioners, at least in the specific sense we will outline later in this paper. It is a mental technology that we built and refined over the ages, a technology that has helped us in so many ways - in advancing our knowledge of the natural world, in bringing medicine to the sick, in raising our standards of living to more comfortable levels, and so on. Another outstanding work of mental technology that man has created, also a program running on our brains, is the application of reason in philosophy. Man has always had the capacity for reason, and has probably done philosophy long before the Greeks, but not before the likes of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle did man use reason as a tool - that is, a technology of the mind - for the discovery (or invention) of Truth. Although MM-Theory would use the lower case 't' in "truth", it is nevertheless a monumental feat to have discovered the power of reason to uncover it - that is, to understand the method by which reason can be applied to thought in order to churn out almost any conclusion one wishes given that a solid, consistent, and clear argument can be given in its support. The invention of reason-based philosophy was certainly a stroke of genius - a masterpiece as far as great inventions go. At base, the scientific method, reasoned philosophy, and many other great solutions to intellectual, social, and political problems boil down to ideas - systems of human thought - programs. But the human strife - and success - to solve these problems at such a broad level is nothing new - it may be rare, but it hardly needs the defense of the potential that any kind of "mental technology" could afford us. We invented these systems without even the slightest thought of anything remotely like "mental technology" in mind. So what I hope to convey in this paper is not so much that such mental technology is possible - it obviously is - but that if we were to deliberately and diligently organize and systematize the production of such technologies, the advent of great ones such as the scientific method or reasoned philosophy would not be nearly as rare. Rather than sit and pray for the next great technology to come along by chance, we could work towards its production in a deliberate and organized fashion.
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| Definition: Mental Technologies | | The deliberate application of psychological principles for the sake of controlling or altering one's experiences. |
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Let's begin by setting our sights high. In this section, we will delve into a fantastic world where the technology exists for anyone to create anything they want in their own reality, or even alter their reality to the extent that it becomes a whole new one, with nothing but the shear power of thought. Rather than explain how this technology works, we will outline the general principles and rules by which life in such a world would work. In other words, if the aim of this paper is to show where we as a society can begin our quest to build greater mental technologies, we are starting backwards, depicting the end goal where such mental technology is abundant and the average citizen takes it for granted as a normal part of daily life. Having skipped the centuries, and perhaps millennia, of slow development, we are spared the details of how such a storehouse of mental technologies is possible. Therefore, let's not burden our imaginations with questions of how it all works. Let's assume that a mental technology can be developed to the extents that our imaginations will allow, and ask what a world that runs on it might be like. We have already explored an idea like this in The Universe and "God" when we speculated on what life might be like for a species of immaterial beings. Let's recall what we said:
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Independent vs. Dependent Models of Reality
Subjective Realities
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Having been molded through an evolutionary process like us, the phases of this process were much like ours as well - though metaphysical as their environment was. We might say that they started out as a species simply trying to eek out a survival and evolved to the point where they recognized themselves as a community with an acute awareness of their world. They may have had institutions analogous to our sciences, religions, governments, schools, arts, law, industry, etc. Who knows how similar their institutions were to ours, but they did serve the same function - to form the groundwork upon which a whole civilization could exist and thrive. At this point, they took reality to be independent from perception - that is, as an independent model would have it. At a more advanced stage, however, their sciences and technology turned to their own experiences - their mental life - and groundbreaking strides were made in the capacity to control their own experiences from exclusively inside the mind. Paralleling this breakthrough was the rapidly growing awareness that their experiences defined reality rather than being merely a reflection of it - in other words, a dependent model of reality was gradually being adopted. Taking this to its ultimate ends, they built a mental technology focused on the alteration and creation of whole realities themselves (what MM-Theory refers to as subjective realities). The technology spread in both the directions of empowering one's self to take control of his/her own reality as well as the control over the realities of others. Like all other technologies, therefore, it was used for both the liberation and empowerment of the individual and his/her submission to control and enslavement. The struggle for freedom against the powers of authority persisted - many uprisings and revolutions saw their day, some successful, changing the course of history, others dismal failures, strengthening the foothold of oppressive and tyrannical despots. Ultimately, however, the dialect between the conflicting powers settled into equilibrium and harmony - at least to the extent that the societies of their world could function prosperously with minimal suffering and anguish on the part of the individual. They struck a balance between the extent and quality of freedom that was most healthy and that of the dominance of the highest powers for the sake of avoiding chaos and anarchy. They continue to struggle by moderate measures (on average), but it is maintained at a level that can be dealt with in a constructive manner for all. They harbor a deep understanding and appreciation for the fact that, although each individual is certainly free to make of his/her life whatever he/she chooses, and is therefore a force to be reckoned with, there is no escaping the role of intricate connection to a larger universe such that its hold on one is always steadfast and in fact necessary if any security and happiness is to be attained at all.
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Projection
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So what kinds of things can these immaterial beings do now that they've established a world rich in mental technology? What kind of powers do they enjoy? Well, for one thing, they can materialize any object they wish by creating the apparition of it. For example, if one of these beings wished she had an apple, she could bring one into existence by creating the visual experience of it (along with the other sensual experiences that project as the properties of the apple). This assumes, of course, that they experience vision and other sensations like we humans do (and that they know of apples), but even if they don't, they can create any entity they want by deliberately giving rise to the experience of it. If they have moods like we do, they have the power to turn them on or off like a light switch. If they have beliefs, they can adopt or suspend any belief system on a whim as they see fit. They can even create virtual companions when they get lonely (although there would be no one beyond the mind of the creator for the virtual companion to correspond to). In fact, they have the ability to create whole new experiences the likes of which they've never felt before. Pushed far enough, this technology can completely dissolve one's entire reality and replace it with a new one, freakishly alien and bizarre as it may be. If they were once material beings like us, this technology allowed them to transcend their material reality and enter a much broader immaterial world (their own constitution included). They can replace every single one of their material experiences with other experiences that bear no resemblance to matter or physicality whatsoever.
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But how do they partake in such a lifestyles without making fatal mistakes? To indulge in the creation of realities by way of manipulating one's own experiences can, I'm sure the reader will agree, be catastrophically dangerous. We've all heard stories about drug users who believed they could fly - only to fall to their death after leaping off a building. The drug may have created a temporary reality in which it actually was the case that the individual could fly, but as we know from Reality and Perception, some realities can override others. In this case, the reality of physics where gravity reigns over all things near the Earth's surface is way more powerful than any drug induced reality one might temporarily indulge in. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that they would have ever advanced to the stage of mental technological prowess that they enjoy in our hypothetical scenario unless they had gone through the trials and failures that one must pass through in the pursuit of advancement in any field. We must make mistakes in order to learn. This is the way it has always been - in our physical technology and otherwise. But we take precautions. We understand that the strides we wish to make in whatever field always require experimentation and risk, for these strides are strides into the unknown. We try not to rush into the unknown too hastily, for the more bogged down we are with uncertainty and unfamiliarity, the less control we have over our situations. So we take moderate risks in our pursuit of more advanced technologies - of whatever sort - and sometimes these risks turn into disaster - that is the nature of risks - but these disasters usually pale in comparison to the disasters that constantly befall us in the absence of such advanced technologies (disease and hunger, for example, in the case of physical technology). At least the disasters that we suffer in the pursuit of better technology are something we can learn from and prevent in the future. Therefore, if the hypothetical civilization of immaterial beings we are contemplating here have achieved such a high level of mental technology, it was not without learning how to wield it in a safe, responsible, and controlled manner - a manner that allows them to easily survive and enjoy the fruits of their labors.
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So how is this done? What are the general rules of conduct that we must heed in order to enjoy such mental technologies? For one thing, they would have to have learnt never to indulge in any pleasurable experience to excess. There is nothing wrong with enjoying life or living it to the fullest, but to gorge oneself in the ecstasy of pleasurable experiences without restraint can lead easily to addictions or intolerable withdrawal symptoms when such experiences can no longer be had. I would suppose that the sort of technology brought to bear on such a danger would be one by which the individual is able to boost his/her will power and conviction to practice the art of creating experiences in a safe and responsible manner. Such a technology might even be left to run autonomously, like automated machinery, so that the individual wouldn't have to maintain or think about it, at least not too often. Another useful technology they would probably be accustomed to would be one by which the individual can always recognize the signs according to which his/her mental status - whether or not due to the use of mental technologies - is in need of adjustment - sometimes urgently, other times not - and to seek the help of others without being afraid. This is saying something more than just that one ought not to be afraid to ask for help, but that a mental technology can be put in place such that any fears over asking for help would automatically be put aside, and that one's best judgment as to what course of action is best automatically brought to full consciousness.
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Another obvious rule that comes to mind is never to venture out into the vast universe of alternate realities without at least a few others who remain behind to watch out for your safety. Putting aside immaterial beings, we can imagine that if one (a human) wished to experiment with a new brand of mental technology, he/she could do so in a safe environment (the home or a controlled laboratory setting) where the risk of incurring physical harm is minimal, and that a small group of others (sometimes known as "sitters") serve to watch over him/her as he/she explores other mind states, taking absolute care to make sure he/she doesn't do anything to seriously harm him/herself or others. If the damage so happens to be of a more psychological sort - for example, inadvertently stumbling upon a severely traumatizing experience - one ought to have ready a team of therapists who can help one recover in a timely manner. It does make a world of difference to the recovery process, however, when one knows that the choice to risk experiencing something so grueling as to be traumatized by it was his/her own, which is why this practice must be done in a purely voluntary spirit. There are many for whom risks, even physical risks, are no deterrent at all, such as the dangerous job of police officers or firefighters. Firefighters are an especially good example because they are often volunteers, understanding the risks that go with such precarious work but also keeping sight of how valuable their work is to others. Firefighters, as well as police officers, will rarely take highly dangerous risks without some amount of backup, someone ready to rush in after them should they need help. They also have counselors to help them through those occasions when the stress of the job is just too much for them to handle in a psychologically healthy manner. These precautions can be put in place whether one is experimenting with physical, mental, or any other brand of technology.
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It would certainly be wise to make sure that there is always a way for one to return to the normal state of mind - to the "home reality" as we might call it. It would not bode well for mental technology if practitioners were constantly getting lost in the realities they explore, rendering themselves permanently unreachable by those charged with guiding their return and recovery. But even then, it depends on how willing one is to sacrifice him/herself for the sake of the practitioners he/she is a part of - for the sake of their ongoing efforts to learn more about what the human mind is capable of experiencing. I sometimes liken the explorer of mental states to an astronaut taking a space walk. He is venturing out into an environment that his makeup is not meant for, but protected from the dangers therein by his spacesuit. He is strapped to a cable that keeps him from drifting off into empty space and with which he can pull himself back to the safety of the spaceship. He has a team of other astronauts who remain behind in the ship, keeping a close eye on his status and vital signs, and ready to take whatever measures are necessary to rescue him should he fall into danger.
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Such extreme measures may seem excessive considering the level of mental technology we are at in today's world - with respect to its innocuous and banal nature, that is - but we are considering a different context, an extreme one. We are imagining what a society based on a foundation of mental, as well as physical, technology so advanced as to be indistinguishable from godlike powers might have to deal with. In such a case, the caliber of mental technology involved would be enough to warrant these kinds of precautions.
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Projection
Independent vs. Dependent Models of Reality
The Design Analogy
Higher Reality
Subjective Realities
The Universal Mind
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Once we are able to wield a mental technology of this caliber, I would say we have become "hoppers" - that is, we would have become a species with a tendency to deliberately "hop" from one reality to another - that is, to alter the makeup of one's experiences so radically that it be indescribable as anything other than an alternate reality. Given the central tenets of MM-Theory, this could be taken quite literally. And to indulge in such technology, one is far better off interpreting his/her experiences in the context of MM-Theory. He/she would have a conceptual framework from which to work and integrate the kinds of exotic experiences a hopper typically encounters. The mark of a good hopper is the ability to transcend whatever reality he/she finds him/herself in - sometimes with more ease than at other times. To do this, he/she must suspend any belief in the absolute ontology of his/her present reality. He/she must have the attitude that if something is unreal or untrue - that is, it has not projected itself except for in the imagination - it can still be willed into existence, its truth can still be manufactured. He/she must not regard him/herself as bound in any way to the reality he/she finds him/herself in. Such a view fits only under the class of worldviews we have called "dependent models of reality". A whole civilization consisting of, or led by, hoppers - some more skilled than others - would be a civilization that takes a dependent model for granted. The way everyday life would be experienced for such people would fortify such a view almost as strongly as empirical evidence fortifies a scientific view. In fact, they need to view reality this way, for that is the view that best captures the brute hands-on experiences that go with such a lifestyle. Indeed, the ability to compartmentalize one's repertoire of experiences into different realities (or reality designs) is the key strategy to maintaining sanity. Without this strategy, one inevitably mixes and merges his/her experiences into a jumbled mess and ends up falling into delirium. In quite a literal sense, hoppers are those who have transcended their home realities and now call a higher reality their home - namely, the infinitude of subjective realities comprising the Universal Mind.
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| Definition: Hoppers | | Hoppers are beings capable of, and who practice, applying mental technologies in order to migrate, or "hop", from one subjective reality to another mutually exclusive one. |
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Quantum Entanglement
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So a hopper is able to manipulate the contents of his/her reality, even to the point of creating a whole new one, but what about the reality of others? Can a hopper alter other people's subjective realities? Well, to be sure, we can alter the realities of others. Even a simple task as rearranging the furniture in one's living room alters reality, both for us and anyone who comes to visit. Cult leaders, it could be said, are geniuses at creating whole realities for others to live in - that is, in terms of religious beliefs and ideologies. But we only know how to do this by physical means - that is, we must engage the physical world in order to effectively alter the realities of others. Even the cult leader must use his/her voice in order to preach his/her doctrine, an act that entails the emission of sound waves through the air. What we want to ask is whether a mental technology of significant sophistication can be engineered so as to alter the contents of another's mind purely by the power of one's own thoughts. To do so would seem like a paranormal act - that is, an act of ESP. If such acts were indeed possible, the only phenomenon known to science that could account for it would be quantum entanglement. The reader might recall from our paper Quantum Mechanics that quantum entanglement is a phenomenon whereby one particle has an instant effect on another particle a certain distance away - that is, the effect occurs without having to travel the distance between them, which, if it were to travel the distance, could not be done instantly - perhaps very quickly, but not instantly. Therefore, it is conceivable that particles in one person's brain could have instant effects on particles in another person's brain. Another possibility is that there is more to the workings of the Universal Mind than our physical sciences would suggest (vis-à-vis the physical representations it unveils). Suppose, for instance, that the Universal Mind had the ability to monitor our thoughts such that it was able to sense our wishes and intentions. In that case, we could will the alteration of another's reality, and the Universal Mind, sensing our intentions, could choose to either grant our wish or deny it. If it grants it, it carries out our intention on our behalf, inundating the other person with extraordinary sensations or directly infusing his/her mind with thoughts or emotions through some channel other than the senses. What kind of mechanisms would have to be in place in order for the Universal Mind to have access to our thoughts? Well, we know that the flow of energy that passes from neuron to neuron is foremost an electro-chemical signal, but there are other channels of energy that escape our brains, such as heat or electromagnetic radiation. It is certainly possible that other forms of energy also escape our brains in forms that our sciences have yet to discover - or perhaps will never discover, at least not directly. These "hidden" channels of energy might be taken up and interpreted by the Universal Mind, and an accurate replication of our thoughts extracted. The same process could work in reverse, the Universal Mind implanting thoughts and emotions via this "hidden" channel of energy. Although this is all possible in principle, it sounds more like a science fiction movie like The Matrix. In fact, The Matrix is a good analogy for our present discussion, as we will see shortly.
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To fully immerse oneself in an alternate reality, one must take that reality to be the one and only reality. Does this work with hoppers? That is, wouldn't the notion of taking a reality to be the one and only reality work contrary to the practice of reality hopping? A hopper must never succumb to the belief that the current reality, or any reality, is the one and only - otherwise, how would he/she ever find the means to transcend it? Well, when a hopper jumps from one reality to another, he/she never really takes them to be full realities unto themselves. He/she takes them to be more like different regions in the Universal Mind, like different countries here on Earth. He/she does have one reality he/she calls "the one and only" - namely, the ultimate reality above which there are no others - and that is the Universal Mind itself. On the other hand, it is possible for a hopper to allow him/herself to be temporarily subjugated by a particular perception of reality and succumb to full belief in it as the one and only reality, but such a situation, unless it is accidental, would usually follow some set of preparations that are put in place to eventually bring the hopper out of it - some group of others overseeing his/her journey and awaiting the appropriate moment to bring him/her back, or some set of signals left behind by the hopper him/herself that would stimulate the appropriate mental process by which he/she would return (like an alarm clock bringing us out of our dreams).
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But how could any alternate reality be taken as real - even if only as a region of the Universal Mind - when all hoppers who explore them know that all their experiences correspond to the activity of certain MODs in their brains? That is to say, if one takes his/her experiences to be the result of neurons firing in the brain and chemicals therein binding to receptors, and nothing more, then he/she takes those experiences to be "just mental". Even if we consult the tenets of MM-Theory, they would say, not so much that such experiences are "just mental", but that if they are constructed exclusively from within one's mind, they have no corresponding set of experiences beyond the mind to represent. If we believe that our experiences correspond to MODs in our brains, then this is all we'll ever believe, for experiences are all we have. How, then, can one transcend the material reality, for reality consists not only of our more sensual experiences, but our beliefs as well. That is to say, we may be able to induce a whole gamut of sensory, emotional, and other experiences in our minds, but so long as we maintain the belief that they all correspond to MODs that exist in the original or "home" reality, we haven't really transcended that reality.
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Projection
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Well, to understand the link between our experiences and the corresponding MODs is not necessary per se for one to become an effective hopper. All a hopper does is implement certain mental technologies in order to alter his/her experiences of reality. He/she begins this process by engaging his/her current experiences from the subjective first-person point of view, and then applying the appropriate mental technology in order to change them, thus bringing him/herself into a different world.
He/she needs nothing by way of neurological understanding (although it would be highly doubtful that such understanding would be lacking). So long as he/she takes his/her new experiences to be real - that is, to believe in the authenticity of their projected forms - then it can be said that he/she has transcended the previous reality for this new one. It would also require that the old and new realities be mutually exclusive - that is, that at least a few of the contents (or truths) of one conflict with the other such that they could not be subsumed under the same reality (an atheist's versus a theist's reality, for example). Otherwise, he/she has not transcended his/her original reality, but simply altered its contents (which is something we do several times a day - even without mental technology).
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Independent vs. Dependent Models of Reality
Reality Qualifier
Reality Transitions
Higher and Lower Realities
Dispensing With Reality Designs - Precautions and Consequences
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What might a hopper in the midst of exploring an alternate reality say when questioned about the corresponding MODs in his/her brain and the role they play in this alternate reality? First all of, a hopper would never answer such a question in terms of an independent model of reality. He/she would answer it in terms of a dependent model. He/she would say that those MODs do exist - in the reality he/she left behind. In other words, he/she would always use a reality qualifier to answer such questions. These kinds of answers are always context-specific - or reality-specific. On the other hand, one could press for a more satisfying answer - like do you believe your MODs are real in the reality you currently find yourself in? To this question, the hopper could honestly answer "no". If the hopper has designed the current reality to be an immaterial one where MODs don't exist, then by definition it contains no MODs. What about when asked whether those MODs ever did exist? He/she would have to admit, after all, that he/she once believed in them, and if he/she really does take a dependent model to heart, then those beliefs constituted the real thing, and so the MODs were once real. But again, this depends on which reality one has in mind, for if the hopper were to interpret his/her shift in belief as a reality transition, then he/she could still deny the reality of MODs in his/her current reality - even in the past (each reality has its own timeline, after all). If, on the other hand, the reality in question were the entirety of the Universal Mind, then he/she would have to admit that those MODs did indeed exist, for anything that is experienced, or ever was experienced, exists therein. He/she wouldn't be bound to this reality qualifier, however, even if it is the highest one he/she could attain, for even it is only a design in his/her own head, one he/she should be able to dispense with, or at least modify, should he/she be so inclined (but see sidenote ). But in any case, he/she would have transcended the material world where those MODs exist because any way you cut it, they don't exist now.
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Now, if the present reality, whatever it so happens to be, acquires the "reality" label, then it is conceivable that one such hopper might choose to remain in that reality as though it were his/her new "home"? Is this possible? What would become of the old one? Well, certainly it is possible to remain in an alternate reality indefinitely. But one would think that an occasional return to the previous reality would be necessary, if only to eat or drink - otherwise, such neglect of one's basic material needs would go unmet and death might be the result. Well, there is no reason why one who has chosen to call an alternate reality "home", spending the rest of his/her life there, would not return occasionally for maintenance purposes, but there are other hypothetical scenarios in which one could remain in the alternate reality without returning once. Suppose the hopper in question chose to connect him/herself to a machine that maintained his/her vitality at the level just necessary for survival. So long as the machine was rigged well enough such that it could go on running for years without breaking down, the hopper could very well indulge in his/her alternate reality for however long he/she wished. He/she could stay even longer if he/she were lucky enough to have others maintaining the machinery he/she was connected to back in the original reality.
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Gravity
Higher Reality
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But these scenarios rest on the assumption that the alternate reality depends on the original one - that is, that there must be something in the original reality that allows the alternate one to be experienced. In other words, they assume that no reality can be more powerful - that is, exert more gravity - than the original one - no reality can be higher. Is this a fair assumption? It couldn't be fair under absolutely all conditions. It would be too presumptuous and naive to believe that one could never be brought to a higher reality. There have been numerous instances in history when a world we once took to be real was discovered to be illusory. The world being flat is a good example. Well, what does it mean for a reality to be "higher" than another. If we go back to our formal definition from Reality and Perception, we find that a "higher" reality is one "that is more convincingly real than another". So in order for one to transcend from a lower reality to a higher one, one must be overwhelmingly convinced that the higher reality is the reality and the lower one a fabrication of the mind. Of course, one must be so convinced over a lengthy period of time (dreams, for example, only last through the night, and therefore don't quite qualify as a higher reality than the waking one). It must also be permitted that one might occasionally fall back into lower realities for short moments (again, dreaming is a good example). But what matters for the present discussion is to determine by what powers would someone be so convinced that a particular reality was "more real" than another. Let's be more specific. Let's ask what could convince a hopper that a particular immaterial reality he/she ventures into is not, in fact, dependent on MODs in the material reality he/she calls the "home" reality - and could he/she be right?
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Entailment
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Let's not forget that for our hopper, whom we shall call "Erica", the highest reality is simply the Universal Mind - that is, the belief in it. But let's suppose that Erica assumed that the material world was a reliable representation of the greater realm of experiences beyond her mind (much like MM-Theory assumes). Therefore, any MODs she sees, along with their activity, represent experiences entailing the perception of those MODs and their activity. In other words, Erica believes that no human can have an experience without a representation of those experiences taking the form of MODs in the material reality. So far, this does not conflict with the belief in the Universal Mind. Now let's suppose that upon visiting an alternate reality, Erica was overcome by a revelatory experience that was so powerful, it convinced her that the MODs of the material reality she had just come from were extremely poor representations of what a human being might experience. Let's suppose that she woke up to the fact that the entire material reality she had been living in was a dream, or something like a dream, one that we are all immersed in and have been since the advent of our race. Suppose it was a natural state for us to be in, a state that was maintained by natural mechanisms operating on us from elsewhere in the Universal Mind - that is, it is part and parcel of how our minds evolved. There's no reason that such a revelation would conflict with the belief in the Universal Mind. In either case, it is the Universal Mind that supplies us with all our experiences and convinces us of the reality erected upon them. Therefore, such a shift in reality does not take one away from a reality defined by belief in the Universal Mind. Both realities are the same with respect to this belief, but they differ with respect to how the Universal Mind maintains the correspondence between human experiences and the activity of MODs.
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The Matrix
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You might think of this as similar to Neo discovering the Matrix. In the movie The Matrix, the main character, Neo, discovers that for his whole life, even since he was just a newborn, he had been physically plugged into a computer. A cable connected to his brain through the back of his head had been overriding the functions of all his senses - that is, instead of receiving sensory information from the real world, the computer kept his senses dormant and sent his brain signals through the cable instead. These signals were carefully designed to mimic the kind of information Neo would otherwise get through his senses - in other words, to mimic the real world. Thus, his brain, receiving these signals, was completely convinced that he was simply living in the real world. Now, the things Neo sees in this virtual world are indeed material representations of things beyond his mind - namely, digital information constituting the computer program (called "The Matrix") controlling what he senses - and they are indeed reliable representations insofar as their mapping to the Matrix in concerned. But they are terrible representations of the rest of the world surrounding the Matrix - that is, the real world in which robots have taken over and left it as a post-apocalyptic wasteland in which humans can barely survive. Even if Neo knew that the ordinary world he was being presented with was an illusion, the only things he could gather from the material representations he is surrounded by is what the Matrix must be feeding him, what the Matrix intends, or is programmed, to convince him of. We can say with certainty that for Neo to experience the real world, as he does once he is disconnected from the Matrix, does not depend in the least on the representations presented to him while plugged into the Matrix. We can say, however, that those representations depend on the real world to be experienced - more specifically, they depend on the proper functioning of the Matrix and one being plugged into it.
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Subjective Realities
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Of course, the world Neo wakes up to is still a material world, just like the world conjured up by the Matrix. But the world Erica wakes up to is entirely immaterial. So what is it in this immaterial world that convinces her that the material world was all an illusion - or at least, that her experiences of the immaterial world are not dependent on MODs back in the material world? Well, no matter what the world one's eyes are open to, that world is always presented to him/her from something exterior. In the case of Erica, she still believes in the Universal Mind whether she considers her "home" reality the old material one or the newly discovered immaterial one. She believes that it is ultimately the Universal Mind that determines what she will experience and what the constitution of her reality finally is. It was that way when she believed in the material world and it is that way now. This is different from Neo. When Neo escapes from the Matrix, the world he is then exposed to is the real world - no cables feeding information into his brain. He doesn't take the real world of robots and people plugged into machines as another mirage, a veil of perception folded over his eyes - as though he had simply switched from one Matrix to another - but the actual authentic real world, nakedly exposed and bare. Nevertheless, there is always something that feeds information into his brain. If it is not the Matrix, then it is nature herself.
In order to see, light must be fed into our eyes and transduced into electric signals that stream towards the brain. In order to feel touch, material objects must mechanically interact with our skin and stimulate receptors that thereafter send signals to our brain. Similar dynamics are at play with our other senses. It could be said, therefore, that, in a manner of speak, nature is a sort of "Matrix" as well, determining what we see, touch, and sense in anyway. We are "plugged" into her - perhaps not so obtrusively as a cold metallic cable gouged into the back of our heads, but certainly by energy and mechanical operations stimulating our senses. The light streaming into our eyes, for example, is, crudely speaking, like an immaterial "cable" piercing our eyes, and convincing our brains that the information it carries faithfully depicts the real world. Now, if we bring the Universal Mind into this picture, we can say that the light entering our eyes, and all other physical processes by which our senses are stimulated, are themselves representations, at least the cognitive sort, of an outer world that we haven't the faintest idea how to model conceptually except by these very cognitive representations. It is this outer world that determines what the inner world - that is, one's subjective reality - consists of.
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Direct Experiences
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If this outer world is like the Matrix - whether a contrived artifact or purely natural - then we have no way of knowing whether the representations it presents us with are completely faithful and exhaustive or there is so much more that is not represented. We have no reason to doubt that the representations indeed mimic what is going on in the outer world just immediately beyond our perceptions - they must correspond to direct experiences after all - but exactly how far beyond our perceptions can these representations reach? Is it possible that, not much beyond our perceptions, there is an astronomically complex and sophisticated system of experiences that constitute a godlike being (other than the Universal Mind itself) who is overseeing what we see, feel, and experience in any other way. Perhaps, like the Matrix, it carries out unimaginably complex computations, sifting through mountains of data, in order to maintain the consistency and believability of our material world. Perhaps the MODs our neurosurgeons have discovered are really an invention it created in order to give those very neurosurgeons something to discover. If it really were the Matrix we were plugged into, it would have to improvise when neurosurgeons peer into the brain, for it certainly wouldn't want that bulky cable piercing the brain stem to be discovered.
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Entailment
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So what is it that Erica finally discovers? Well, rather than "discover" anything, let's say she is presented with something. She enters into a state of mind in which, for whatever reason, the "outer world" (that portion of the Universal Mind that, like the Matrix, computes our world) presents her with the particular revelation that overtakes her so. Suppose it sees fit to do this because only in the particular altered state of Erica's mind are there the sorts of experiences capable of entailing, with the help the agencies beyond her mind, this revelation. It explains in every minute detail how it is that the material world was always a dream, one in which everyone is engulfed and from which she has awoken. It tells her that it deliberately creates the apparition of MODs for neurosurgeons, and anyone who gets the chance to peer under the skull, to look at. It tells her that it could have created whatever apparition it wanted, and still can, like a hamster in a wheel or a gremlin pulling strings, but chose to create MODs instead. It isn't forced to create MODs, and in fact under rare circumstance, such as that which Erica now finds herself in, it will present the beholder with other apparitions. It even tells her there have been times when, although it looked as though a particular individual was experiencing this or that based on the observed activity of his/her MODs, the individual was experiencing nothing of the sort. In that case, Erica now sees that what she experiences does not depend on the activity of the MODs in her brain, but on what this Matrix-like super-intelligence decides. It will, for the most part, maintain a quasi-consistent correspondence between these experiences and the observed activity of MODs, but Erica now knows there is something more out there, something greater, determining all our experiences more tenaciously than MODs ever could. This point can be made more generally as follows: because the mechanisms that ultimately determine our experiences are forever beyond our grasp - that is, forever unknown - there is always the possibility that what we do perceive is not an accurate representation of those mechanisms at all, and therefore there is always the possibility of discovering better and more complete representations such that they bring us into a higher reality. If there is indeed such a higher reality, the present reality would depend on it, and not visa-versa.
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But how does Erica know her experiences are real? Well, of course she knows they're real - that's what experiences are - but how does she know they can be relied on? For example, suppose that her doctor discovered that she had a tumor. Would it be wise of her to evade death by escaping to the immaterial reality in which MODs don't exist, and therefore neither does the tumor? In the parlance of MM-Theory, we wouldn't ask whether Erica is right or wrong in believing this will resolve her problem - she is right by default - but we would ask whether the reality she believes in - the immaterial one in which MODs don't exist - is stronger than the one in which it is imperative that she heed the doctor's warning. Well, the most brute test one could conduct to find out is to allow her to escape into her immaterial reality and simply wait for the tumor to take its toll. That's usually how a reality proves itself. In a metaphorical manner of speaking, realities are in a competitive game of survival. Only the strongest survive. Of course, if we ever wanted to put two contending realities to the test, it would be more prudent to do so when the ultimate outcome was not a matter of life or death. In the case of Erica and her doctor, however, which reality wins can only be determined at the critical moment - when the tumor either takes her life or she overcomes it. Ultimately, of course, it is the Universal Mind that determines which reality wins out, but as for the question of whether Erica's belief in her revelations - the one about MODs not always being presented to us consistently - is reflective of what the Universal Mind is actually doing, we won't know until she puts it to the test. But whether Erica is wise or foolish to believe in her immaterial reality, the choice to do so is hers, and thus it is always possible, however unwise, to transcend the material reality in such a way that the immaterial reality one ventures into does not depend on MODs or any other material thing in the reality left behind.
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This is why a reality requires a long period of time before it can be said to be higher than others. Time is a good test. It provides ample opportunities for the reality in question to be challenged and pitted against by competing realities. The scientific way of understanding the world today is a good example. It has stood up against numerous superstitions and naive assumptions, such as the world being flat, and has maintained its foothold over them for centuries. This was not out of a dogmatic refusal to concede those superstitions and naive assumptions, but by rigorous scientific experimentation - the ring, so to speak, in which two contending belief systems fought it out. Yet the scientific worldview is only a few centuries old, but because of its profound and lasting effects on our perceptions and understandings of the world - understandings that, in virtue of the hands-on empirical manner in which they were gathered, are not so easy to dismiss - it seems unlikely that we will be abandoning them in favor of the older superstitious beliefs any time soon. Nonetheless, we held onto these superstitious beliefs for several millennia before the modern age. This should remind us that no matter how close we feel we have come to a full and true understanding of the nature of reality, there is always the possibility that a new age of even greater and clearer understanding will eventually overtake us and raise us up to much higher realities. Hoppers would be sure to discover them more readily than we would.
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These are just some of the possibilities that await us in the distant future, assuming our civilization invests in mental technologies and we are capable of taking them this far. This is what life would be like for us. Not necessarily everyone would be a hopper, however. Hoppers would probably be more akin to a profession like the typical scientist or technician of today. Today's scientists are leading civilization into newer and deeper understandings of the physical world, but the average citizen doesn't readily conduct formal scientific experiments - he/she simply enjoys the fruits of such labors as they are handed down to him/her by those professional scientists who do conduct such experiments. It may be the same with the average citizen of a society led by hoppers. I'll be the first to admit, however, that a world such as this sounds more like science fiction than a real possibility. We have not really expounded the means by which such mental technologies would actually work. This was not our intention, however, for in this section we merely set out to paint a picture of what life in such a society would be like, as well as the principles and rules governing the manner in which hoppers would go about exploring alternate realities. The point was to make clear a general picture of what mental technologies could help us achieve in the most outlandish of cases. But what could they help us achieve in the near future - that is, what do we know now about the nature of mind, with the help of MM-Theory, that could start us out on such a journey? Answering this question will be our focus for the rest of this paper.
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Before we get into how mental technologies can be built, let's address the question of whether they could be useful. The pursuit of greater mental technologies is only as worthwhile as it is practically feasible. Indeed, in virtue of the fact that the experiences we as human beings are bestowed prove to be so reliable and consistent, one might assume that any alteration in the way we experience reality would only secure a devastating downfall. Why fix it if it's not broken? Certainly, when it comes to specific types of people who live happy and wholesome lives, there doesn't seem to be much of a need to gain greater empowerment over one's experiences. We in the western world are accustomed to that sort of lifestyle. But we must remember that we comprise only a small portion of the world's population - no greater than 50%. The great majority of people on this Earth, however, are living in much more squalid conditions compared to us, and making a living is so much more difficult. Life is not comfortable for most people on this planet. But even for those living in our cozy corner of the globe, life can be unmanageable. We have our fair share of problems. There are those who are homeless and addicted to drugs, there are those who suffer severe psychological disorders, there are families torn apart by sons killed in war or daughters raped by crazed sex fiends, and so on. So there are plenty of people on this Earth, and plenty of horrid conditions, that urgently require some form of salvation, some form of relief. Our physical technology, although setting the bar high for other forms of technology, still hasn't found a way to bring relief to these people and end their suffering, at least not as effectively as they need. These are psychological problems - some resonating to a more sociopolitical level, some remaining personal - and so they require a psychological solution. Thus, the need certainly exists for better and more abundant mental technologies - and coming at a faster rate - but needs are only half the criteria we require. In order to prove the utility of mental technologies, we also require the possibility of their attainment. That is to say, unless such mental technologies are possible in the first place, the need for them, however desperate it may be, is too ineffectual, and we are better off looking for solutions elsewhere. Therefore, in this section, our aim will be to argue for the utility of mental technologies along two lines: 1) what it can do to solve the typical sociopolitical, as well as personal, problems of today's world, and 2) how it can solve these problems.
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The most general argument that comes to mind in support of the utility of mental technologies is as follows. Experiences are what we use to survive. We depend on pain being painful in order to heed the signals of immanent danger. We depend on pleasure being pleasurable in order to find what's good for us. We depend on colors to distinguish different objects from each other and their background. We depend on sound in order to detect activity in our environment and to receive and interpret oral communication. We depend on cognition in order to analyze complex situations and make predictions of how such situations will turn out. We depend on emotions to intuit when social situations are good or bad, or when danger lurks about. Obviously, not all experiences are useful for survival, but the ones that have been genetically passed down to us clearly serve such a purpose.
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Eine Kleine Nachtmusik
Starry Night
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Imagine an animal whose intellectual sophistication is significantly "less evolved" than our own - say a cow. It is highly unlikely that a cow contemplates such deep mysteries as the origins of the cosmos or the purpose of life, nor is it likely that she would appreciate the genius of Mozart's Eine Kleine Nachtmusik (A Little Night Music) or Van Gogh's Starry Night. These things require abstraction and sophistication of thought. If the cow does experience cognition at all, it would have to be something trivially simple like "I'm hungry" or "There's danger nearby". There's no reason to doubt that cows experience sensation, and maybe even emotions such as fear of predators or love for their offspring, but it is fair to say that they are severely lacking in the department of advanced cogitation. Now suppose that one of these cows, after a restful night, awoke to find that she could think extremely deep and abstract thoughts - that is, by a cow's standards. Insight after insight flood her mind as she sifts through the inflow of ideas and follows one chain of thought after another. What an experience that would be - even for simple thoughts like basic arithmetic or the possibility of an afterlife. One might even say that the experience was profoundly spiritual, that she had been raised to a higher level of consciousness. The likes of such an experience would be nothing she had ever been through before. She might want to spread her newfound understandings of the world to her peers, but even if she could talk, what would she say? How could she express something not even she could fathom the day before, let alone her peers as it stands now? So she has this incredibly deep experience that could be described as nothing other than an alternate, maybe even higher, state of mind - and therefore an alternate, or higher, reality (a human one?). At the very least, we would have to say that abstract and complex cognitions of this sort are a whole new experience to her, ones that her simple cow brain is not equipped to deal with (let's not worry about how such a brain generated those experiences in the first place - if necessary, we can say it mutated over night). She had an alternate experience. Was it useful?
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Well, abstract thoughts are certainly useful to us - as humans, we depend on them to survive. Some might say they are our distinguishing feature among other animals, the key to our success as a species. So we can say, in a general sense, that cognitions are a useful experience. Whether they are useful to a cow is a question that can be answered based on what the cow does in response to them. If our cow in the above scenario was to use her new sophistication of thought to figure out what her destiny on the ranch was - namely, to be slaughtered, disemboweled, chopped into pieces, and sold at a local meat market - she might start planning, quite furiously, her escape. If she succeeds, then cognition served her well in the pursuit of survival. Of course, escape, and other forms of survival such as tool making, require more than just clever thinking, but free hands with opposable thumbs too. These are not necessary however - they just help a great deal - and with enough insight and creative thinking, she could probably accomplish any task a human could.
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So cognitions are useful - but we know this already. However, the point of the above thought experiment was not just to show the utility of cognition, but to show how alternate, maybe even higher, experiences can prove useful even if we think we have everything we need to survive, mentally or physically. There is always the possibility that a new experience, one we as humans have never had, can, in addition to what we already depend on, help us to survive. In fact, there may come a point in our future, either distant or near, where what we currently depend on to survive may not be enough, and that if there is any hope for our ongoing existence, it will be by altering the way we perceive the world and experience life - that is to say, in neurological terms, by rewiring the brain. Our world is changing at a faster rate than it ever has before. We humans are changing our environment too quickly for the biological mechanisms of our evolution to keep up with. We may not be able to adapt to such changes on the level of genetics, but we can certainly change the way we interact with the world - that is, the way we behave - for it is our behavior that has the most direct impact on the world and the changes we put her through. Such a change in behavior will require more than a little self-discipline, however - it will require a total overhaul of the way we perceive the world and our attitudes towards it. If we could learn to be more flexible with such perceptions and attitudes, wielding them with a greater degree of control, we could more readily craft the kinds of experiences we need in order to survive in any environment no matter how it changes. This idea, that we can guide our evolution, will be explored later in this paper. We will also touch on a fact about the human brain that makes us unique - namely, it's amazing plasticity. Out of all animals on this planet, at least as far as we know, we humans have the best chances of adapting to environmental changes, and this is due to the plasticity of our brains, its ability to be "re-programmed" - that is, rewired. The point for now, however, is that finding new experiences can be useful, if for no other reason than for our survival, and may be necessary under extreme circumstances.
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Another argument that comes to mind is to point out the many mental technologies that we have invented already. Although they may not be much when compared with the technologies of hoppers, they are an advancement from years passed. One example is the use of mnemonic devices to help us remember things better. A typical mnemonic device is to associate the name of someone you've just met with a visual scenario. I remember once that a person remembered my name (Gibran) by imagining me shopping at a grocery store perusing the cereal isle and picking out the G-Bran flakes. So she visualized the letter "G" coupled with flakes of bran on a cereal box, and with an image of me holding it, she could associate my face with my name. There are certain principles of mind at work here, principles without which this particular technology wouldn't be possible. For one thing, there is the principle of thought associations. When one thought is associate with another, such as my name being associated with a mental image, that thought more readily comes to mind when the other is already in mind. There is also the principle of visual images being more memorable than intangible facts like the proper spelling of a name. There is even the principle of unique and eccentric scenarios being more memorable than dull, boring, and insipid ones (although I'm not sure how eccentric my buying G-bran cereal is - but if I were to wear a pink bunny suite, that's an image that would stand out in her mind for sure  ). These are principles about the nature of thought and memory that psychologists have unraveled, just like the principles of physical phenomena that physicists unravel, and just like those physicists, psychologists give us technologies based on these principles, this particular one being called "mnemonic devices".
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Another mental technology that has become common knowledge in today's world is the power of positive thinking. Positive thinking works more effectively with some people than others, but to the extent that it does, it is an excellent example of a mental technology. Positive thinking can be used to lighten one's mood. We will see later in this paper that how effective this is depends on the circumstances surround one's mood and the believability of the particular positive thoughts employed. Positive thinking can also help one achieve success in a whole range of endeavors. This makes sense. One is bound to be more successful at whatever goal he/she aims to attain if he/she has a more positive outlook on his/her chances of success. One is bound to be more successful when one looks out for opportunities and means to success as opposed to one who concludes from the start that such a goal is beyond reach. Positive thinking helps one endure through rough times, the thought that one can make it through serving as an amazing boost of motivation. Among other things, positive thinking can improve one's self-esteem, guide one to lead a healthier lifestyle, and give a positive impression to others such that socializing and amicability become more fluid.
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fMRI Machines
The Neurology of Meditation
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Yet a third example exists: meditation. It has been shown that meditation can help one lead a more relaxed life and clear one's thoughts of emotional biases and stress. In fact, it has even been shown by brain imaging technologies that meditation has noticeable neurological effects.
In one study, for example, Buddhist monks who had years of meditation experience were asked to meditate while an fMRI machine scanned their brains. A control group of meditation novices underwent the same treatment. The results showed greater changes in the brains of the Buddhist monks than in those of the novices. The Buddhist monks showed heightened activity in their left prefrontal cortex and reduced activity in their right prefrontal cortex. The novices, on the other hand, showed very little change in brain activity. It is not fully conclusive what this shift in cerebral hemisphere activity entails about the subjective experience, but it is clear that meditation does have effects on one's mind. One, therefore, can control what he/she experiences by skillful meditation.
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Now, it should be noted that the best approach is probably one in which both mental and physical technologies are used together. For example, psychiatrists will often prescribe drugs (a physical technology) to patients suffering from depression, but at the same time conduct psychotherapy (a mental technology) in order to alleviate the patient's emotional pain. The goal is to provide the patient with immediate relief, but at the same time train him/her to manage his/her depression so that in the long run, he/she will not need the medication. Another example, again a mnemonic device, is writing things down in order to remember them. Unlike associating a name with a visual image, this sort of mnemonic device depends on something physical - the pad of paper with one's notes written on it. Combating alcoholism can be difficult if one's will is not strong enough to resist temptation, but ridding the house of all alcoholic beverages, which is a physical act involving physical objects (or the lack thereof), can make the struggle much easier. Numerous other examples can be sited - both for purely mental technologies and combinations with physical ones - but I'm sure the reader gets the general idea.
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Experience (first contribution)
Experience (second contribution)
Essence of Realness
Real Things
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There is a third use towards which the principles of MM-Theory can be put. Strictly speaking, the last two arguments - that alternate experiences can help us survive and that we have already made small strides towards better mental technologies - didn't really hinge on the core principles of MM-Theory. I suppose the notion that alternate experiences can help us survive touches on the first contribution to our customized definition of experience - namely, that experiences can take any qualitative form whatsoever - and this may predict the possibility of alternate (that is, non-human) experiences, but it hardly requires MM-Theory as a whole in order to fathom, or even prove, the possibility of such experiences or their usefulness. MM-Theory is required to explain why such experiences are possible, but not simply that they are, nor that they can be useful. But the third use we will shortly expound hinges on an essential principle that is deeply engrained into our theory - namely, that one can suspend his/her usual reality in order to temporarily adopt another. This principle is drawn straight out of the second contribution to our customized definition of experience - that all experiences contain the essence of realness - and it follows from this point that because the reality each one of us perceives and takes for granted consists of a system of experiences, it is a genuine reality. What this means is that this principle can actually be applied in a practical sense - namely, by recognizing that the suspension of one's beliefs, or any experiences, for alternate ones will actually bring one into a new reality, one in which all the newly adopted beliefs are actually true and the newly acquired experiences are actually real things. How exactly is this useful? It can be incredibly useful in psychotherapy.
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Unconditional Positive Regard
Carl Rogers
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The way psychotherapy works in western culture is by very scientific and objective standards. That is to say, the therapist usually takes an objective view of reality, and if the patient's perceptions of the world differ from this objective view, they are judged to be erroneous and in need of correction. The therapist doesn't wish to make the process of correction an offensive or grueling one, and so she uses unconditional positive regard (a term coined by Carl Rogers, meaning to preserve an atmosphere of respect and care for the patient regardless of the character of his/her personality or problems). Nonetheless, the process has always been to bring the patient from the psychological state constituting his/her disorder or problem to a more healthy state, and this process is carried out on the presupposition that the initial state constitutes an objectively inaccurate view of reality in need of correction. This approach stems from the Freudian method. Freud's method was to insist that the patient is inventing or holding onto his/her particular views and beliefs in order to avoid facing truths or feelings that are too excruciating, and therefore repressed into the unconscious. The Freudian method was to bring those repressed truths or feelings to consciousness so that the patient, in finally experiencing them, could make a more informed and rational decision on how to deal with his/her problem. But the process is very invasive and disconcerting. The patient is not only forced to endure emotionally exhausting sessions, but typically fights against the therapist, denying with all his/her will the formal diagnosis. It leads one to wonder whether Freud would have bothered to use anesthetics if he were to become a surgeon rather than a psychiatrist. But the notion that one can actually enter into a whole new reality, even by a simple shift in perspective or belief, puts a new twist on psychotherapy such that maintaining unconditional positive regard becomes so much easier, and under ideal circumstances automatic. In fact, under such ideal circumstances, no "correction" would be needed at all - at least, not the sort that requires disagreement with the patient's views, which might come across as offensive or disturbing.
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How would this work? Ideally, the therapist would have enough flexibility of thought, presumably by training, to be able to listen to the patient describe his/her world and temporarily build a replication of that world in his/her own mind. With more advances in mental technologies, this should become all the more doable, but even with the limitations of today, a trained therapist should at least be able to replicate certain belief systems and appreciate different perspectives, even to the point of establishing a strong empathic rapport with the patient. The therapist would have to adopt a temporary attitude that he/she knows nothing about the way the world really is, and the patient is an expert on the subject. This attitude is one according to which the therapist is learning what the world is like. When the therapist asks questions - such as "How do you feel about such-and-such?" or "How did you interpret what so-and-so said?" - he/she is not so much analyzing the patient as a professional who knows more about the workings of the patient's mind than the patient him/herself, but as a pupil asking questions of a teacher. In fact, rather than ask, "How do you feel about such-and-such?" the therapist ought to ask, "Is such-and-such a good thing or a bad thing?" Rather than ask, "How did you interpret what so-and-so said?" the therapist ought to ask, "What did so-and-so mean?" That is to say, the therapist ought to go about all his/her questions as though the answers the patient gives are more than just perceptions and beliefs, but truths and realities. When the therapist asks his/her questions, he/she asks in the spirit of gaining knowledge about the new reality he/she is entering, knowledge that he/she must trust is forthcoming, and if anything is left out or seems inconsistent, any further questioning must be in the same spirit - that is, as though the patient can answer them and make sense out of the therapist's confusion. When the therapist enters this world, he/she is the guest, the novice, the one who has something to learn. The patient is the host, the expert, the one who has something to teach. The therapist must humble him/herself, but maintain and act upon an eagerness to learn and explore.
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Once the therapist has replicated the patient's world in his/her own mind, he/she then resumes the role of therapist, but now from the subjective perspective that, until now, only the patient had access to (unlike the Freudian therapist who remains fixed in the objective perspective). The difference this makes is that the therapist now performs the therapy as if he/she were the patient him/herself, but with the skills and knowledge of a therapist who can deal with psychological problems and the typical stresses of life. In other words, the therapist takes on the patient's burdens and aims to resolve the problems with a storehouse of skills and knowledge the patient may not have. Approaching these problems from the patient's own subjective perspective - that is, as though the therapist were inside the patient's mind - makes for a much more informed understanding of and appreciation for the patient's particular predicaments. It also makes for much more effective and, because the therapist is virtually the patient him/herself, more automatic unconditional positive regard. And if the therapist carries a figurative tool belt of mental technologies, not only can he/she empathize with the patient more sincerely and apply effective coping skills to the patient's problems, but he/she might even be able to change the patient's reality - at least the replicated version in the therapist's mind - and thus forge a path from that reality to a more healthy and happy one.
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Now, the way we have been describing this kind of therapy has been rather idealistic, and when put into practice, would probably not work quite as smoothly. For one thing, we are assuming the therapist can replicate all the patient's experiences without a trace of error. We are also assuming the patient can describe his/her experiences fully and accurately so that the therapist won't inadvertently misunderstand the patient (and such misunderstandings, if they slip by, may go unnoticed throughout the entire series of sessions). Something else we are assuming is that the therapist can act as pupil at all times. But in practice, there are bound to be times when the therapist must step out of the role of pupil and simply be a professional. It would be more like a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, the therapist would need to listen to the patient as though he/she knew more about the world than the therapist, but on the other hand, always listen to a quiet voice he/she keeps at the back of his/her mind, a voice reminding him/her that he/she is a professional and is responsible for guiding the patient away from further psychological distress.
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This balance can be struck by knowing when to ask questions as a pupil and when to offer suggestions on how to change the patient's reality. These must come across as suggestions only. They must be put forward as a pupil would to a teacher - that is, as though the teacher has the final say on whether the suggestion will work or not. The therapist offers the suggestion based on what he/she has gathered of the patient's reality thus far, and on his/her expertise in changing experiences and realities. For example, suppose that the patient was a schizophrenic who suffered delusions of paranoia. Suppose he thought that evil spirits were hounding him. The therapist has two points of view from which to assess this. She can assess it as a professional therapist, in which case she would diagnose the patient as a paranoid schizophrenic, or she can assess it as though she were the patient, in which case evil spirits really are hounding him. If she were to go with the former assessment, she might encourage the patient to face the fact that he is a schizophrenic and that evil spirits don't exist (and then she might prescribe drugs). If she were to go with the latter assessment, however, she might suggest the following. Perhaps, she could say, those evil spirits aren't evil after all. Perhaps they're merely trying to challenge the patient to grow along certain spiritual lines. They may be tough, but it might only be because they see the potential in the patient for tremendous spiritual growth even under such grueling pressure. She might even lend herself some credence by saying that she read this somewhere, or heard about it from some spiritualist friends (and some spiritualists really do say this). She might go on to say that the first challenge the patient ought to face is to confront these spirits and tell them that he's not afraid. With any luck, the power of suggestion might come into play, and the patient's spirits might respond according to what the therapist proposed. But even if the power of suggestion doesn't work - that is, the spirits strike the patient as frightening as ever - the therapist can still help the patient sustain the belief that he is being challenged spiritually, and thereby gear him towards reacting to the spirits in a positive way (and drugs might still be prescribe, but it all depends on how well the therapist's suggestions work).
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In the latter case, the therapist has altered the patient's reality from one in which there are evil spirits hounding him to one in which those spirits aren't evil but simply very tough "trainers". Of course, in the former case in which the therapist would hit the patient with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, she would still, assuming the patient can accept this, have brought the patient from a reality of evil spirits to one of schizophrenic delusions. But apart from the fact that such a move might be excruciatingly devastating to the patient's ego, he most likely wouldn't believe such an assessment. To him, these evil spirits are simply real, and anyone who brushes him off as "crazy" just doesn't understand him. However, a more holistic approach, and a more realistic one, would be to offer both assessments - that the spirits might be real but that the patient might also be schizophrenic. The therapist can do this by expressing a certain level of confidence in both assessments but also a certain level of doubt. In other words, the therapist can say that she is not sure what to make of the patient's situation. She can say that, for the most part, she believes the patient, but just not to dismiss other possibilities prematurely, they ought to consider the possibility of a schizophrenic diagnosis. Insofar as the spirits are real, she can offer the suggestions outlined above, but insofar as the patient is schizophrenic, she can prescribe drugs. As the therapy progresses, both therapist and patient would invest more focus into which ever of these approaches seems to be more effective. With any luck, the patient may end up making some close friends out of the spirits, friends who, regardless of their realness, would bring happiness, not fear, to the patient, and neither drugs nor a degrading diagnosis as "crazy" would be required.
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Subjective Realities
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Of course, there are certain ethical considerations to address. If the therapist secretly believes the patient is schizophrenic, it would seem that she has no choice but to lie if she is to go with the therapeutic approach suggested here. But if she feels she must lie, then perhaps she is not cut out for this therapeutic approach to begin with. The fact of the matter is, the principles upon which this therapy is based shouldn't require the therapist to lie. Those principles state that we each live in our own subjective realities and whatever one perceives in his/her subjective reality is genuinely real. Therefore, the therapist has every right to believe the patient's spirits are real. Furthermore, because the therapist understands her own reality to be nothing more than the conglomeration of her own experiences, she need not take it to be authoritative over the patient's. It's just one reality being contrasted with another. Therefore, such a therapeutic approach obviously requires a perspective much like that offered by MM-Theory, and if the therapist can believe in such a perspective, there is no need to lie at all.
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Dependent Models of Reality
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Then again, the therapist does have the responsibility to give "good" advice. She is an expert after all, and if she ignores the expert advice that comes to mind after making her professional assessment - that is, in favor of believing the patient - she could be held accountable for steering the patient in the wrong direction. Well, we already addressed this point by offering the "balanced" approach whereby the therapist would openly consider both possibilities - that the patient is right and that his perceptions might be the result of some psychological condition - but something more needs to be added. That something is to inform the patient from the beginning about the approach the therapist intends to take. Therapists do this all the time. A psychoanalyst would tell the patient that she takes a psychoanalytic approach. A cognitive-behaviorist would tell the patient that she takes a cognitive-behaviorist approach. A therapist undertaking the approach we are proposing here might tell the patient that she will, for the most part, believe what the patient has to say and come up with suggestions - that is, ideas, perspectives, thoughts the patient may not have considered - that she feels would help draw the patient closer to a happier and healthier state of mind. She might even feel comfortable expounding the theoretical framework within which they will be working - that is, a framework qualifying as a dependent model of reality, maybe even MM-Theory itself. The patient may disagree with this approach or this framework, but this is no different that patients disagreeing with any therapeutic approach. A patient may tell a psychoanalyst that he thinks psychoanalysis is all bunk, in which case both the patient and the therapist are better off assigning the patient to someone else.
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But even if the patient disagrees with the therapist's methods - that is, when the method is the one under consideration here - this method might still work. All the therapist would be doing, after all, is offering suggestions that should work according to how the patient perceives his own reality. The patient may still choose to accept or reject these suggestions, but he has the advantage of understanding how they would work. That is to say, the therapist offers these suggestions based on what it is like to be the patient, and if the therapist sees an opportunity for change somewhere in the patient's reality, it shouldn't be that hard to point it out to the patient as well. In other words, such suggestions should come across as "believable" or "doable" to the patient, for they stem directly out of what the patient already perceives and believes. This is unlike other therapies in which the advice given by the therapist might be taken only because the therapist is the expert - that is, she knows better than the patient - and therefore the patient accepts the advice on faith - that is, hoping that the therapist is right even though he may not understand how such advice would work.
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Obviously, this requires a fair degree of open-mindedness on the part of the patient. It happens all too often that those who are caught up with some issue, or struggling with how to deal with some dilemma, will brush off good advice with one excuse or another. We often get the response "yeah, but..." - that is, there's always a "but", always something the person reacts with in order to remain in a state of perceived helplessness and misery. Again, however, this is something that might crop up in any therapy, and it is up to the patient to take or leave the advice offered by the therapist. But given the context that we are espousing her - namely, that we are working from within the patient's world, a world in which he is the expert and the therapist only the pupil - it might give him greater incentive to come up with excuses and "buts". To deal with this, it might be wise for the therapist to touch on this at the beginning of the therapy, that is at the point when she informs the patient about the approach she will take. She might tell the patient that although not all her suggestions will necessarily work, and the patient is surely the expert on his own world, these suggestions are also psychological tools that can be used in a therapeutic way, and that he ought to be careful with the excuses and "buts" he comes up with in reaction to her suggestions because, as much as they may be true, they also work to destroy those psychological tools, thus potentially worsening his condition. In other words, the patient ought to understand that they are working together to build a better reality for him, and it is therefore to his advantage to be open-minded about the therapist's suggestions, thinking carefully about whether they might be useful towards this end before dismissing them. The therapist should also point out that he need not worry about being deluded into believing in a fabricated reality because the best suggestions - that is, the ones that prove most useful - will be those that make sense according to his reality as it stands at the time, and are therefore things he would believe anyway should he have thought them up on his own.
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These are just a few of the uses towards which our current mental technologies, however primitive they may be, can be put. Now let's look at the physiological means by which these mental technologies, and more advanced ones we will probably see in the future, are made possible. Let's focus exclusively on the brain. As the reader knows at this point, the brain is a vast network of interconnecting neurons. They pass information around by electric signals that travel down their length and by chemical signals excreted between the microscopic cleavage, called the "synaptic gap", between their connections. For the purposes of this section, what the reader ought to keep in mind is that this is a physical process that, under special circumstances, can be controlled directly - that is, by the shear power of thought alone. There are other circumstances, however, over which we, as it stands with our current level of mental technology, have no control. We have no control, for example, over what we visually experience when we look at particular objects or in particular directions - that is, apart from closing our eyes or physically reaching out with our hands to rearrange the physical setup of the visual scenery. We can't help seeing what we see because the process of vision - that is, from the point at which light enters our eyes to the point when the information extracted from the light is interpreted by the occipital lobe - is quite automatic and outside the scope of anything our will, if we indeed have one, can be applied to. There are other neural processes, however, over which we have a great deal of control. We have a great deal of control, about as much control as we have over our limbs and other bodily extremities, over our thoughts.
It is difficult for neurologists to pin down exactly where in the brain "thinking" occurs - it seems fairly sporadic, depending on the precise type of thinking in question - but for our purpose it doesn't so much matter. We can assume, with good reason, that thinking, at least abstract thinking, occurs in the frontal lobe. We can assume this on the basis that the frontal lobe has been shown to correspond to planning, problem solving, and other tasks requiring a high degree of sophisticated and abstract conscious cogitation. We will hold onto this assumption for the purposes of this section, but wherever thinking occurs in the brain, the question of location is of only secondary importance. What is of primary importance is that we seem to have a high degree of control over it. What this means is that insofar as the neural activity that goes on therein is concerned - that is, the electric and chemical signals, the strengthening and weakening of synaptic connections, and how these connections are configured overall - we can say that it is we who control it. This need not be interpreted as though free-will were involved - at least, not in the sense that our will has the power to override the laws of nature - but if not, it should be interpreted as though the quintessential "we" who controls this neural activity simply is, or at least corresponds to, this neural activity. In that sense, it is no wonder we are in control of our own thoughts, and the implications of this for other neural activity elsewhere in the brain will be explored in this section.
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Perhaps the most extraordinary feat a mental technology could help us achieve is the spontaneous production of raw vivid sensory experiences - that is, hallucinations. Recall the example we gave above about the immaterial being who could spontaneously will an apple into existence by creating the sensation of it in her mind. How is such an act possible neurologically? We know that hallucinations happen - even in the absence of drugs. Certain types of schizophrenia feature occasional hallucinations. Reports from psychoanalysts tell us that subjects can experience hallucinations as symbolic representations of psychic content repressed in the unconscious. So we know hallucinations are indeed possible. What we don't know is whether they can be willed on cue. We are going to assume that all mental technologies begin with thought (although there is reason to believe otherwise), and therefore begin physically in the frontal lobe (or wherever in the brain thought corresponds to, but recall we are assuming it to be the frontal lobe). Therefore, our question is: can hallucinations, or any experience, be willed by thinking?
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Well, the way neural networks form in the developing brain is by reaching out with their growing dendrite arms and making contact with other neurons. It is said that a single neuron can form up to 10 thousand connections with other neurons, and with up to 100 billion neurons, that makes for a maximum of 1015 connections. Of course, not all brains contain 100 billion neurons and not all neurons have 10 thousand connections, but needless to say there are a lot.
I admit that I'm not certain about whether or not these neural connections always span the entire brain - that is to say, supposing we took a neuron from the occipital lobe at the back of the brain, there is no guarantee that at least one of its connections will be to a neuron at the very fore of the brain. But the potential is there. That is, it is possible that for an arbitrary neuron selected from an arbitrary location, it will have at least a few connections to neurons in any other arbitrary location in the brain. And if the selected neuron so happens to be from the frontal lobe where cognition takes place, it is conceivable that its firing could affect other neurons as far away as the occipital lobe (where vision occurs) or the auditory cortex (where hearing occurs) or any other sensory region.
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Threshold Potential
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But we don't typically experience this. Why not? Well, it could be that the span of a neuron's connections to other neurons really isn't as widespread as we're assuming - that is, their interconnections may only reach as far as neurons local to the region of the brain where they reside. But another possibility is that the type of connection formed between them is inhibitory - that is, the firing of a neuron in the cognitive regions may only have an inhibiting effect on the neurons in the sensory regions (this doesn't necessarily mean we can block out sensation simply by thinking - even inhibitory effects can be overridden if the neuron being inhibited is excited by other more powerful sources of stimuli). Another possibility is that the flow of the electric signal works in only one direction - that is, from the sensory regions to the cognitive ones. Yet there is another possibility - that in order for the sensory neurons to fire, they need to breach their threshold potential. A threshold potential is the amount of depolarization required to cause the neuron to fire. Depolarization, in turn, is the amount of signal received from neighboring neurons that causes the recipient neuron's membrane voltage to increase. It could be that the number of connections from a cognitive neuron to a sensory one is too few, and therefore the sensory neuron's threshold potential cannot be breached.
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But whatever the neural roadblocks to willfully inducing one's own hallucinations, the question is whether or not they can be undone. The human brain is a very plastic organ - meaning that the neural connections therein can be modified - some more easily than others. To be sure, connections reaching from the more anterior regions of the brain to the sensory regions (at least the visual system) have been found. It could be that under rare circumstances, these posterior directed connections do indeed stimulate the sensory regions. Some such circumstances might include those mentioned above - namely, schizophrenia and unconscious content - or it may include hallucinogenic drugs. Indeed, some drug-induced hallucinations that have been reported are rather sophisticated - that is, depicting recognizable and familiar objects such an animals, people, man-made objects - the likes of which could not be induced simply by chemicals binding to neural receptors in the sensory regions. That is to say, if these complex objects are so recognizable and familiar, there is reason to believe they originate from the more cognitive recesses of the brain rather than the raw sensory regions where we might expect nothing more than simple lines and shapes. Overall, what this tells us is that there probably are connections leading from the more cognitive regions to the sensory regions, and if they can stimulate the sensory regions in these rare cases, there is probably a way to make these sensory regions more sensitive to them. If the brain is indeed plastic and its neural connections modifiable, then perhaps it's only a matter of increasing the number of receptors at those connections such that the recipient neuron's threshold potential can more readily be breached.
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The Butterfly Effect
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There is certainly a multitude of scenarios to consider, some more plausible than others, but regardless of what the possibilities are, there is a general principle that we ought to keep in mind, a principle according to which almost anything is possible in the brain. That principle is that physical causes will have physical effects, and those effects can be of a variety of sorts and reach all the vast corners of the brain. To put this more specifically, the activities of the cognitive regions in the frontal lobe are certainly physical phenomena. They consist of electric signals and the release of chemicals that neurons are sensitive to. If physical activity of this sort can happen in the frontal lobe, there is in principle the potential for those effects to propagate to other areas of the brain by means other than the standard flow of electric and chemical signals. It may seem implausible that such propagation would occur if not by the standard means, but perhaps there are others means - that is, more subtle means, or perhaps through mechanisms that arise under rare circumstances. This idea is best captured by the "butterfly effect", which we explained in The Universe and "God". But to recap, the butterfly effect is the phenomena by which something as subtle as the fluttering of a butterfly's wings can have earth-shattering effects like tsunamis halfway across the globe. Well, if the neural activity in the cognitive regions is as subtle as the fluttering of a butterfly's wings, then surely it could have far reaching effects of all kinds. Who's to say how predictable these effects are? Who's to say what kind of effects these could be? Perhaps it is simply a matter of thinking the right pattern of thoughts. Perhaps it is a matter of timing our thoughts with our emotional states. Perhaps it is a matter of forming a specific belief system such that it corresponds to a specific neural configuration in the frontal lobe, a configuration that so happens to be of the right sort to more readily induce activity elsewhere in the brain.
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Subjectivist Theories
Projection
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But for argument's sake, let's suppose that the only thing we can do is reconfigure the neural networks of the cognitive centers - that is, that there is no way of stimulating the sensory, or any other, regions directly. There are still certain things we can do. At the very least, we can redesign our belief systems. We will devote an entire section to this topic later in this paper. In that section, we will expound the principles upon which this can be done. For one thing, one would have to be able to rise above one's own beliefs - that is, to recognize their mental standing (in the context of a subjectivist theory like MM-Theory) and thus their amenability to change. Understanding reality as subject to change, even at the level of truth (that is, as what belief systems project themselves as), goes a long way toward acquiring the skills to do this. In fact, if one holds a belief like MM-Theory, that belief should map onto a neural configuration somewhere in his/her cognitive centers. It seems then, that if such a belief helps one to feel free to alter other beliefs, then the neural circuitry that this belief corresponds to functions such that those neural configurations that the other beliefs correspond to, those beliefs that we want to change, become much more plastic - that is, much more "programmable". In the aforementioned section, we will talk more about the "programmability" of the cognitive centers, comparing thoughts and belief systems to software running on a computer. But we don't have to delve too deeply into this notion to appreciate the fact that our ability to acquire new beliefs and perspectives on things is probably one of the simplest mental technologies at our disposal. We do it all the time - albeit, somewhat unconsciously and passively - but if we were so inclined, we could do it more deliberately and actively. It is a matter of no longer waiting passively for something, or someone, to change our minds on certain issues, and instead actively looking for or inventing reasons to change our minds.
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Now, if we can configure the neural connections in the cognitive centers, then it seems reasonable that we should have some degree of control over those MODs directly connected to the cognitive centers. One arrangement that is already like this is the connection between those areas in the frontal lobe involved in planning actions, the premotor cortex, and the motor cortex. When we plan to execute simple actions, like raising one's arm, the planning is carried out by the aforementioned centers in the frontal lobe, the preparation to enact that plan is carried out by the premotor cortex,
and the actual execution of the act is carried out by the motor cortex. Such an arrangement is naturally setup so that the control we have over our thoughts - in this case, our planning - can be used to control, just as easily and effectively, our behavior. Might similar arrangements be formed between those same planning centers and other directly connected regions of the brain? One arrangement that comes to mind, although not as salient as that of planning and behavior, is that between our thought centers and our emotional centers. It is possible, under certain conditions, to think our way into different moods. Positive thinking can make us happier; negative thinking can make us miserable. We will explore this particular arrangement in more detail later in this paper. For now, let us conclude that our thought centers certainly seem to have some influence over other adjacent centers in the brain. In order to build a mental technology on this fact, we ought to study other potential arrangements such as these - that is, arrangements whereby the cognitive centers can directly influence other areas of the brain in virtue of the direct connections it holds over them.
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And if we are able to control these adjacent MODs, then perhaps it is even possible to use them as tools to control other MODs - that is, MODs that are not directly connected to the cognitive centers, but directly connected to those MODs that are directly connected to the cognitive centers. In effect, to have such an arrangement would be like controlling a robotic arm by sitting at the helm and manipulating levers, buttons, and other controls. These controls would represent the cognitive centers - easy to use and fully subject to our will - and the robotic arm, those MODs directly connected to the cognitive centers.
If we have sufficient control over the robotic arm, then we might even use it to control other machinery - maybe even other robotic arms. These other machinery, then, would represent the MODs that aren't directly connected to the cognitive centers, but are directly connected to those MODs represented by the robotic arm. In principle, this arrangement could be extended ad infinitum, one robotic arm after another, each one controlling the next. In principle, then, it is possible that the cognitive centers can serve as the first in a long chain of MODs, each controlling the next, with no restrictions on where this chain might end - the primary sensory regions perhaps. Is this arrangement feasible in a practical sense? It wouldn't seem so as things stand right now - that is, at our current level of mental technology - but we have seen the astonishing feats man is capable of when it comes to advancing physical technologies. The very robotic arm under consideration is a fine example. From the point of human hands manipulating controls to the actual extending and contracting of the arm and the claw, there are a series of miniature machines - mostly computers with programs running on them, one program after another instigating and controlling each other - that coordinate their activity in perfect synchrony such that the whole system works as though it were a third human arm. I believe the same potential to extend our powers this far is there in mental technologies as well.
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So if we are to begin with our thoughts, then perhaps this analogy is very fitting. Our thoughts are very much like mental "arms". Whereas with physical technologies, we must use our physical arms to create and use them, with mental technologies, we must use our mental arms. We can even preserve the materialist terminology. Our mental arms are not only our thoughts but the billions of neurons in the cognitive centers of the brain. These long thin strands of cellular membrane reach out and, with finger-like dendrites, grab onto other neurons in order to manipulate and control them.
It will be very conducive to our discussion to think of these outreaching neurons like arms. In that way, we are reminded that although such a technology is hard to fathom in virtue of its mental infrastructure, there is always a corresponding physical counterpart, one that works very much like our physical arms, and because we have just as much control over them, they can be used in the same way - to build and wield mental "tools". Even these mental tools have their physical counterparts - namely, other MODs in the brain - and in virtue of the similarities between MODs and computer circuits - similarities we will touch on more thoroughly later in this paper - we might as well think of these tools as computers. And so our mental arms are tapping at a mental "keyboard" whereby the rest of the mind is "programmed" - and like computer programs, its versatility is so wide ranging that almost any program, any technology, can be engineered.
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Functionalism
Subjectivist Theories
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For the remainder of this paper, we will explore mental technologies that are well within our reach as things stand in today's world. In other words, we will put aside our grandiose visions of a civilization based on mental technologies so advanced as to render the production of hallucinations and the migration from one reality to another a part of daily life. We will plant our feet more firmly on the ground and focus on ways to start the long journey towards such a fantastic age. Whether or not such an age is ultimately attainable, we can at least begin the move towards it and see how close we can get. As discussed in the last section, the simplest mental technology, one that is clearly at our disposal, is the manipulation of our own thoughts and beliefs. To guide us in our explorations of what can be done with this most simple of tools, we will take up a functionalist perspective, at least as a good analogy. Functionalism is the view that a thing's identity can be determined by the function it performs, and in the case of the brain and mind, their functions seem to be, respectively, to serve as the body's computer and the software running upon it. The most radical form of functionalism says that the mind and brain simply are a computer and software, but we are not radical functionalists. We are subjectivists, and in particular, subscribers to MM-Theory. We take the mind to be fundamentally a system of experiences and the brain to be a material representation of the latter. Nonetheless, functionalism still serves a purpose for us - namely, as an extraordinarily good analogy for what the brain and mind are. Therefore, we will begin this section by drawing out the similarities between the mind, particularly cognition, and computer software as typically found in standard programming languages.
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So how are thoughts and beliefs like computer programs? First of all, what is a computer program? A computer program is a set of instructions given to and executed by a computer, a set of instructions meant to be followed in a particular sequential order. For example, a simple program might be written for doing basic arithmetic. The instructions might be:
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1) Wait for input from user.
2) If input is syntactically incorrect, then display error message and go to step 1.
3) Otherwise, go to input parsing subroutine, and return with results.
4) If second token is '+', then add first token to third.
5) If second token is '-', then subtract third token from first.
6) If second token is '×', then multiply first token by third.
7) If second token is '÷', then divide first token by third.
8) Display results.
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There are a few terms in the above that might be somewhat cryptic to some readers - namely, the "input parsing subroutine" and the first, second, and third "tokens". But these are fairly simple. In computer programs, a subroutine is simply a section of the program that the computer will skip to when instructed to. It starts at the beginning of that section and follows it through to the end. The end is marked by an instruction that tells it to return (usually, the instruction is literally "return") to the point in the program it had left when skipping to this subroutine. Subroutines are useful when the task performed by the subroutine in question is necessary at various points in the program; rather than write out the subroutine for each and every point at which it is needed, it can be written once and a one line instruction telling the computer to go to it (such as step 3 above) written whenever the need arises. We haven't explicitly written out the "input parsing" subroutine above, but what is implied is that the input given by the user (say "12 ÷ 4") needs to be "parsed" and the results returned. Parsing is typically needed in programs in order to convert user input into a format that the computer can read - in this case "tokens". That is, the computer would not be able to do arithmetic on "12 ÷ 4" as entered in by the user - it would need to do arithmetic on "tokens" derived from the parsing of "12 ÷ 4", and so a subroutine is needed for this. A token is, in this case, a unit of information that the computer can deal with. The tokens of "12 ÷ 4" are '12', '÷', and '4' (the first, second, and third tokens respectively). These are what's returned by the subroutine and subsequently used by the appropriate arithmetic operation.
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But this isn't a course in programming languages - rather, I give this example as something sophisticated enough, yet not too sophisticated, in order to have something to compare our thought processes to. In what way are our thoughts like programs? Well, let's toy with a rather innocuous example. We're a culture of cleanliness and hygiene. We typically won't eat anything that falls on the floor. So if, say, one was chopping carrots and a piece fell on the floor, we're more likely to rinse it under a tap (if not throw it out) before throwing it into the salad. We can think of this as a program running on our brains:
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if (carrot.state = on_floor) then
{
rinse(carrot)
}
set carrot.state = in_salad
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This again may seem cryptic - most programming languages are - but a seasoned programmer would interpret this as follows. If the state of the carrot is "on the floor", then rinse it and change its state to "in the salad"; otherwise, simply change its state to "in the salad" without rinsing it. We do this quite automatically, much like a computer, and in fact most people are just as likely to do it even after having just scrubbed the floor spotless and sparkling clean. That is to say, the program is run regardless of the circumstances surrounding the particular carrot dropping incident. If it is a program running on our brains, this is no surprise. A computer simply executes the instructions it is given. It doesn't pause to think about the exceptions that might characterize this or that particular instance. It doesn't hold any judgments about the appropriateness of executing the program in a particular situation. If the instructions tell it to rinse carrots when they fall on the floor, it will do nothing other than this.
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Of course, that's not to say we have no choice in the matter, or that such propensities can't be preempted by considerations of the floor's cleanliness. One could bring to mind the fact that the floor had just been thoroughly cleaned, and the carrot therefore would not be contaminated by making contact with it. But this is usually the exception rather than the rule. By and large, regardless of how clean the floor is, people will simply rinse the carrot, or throw it out, without giving it a second thought. Even if it's not the exception - that is, thoughts about the floor's cleanliness do come to mind and influence the decision - it can still be likened to a program, a more complicated one in this case. It would be like the following:
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if (carrot.state = on_floor AND floor.state = dirty) then
{
rinse(carrot)
}
set carrot.state = in_salad
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The difference here is in the first "if" instruction where "AND floor.state = dirty" is inserted. This tells the computer (or brain) to only rinse the carrot if the state of the floor is "dirty"; otherwise, there is no point in rinsing it and it can be thrown directly into the salad. The program can get as complicated as we can make our over-analysis when deciding what to do with the fallen carrot. The point is that, unless we make a concerted effort to defy our programming, or analyze the situation to the point where we come up with reasons to go against it, we typically allow the program to run its course.
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Another example of a typical program running on our brains, typical in western society that is, is the response we usually give when an acquaintance greets us. They say "Good morning! How are you?" and we say "Fine, thank you. And you?" We say this almost instinctually, as if our brains were hard wired for it. It isn't hard wired, of course; rather, we are running a program like:
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if (acquaintence.greeting = "How are you?") then
{
say "Fine. And you?"
}
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But not all cultures are like the west. In the middle east, for example, venting to another about one's burdens is a highly valued and useful way to ease the hardship typical of life in that part of the world. If you were to greet someone from the middle east in the same way - that is, with "Good morning! How are you?" - you're likely to get inundated with a dramatic lament: "Oh, let me tell you how I am this morning. My children are sick and I can't afford the doctor's bills. My wife keeps nagging me to fix the leak in the roof. I keep getting in trouble at work for not keeping up with all the tasks they keep loading on me. My boss won't give me a raise because he's not impressed with my expediency. On top of that, my car broke down this morning, I'm overdue on my bills, and I've got a stabbing headache." In other words, the program running on a typical middle eastern man's brain is:
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if (acquaintence.greeting = "How are you?") then
{
run subroutine("lament")
}
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Not all programs are instructions on how to behave or what to say. Some are rules for deducing answers to questions, or what logically follows from a given set of conditions. For example, we know that if we see a man in a dark blue uniform and he has a gun on one side and a radio on the other, then he is a police officer. Forensic scientists know that if a suspect's DNA is found on a murder weapon, then he must have been handling the weapon at some point. All these things can be put in terms of computer programs running on our brains. We see a lot of "if"s and "then"s in these programs, and this gives us a general format for the structure of our thoughts when they take the form of programs (although they don't, by any means, always fit this format), and that is "if conditions C1, C2, C3... hold, then consequences Q1, Q2, Q3... follow" where Q1, Q2, Q3... can be either one's conduct or a set of newly computed truths or facts.
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Now, these examples are fairly innocuous in that they probably wouldn't stir a lot of controversy. There are, however, a whole slew of examples we could give that are more emotionally charged. Morality is a good example. We typically follow certain moral guidelines in our general conduct. For example, we might experience heightened levels of frustration or rage in the midst of a heated dispute over sensitive issues. But most of us have a program running on our brains along the lines of "Violence is wrong. Verbal dispute is not as bad. Therefore, always choose verbal dispute over violence when possible." This is highly oversimplified, of course - not all of us may share this sentiment, nor do we follow this rule all the time - but to believe in such a moral maxim is tantamount to running it as a program on one's brain. Religion is another sensitive issue. I'm not sure if there are many Catholics now-a-days who still believe in the Pope's infallibility, but it used to be the case that whatever the Pope decreed, it was sanctioned as indisputably correct and virtuous. This was due to a program running on the brains of most midieval Catholics that said "If the Pope says such-and-such, then such-and-such is true". The Pope could then control believers just like a computer, sending them off to war, extracting donations from them, silencing any questioning of his authority, and so on. As far as they were concerned, if the Pope says so, it's written in stone. You can imagine how much emotions come into play with these controversial programs. The behavior of those who follow these programs, when emotions flare, won't be determined exclusively by these program. However, when programs are as controversial as these, the emotions in play are usual brought in to serve those programs, defending them with passion and fervor, rather than against them. But there are cases in which emotions are stirred because the individual has mixed opinions, or is loathed to admit the flawlessness (buglessness?) of a program he/she would rather deny. In any case, emotions confound things, making behavior less than predictable even when we do have a clear picture of the program running on one's brain.
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What's even more controversial, perhaps more than morality or religion, is the very proposal we are putting forward - namely, that our thoughts and beliefs run us like programs. We take pride in our freedom to think what we want and to behave as we please, and the notion that we are just robot-like drones, heeding to our beliefs and preconceptions like a computer to a program, can be unflattering. However, I would like to point out that the parallels being drawn here - that is, between computer programs and our thoughts and beliefs - don't depend on a loss of free-will or independence from determining factors. Rather, what makes our thoughts and beliefs so much like instructions in a program is their idealistic nature - that is, their tendency to paint pictures of reality as though everything can be placed into neat and well-defined pigeonholes, or black and white categories. Such thinking persuades one to approach the world as though there were no exceptions to the rules he/she believes determine reality. One is persuaded to believe that things can be known and understood exactly, absolutely, universally, unconditionally, and not as though one's knowledge and understanding of the world were mere approximations or only useful guidelines. Let's examine this notion in a little more detail.
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Indeed, computers run programs as though the instructions were absolutely unconditional. They never pause to think about whether or not the instruction ought to be executed. They never say, "I'll only execute the following instruction under certain conditions, or if it seems appropriate." This can be seen more clearly with "if/then" instructions. These instructions take the form "If X is the case, then do Y". The way computers work is as though such instructions were written, "Whenever X is the case, always do Y" - in other words, it is as though the "if/then" instruction is to be followed universally - that is, unconditionally - as though there are absolutely no exceptions. And indeed this is more or less true of the way computers work, the only exceptions being when some hardware malfunction occurs. Remember that the analogue of "if/then" instructions in the human mind is not always a mandate on how to behave, but often a rule determining truth or fact. The rules for determining whether or not one is a police officer, as mentioned above, are a case in point. We have a habit of treating these rules as though they are universally valid, so that, for example, it must always be the case that an individual in blue uniform equipped with a gun and radio on his sides is a police officer. This is, of course, an exaggeration, for we can easily imagine numerous scenarios where one might not be a police officer even though these conditions hold (performing in a play, for example), but we nevertheless seem to aim to exhaust all the conditions we're inclined to entertain. That is to say, even when we acknowledge that a certain set of criteria don't hold universally, it is still the nature of thought to reach for what can be said to hold universally. If it is not always the case that a man dressed in blue carrying a gun and radio is a police officer, then under what conditions is it the case? How should we answer this? We might say, it is the case when he is not performing in a play, when he is not merely posing, when it is not a Halloween outfit, and so on and so forth. It is the tendency of thought to want to enumerate all conditions such that, in the end, we have a (very complicated) statement that passes for universal truth.
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The ideality of thought is a function of the need for parsimony - that is to say, the brain tries to economize information, and in order to do so, it seeks to trim truths and facts down to as few conditions as necessary. So, for example, if we are taught that all men are mortal, we will store this information in our brains as such - there is no need to question whether some men might be immortal while others not if we see no reason for it. That's not to say we ignore special cases if they occur to us, but we need to see such cases as plausible, or just possible, and even then those special cases count as ideals in themselves, ideals that can be further questioned for their conditions. We draw the line on such questioning when it seems feasible - that is, when it seems our model of the world is detailed enough, with as many conditions as necessary, such that any remaining difference is negligible. Those of us who are bright will realize this, but many others won't. For the latter, such idealistic models serve as full incontestable truths. For the former, however, such models are tentative - that is, until we can discern more particular conditions - but even so, our awareness of their tentative status is a belief like any other, one that could pass as an ideal like any other.
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Let's substantiate this notion with an example. We in the western world take pride in our free markets. Capitalism, we believe, is the most fertile environment for all kinds of goods and services to proliferate. As the theory goes, given enough time in such a market, there will be a cure for anyone's woes. Need new batteries? You can buy them at your local convenient store. Need your plumbing fixed? There will be ten or more plumbers in the phone book to call? Feeling ill? There will be doctors galore ready to treat you. We even have services as exotic and particular as palm readers just in case you're into that sort of thing and feel you could benefit from it. Now, the theory doesn't only predict this diversity and abundance of goods and services; it also predicts that those who provide such goods and services will be experts - experts in the sense that whatever problem they're brought in to solve, they will solve it - not that they can, they will. We think of the capitalist system like a machine, like a computer - we push the right buttons (call the right people) and the machine performs the right function (the people solve the problem). We don't assume that a machine chooses, or that it is designed, to malfunction, and neither do we assume this about the capitalist system or the experts it consists of. It seems to follow from this that there is no problem that can't be fixed by calling the appropriate expert.
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Now, it so happens that in this world of freedom and opportunities, my niche is in the IT industry. My primary line of work is in graphic design, but on occasion I'm called in to help coworkers with computer or network problems. But because these technical problems are not my primary area of expertise, they sometimes stump me. When that happens, I call another expert, one who knows more than me about the particular problem I'm called in to solve. Before this happens, however, I'm not 100 percent confident that I can solve the problem - it is not my primary area of expertise, after all - but I know that I can always call the expert whose expertise is far beyond mine. When this happens, my confidence that the problem will be solved suddenly soars. I no longer feel that the problem might be solved, depending on if I can figure it out, but that it will be solved - the real expert is coming in. This confidence is a direct consequence of the ideality of my beliefs. I tend to believe in the effectiveness of the capitalist system. I therefore believe that if there is a problem to be solved, there is an expert for exactly that problem. I believe that the computer expert, unlike me who has to figure out how to solve the problem, already knows the solution.
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Algorithm
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This belief is just like a program: "If person is expert, person will solve problem. Therefore, if problem exists, call expert". Now, something we haven't mentioned about computer programs is that, if they are written to serve a specific function and they work, they can be referred to as "algorithms". An algorithm is a set of instructions for solving a particular problem, and the emphasis is on the guaranteed efficacy - that is, an algorithm is a procedure that's supposed to work all the time. A good example is long division as a procedure for finding out exactly what one number divided by another is. Algorithms are often contrasted with heuristics, which are methods for making "good guesses", such as when employers look for desirable traits in candidates for a new job opening. Concerning the computer expert I call, I tend to think of this procedure as an algorithm - that is, I tend to think that bringing him in will solve the problem. I take it as an algorithm because I assume that he too has certain procedures in mind, certain algorithms, that will work to solve the problem.
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Now, although this procedure works most of the time, there are other times when even the expert can't solve the problem. It is at those moments when I'm reminded of the ideality of my beliefs - that is, I'm reminded that the procedure of calling in the expert works most of the time, but under certain rare conditions, not even he can solve the problem. This has actually happened to me in my line of work - the expert I call in tries as hard as he might but regrettably informs me that he has no clue how to solve the problem. The fact of the matter is, experts aren't experts because they know all there is to know about their particular field, not because they know every solution to every problem, but simply because they know proportionately more than the non-expert, have significantly more experience, and are better educated in their occupation. But there is always more to learn. The experts are perpetually becoming more expert as they enhance their skills and knowledge. But there will never be a point at which they've reached the maximum level of expertise, a level at which there are no longer any outstanding conditions under which certain problems are beyond their ability to solve.
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To generalize this point, most of us make our way through the world assuming that the system simply works - that is, that all functions such as law, business, education, government, etc. do exactly what we intend for them to do. We assume this because we assume that the experts in those positions are fully trained and fully knowledgeable about their field, that there is not a detail about their field, not a single problem along with its solutions, that isn't covered in their training. But this is only an ideal, a model towards which we aim to approximate the system. The reason we often forget this is because, as a cognitive model, the ideal is really the program running on our brains, not the system as it actually is. We often use these programs as the visors through which we see the world, and so we tend to think of them as algorithms - that is, guaranteed solutions to problems. They are crafted to work perfectly on a supposedly perfect - that is, idealistic - world.
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It should be clear, then, why the comparison to computer programs has little to do with our autonomy as free agents. We may follow our mental programs as though we were zombie-like drones, but this has more to do with our ignorance of the details and special conditions that sometimes hold over the circumstances our programs are designed to deal with, details and conditions that make for exceptional cases in which our programs actually don't work so well. For example, we may believe in the criteria given above for what makes a man a police officer. If we're in trouble, and we see a man in blue uniform carrying a gun and a radio on his sides, we'd probably assume, quite automatically, that the man is a police officer, and run to him for help. If, however, he turns out to be an actor on his way to perform as a police officer, we'd attribute our misjudgment to a lack of foreknowledge rather than the lack of freedom to assume otherwise. We're still perfectly free to reflect on alternate possibilities - like whether he's really an actor or perhaps dressed in his Halloween costume - and to act on those possibilities - say, by asking him. The reason we don't isn't because we're governed by a program that prevents us from considering such possibilities, but simply because of habit - one that comes naturally, as it is to our advantage, like we said above, to economize our beliefs and assumptions. We rely on the ideality of our thoughts and beliefs because without it, we'd have nothing to guide us through the world. The world is too full of details and conditions to be able to digest a clear and simple cognitive model of it, one that is perfectly accurate that is. Thus, our best chances for survival are to rely on our thoughts and beliefs regardless of their ideal status, consequently following them like programs, and simply be mindful of as many details and conditions as seems necessary.
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In fact, not only is this notion - that our thoughts and beliefs operate like programs - compatible with our freedom to think and defy our programming, but such compatibility is necessary for any prospect of converting the program-like nature of our thoughts into a mental technology that we can use on ourselves. The point we want to make, of course, is that we can change our thoughts and beliefs. Thus, if our thought processes are like programs running on our brains, then in order to build a mental technology out of this, we ought to learn the art of self-programming. To be sure, computers can program themselves, and in fact re-program the very program they are in the midst of running. This is what we call a self-modifying program. Essentially, a self-modifying program consists of at least one instruction that tells the computer to change other instructions elsewhere within that very program. So, for example, a self-modifying program might look something like this:
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1) instruction 1
2) instruction 2
.
.
.
n-1) instruction n-1
n) replace instruction m with "display 'good bye'"
n+1) instruction n+1
.
.
.
m-1) instruction m-1
m) display 'hello'
m+1) instruction m+1
.
.
.
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When the program gets to line n, it is instructed to replace instruction m, which at that moment tells the computer to display 'hello' on the screen, with the instruction to display 'good bye' on the screen instead. Why would a program need to do this? Well, suppose instruction m was imbedded in a subroutine - that is, a section of the program that can be skipped to, the instructions within it executed, and then return to the point at which it left off. It could be that this subroutine was executed a few times before instruction n, and at those times it was important that it display 'hello' to the screen, but that after instruction n, it is important that all subsequent executions of the subroutine result in 'good bye' being displayed instead. Whatever the reason, this program is built to change itself, and thus what it is written to do, in the very midst of running.
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Our brains possess the same ability. We are all capable of suspending our beliefs and expectations of how the world works, and to consider alternative beliefs and expectations. In the midst of such acts, it is possible that we suddenly discover flaws in our hitherto held beliefs and gain insight into better and more believable ones. The better and more believable ones might then replace the older ones, thus completing the process of cognitive self-modification. It is only a small step from this to an official mental technology, and that step consists of the deliberate act of modifying one's own programs for the sake of some goal (perhaps trying to come up with more positive attitudes as a means to self-improvement), as opposed to awaiting such changes of thought passively (as when certain insights just come over us without our expecting it).
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Independent vs. Dependent Models of Reality
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But this becomes all the more difficult the more tenaciously we hold onto an independent model of reality. In that case, we take our current beliefs to accurately reflect reality and any change we put them through to result only in self-delusion. This is why a dependent model of reality is so much more conducive to this sort of exercise. Not only does it open one's mind to the potential benefits of such an exercise, making the practice more fluent, but the principles upholding such a model of reality are what make this kind of mental technology work. According to a dependent model of reality, this mental technology is more than just the changing of one's experiences and perceptions, but the alteration of reality itself - and this saves the individual from self-delusion.
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At some point in this discussion, the reader might have pondered over the difference between passively held beliefs and active thought processes. There is a difference, one that is pertinent to this point in our discussion. We have been talking about our thought processes as programs running on our brains, but this doesn't always manifest to us (introspectively, that is) as the actual act of thinking. The program instructing us to rinse the carrot when it falls on the floor is a good example. It is probably not the case that we actively think, "Oh, the carrot has fallen on the floor. When that happens, I ought to rinse it off. Therefore, I will rinse it off." Rather, it is most likely that we rinse it without any conscious or deliberate attention to thought - that is, as an unconscious habit. It can be said, however, that we believe that rinsing the carrot is the appropriate action to take in such cases - that is, beliefs can be held, and do influence how we behave, without our attention being constantly directed onto them. This difference is also the difference between the passive running of a program on our brains and the active modification of those programs. That is to say, it only requires belief, and not the conscious and deliberate act of thinking, in order for those beliefs to constitute a program determining what we do and say. But it requires the active and conscious process of thinking in order to change our beliefs, or at least add to them. So if we want simply to allow our cognitive programs to run on our brains, we only need to preserve our beliefs, but if we want to write new programs, or modify existing ones, then we must actively think - we must think about all the reasons a new belief system might hold (and why it holds more effectively than an older undesired one, should self-modification be our intention).
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It doesn't take much to understand the tight link between the programs running on one's brain and the behavior that ensues from those programs. This is just as true of human beings as it is actual computers. Computer programs can be written and downloaded into the circuitry imbedded in robots with mechanical appendages capable of movement and manipulation of objects in the world. The behavior of such robots can differ radically based on the value of a single bit - that is, on a 1 or a 0. A professor I once had emphasized this point by admonishing that if we were so careless as to program a computer with the wrong bit - a 1 where there should be a 0, or visa-versa - we could start World War III. Not all of us took him seriously, of course, but in principle, his point stands. If the decision to declare war on another country was communicated to the minister of defense by a computer program that conveyed such a decision with either a 'yeah' or a 'nay', which can be determined by either a 1 or a 0, then such a mistake could indeed be so catastrophic as to instigate a full scale world war (in principle, of course - I should hope such decisions aren't settle in such a careless manner). This is true of the human brain as well - not so much in terms of 0's and 1's, but in terms of a single elementary idea. For example, suppose a religiously devote nation was on a conquest to disseminate its doctrine over other nations, and the question was put to the leader of one such nation just after it had been conquered: Will you convert? The lives of thousands, if not millions, could be spared or vanquished depending on the answer - either 'yeah' or 'nay' - given by that nation's leader - like a 1 or a 0 entered as input from a user.
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It is no wonder, then, that such tensions exist between rivaling religious groups. It is often said that such differences are trivial, and not worth the blood and torment that follows from them. Although it most certainly is not worth such bloodshed, it can be understood, in a psychological context, why those making the executive decisions in such matters are so radical and extremist. Take the rivalry between the Catholics and the Reformists in the early half of the 16th century. The central position, or at least one of them, behind the reformist movement was that the Pope is indeed fallible, as all humans are, but this idea, this variable in the Christian program, makes the difference between devotee's allegiance to or rebellion against the Pope's authority. Such a movement threatened his position of power, a position without which he would be left defenseless against those angry and contemptuous revolutionaries who wanted him lynched. Would it not make sense, then, that the Pope would be passionately eager to instill the idea in the minds of Renaissance Europeans that his infallibility was indeed legitimate? Would he not take up any radical position, along with as many defenses backing up those positions, as he could think up? Would he not, so to speak, furiously write as many programs in as many people's heads as he could, programs like "Anyone who fails to recognize the Pope's authority will be found guilt of treason and punishable under the law"? The programs running on our brains are indeed influential, determining a whole variety of behavior, behavior that can lead one into life or death situations, the salvation or downfall of empires, and the course through history we take.
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This says a lot about the function of the philosopher in society. If religions, and ideologies in general, can be traced back to philosophical views, along with the arguments upholding them, then a strong case can be made for the extraordinary power the philosopher holds over society and where it goes. History tells us about the power of religion over so many facets of society. In fact, history tells us this about almost all major ideologies - fascism, communism, democracy, capitalism, science, and so on. Who is the one responsible for disseminating such ideologies, for arguing strong cases for or against them? Typically, it comes down to the philosopher, or at least those who promote such views in the philosophical spirit. Therefore, we can think of the philosopher as a programmer - that is, one who writes programs for society at large. The ambitious philosopher is he (or she) who aspires to change the course of society through the ideas and perspectives it adopts - that is, through the programs downloaded onto civilians' brains. If one's philosophy, or one's belief system in general, corresponds to neural configurations in his/her brain, then insofar as those configurations can be redesigned in any arbitrary arrangement, it is conceivable that any philosophy can be programmed on anyone's brain. All one needs to do is find a logical path from a set of reasonable premises to the desired conclusions - that is, write a functional program - and one can reasonably argue any point one wishes. To be sure, it is possible to write any arbitrary program one wishes on a typical computer, and in principle, it seems that any arbitrary neural configuration can be wired into one's brain. If such a task is indeed possible, it would require the skill and reasoning propensities of a talented philosopher. In the next section, we will explore this notion - that the function of the philosopher is to write programs for society to follow as it proceeds through history - and we will see how such a function qualifies as an extraordinary mental technology if there ever was one. If we were only to recognize it as such, there is no telling how far we could take it.
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The Politician's Function
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There is, perhaps, a reason that philosophers make good programmers and visa-versa. Both disciplines require analytical and logical thinking. I know that in my field of work, which is computers, whenever I sit down to write a program, I feel exactly the same way when I sit down to write out my philosophies. I feel that I go through short intermittent spurts of thinking followed by similar spurts of writing. During the thinking spurts, I'm trying to clarify my thoughts such that the argument or program I wish to write follows a consistent and logical path that does indeed lead to the conclusion or result I'm aiming for. Then it's just a matter of writing it out as I switch to the writing spurts.
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It was Aristotle who first recognized the role of logic in human thought. He understood that if one argued a philosophical position with hard logic, the mind would have no choice but to see the soundness in such argumentation, for logic is just the manner in which our thoughts are lead to their conclusions. He also understood that such a mind would have to be devoid of passions and biases, for those seem to skew and obstruct what would otherwise be a clean and flawless thread of infallible reasoning. But absent those confounding variables, and the dynamics of human thought seem to be governed by formal logical principles. If computers were around in Aristotle's day, he may have described this dynamic as the grounds for a formal method of "programming" beliefs.
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Computers operate on a set of rules. Those rules are first and foremost incarnate in physical circuitry. That circuitry becomes programmable when the user is allowed to input instructions that the circuitry uses to decide how to compute results from incoming data - that is, programs are instructions for how to process data. The results are translated back to the user in a format he/she can understand. Programming languages are built on top of this physical infrastructure such that the user can enter data and instructions in such a way as to feel as though he/she is communicating with the computer in quasi-English (or some other human language), and the computer interprets the data and instructions in a formally logical manner. In other words, the rules imbedded in the hardware appear to the user as the rules of logic being adhered to by a quasi-conscious machine that seems to understand, by some measure, what the user is telling it. This is nearly the same approach the philosopher takes to communicating his/her ideas to others. He/she aims to apply the rules of logic and reason to a recipient whom it is assumed takes in and interprets the words of others according to those same rules. Thus, the philosopher is engaged in an almost identical task to the computer programmer - the only difference being that he/she is working on another human being rather than a machine.
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John Searl
Cartesian Dualism
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Obviously, the philosopher doesn't conduct his/her programming on a one-on-one basis - that is, by going from one person to another and downloading programs upon each encounter. The philosopher does his best work by speaking, through published books, articles, and other such works, to society at large, and even when his programs are successfully downloading, it can sometimes take years, even decades, for those programs to take full effect in terms of behavior and mass movements. One of the reasons why such effects can take so long is because the philosopher's ideas often need to pass through at least a few screening processes. One in particular is peer review. His/her ideas must first become popular among his/her peers, or at least a few among them, and then those ideas gain greater freedom to propagate throughout larger networks of readers, thinkers, and similar interest groups.
If it gains popularity among these groups, it might then enter the media where it can grab the attention of various members of the general public. Given enough momentum and longevity, a philosophy can even enter the consciousness of the layman. This usually takes the longest time, sometimes centuries. John Searle says that the layman understands the problem of mind and matter in the context of Cartesian dualism. This view, which seems like common sense to the layman and is taken for granted by so many, actually began in the mind of a 16th/17th century philosopher whose name such layman probably haven't even heard of. Similar arguments can be made for the Augustinian idea of free-will, Newton's physics, Darwin's evolution theory, Freud's psychodynamics, and many others.
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Now, if these programs have been written and downloaded into the public consciousness for centuries, then what more can we do with philosophy in our quest to build a mental technology out of it? The difference between philosophy as a mental technology and philosophy as it is traditionally practiced is the awareness of its potential to be used as a mental technology and the will to use it as such. In other words, it is not so much a difference in methodology but in the goals we aim to achieve in its use. For centuries now, the aim of philosophy has been, for the most part, to advance one's views in the hopes of acquiring as many adherents as possible. What I wish to propose is that philosophy can be used to improve the lot of mankind - not so much by exposing him to Truth, but by crafting healthy and wholesome belief systems - that is, views that are conducive towards the improvement of life here on Earth. We all know how philosophy can be used towards more violent and destructive ends, at least when it reaches the level of religion and politics, so why not towards world peace and prosperity for all? One must not only be willing to promote peace and prosperity as a philosophy in itself, although this would certainly help, but to understand the principles behind philosophical beliefs as programs running on persons' brains that lead to peace and prosperity - that is, as a consequence that may or may not be expected based exclusively on the content of the philosophy in question. A good example of this would be reverse psychology. It might so happen to be the case that one, or a whole society, is more likely to act opposite of the principles behind a particular philosophy when preached to them by key figures, much like a teenager is likely to do the opposite of what her parents tell her even though, should it have come from her peers, she would have gone along with it without hesitation. So it's not always the content of a particular philosophy that we ought to focus our attention on, but the actual consequences that programming it into society has, consequences such as unforeseen behavior and reactions. Standard philosophy, at least in the way it is conventionally practiced, doesn't concern itself much with this. If we were to use it as a mental technology, however, this would be a top concern indeed.
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At first glance, this idea may sound promising, but as all technologies go, it can be used for destructive purposes. It can be used to promote fascism and totalitarianism. It can be used to cultivate conformity and the silencing of those who wish to question authority. Therefore, serious thought must be given to the ethical matters that would surface should philosophers choose to apply their skills in this direction. Ethical matters and the prevention of abuse must be the first topics to be addressed if any technology is to be built upon principles of mass programming, and perhaps the only topics should it be decided that such a technology is too dangerous to embark on in the first place. I would stand behind this decision should it be made by a group of responsible and highly intelligent thinkers after giving long and careful thought to the matter. The safety and welfare of the masses, I say, comes before bigger and better technologies. But before we jump to such conclusions too hastily, let's consider the ethical ramifications of such a technology and ways to deal with them.
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Burrhus B. Skinner
Operant Conditioning
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Burrhus F. Skinner faced similar issues when he proposed his utopian society whereby social order would be regulated by the issuance of rewards, and whereby punishment would be minimized if not all together abandoned. Skinner was the founder of that field of psychology we know as "operant conditioning". What he proved was that, to a large extent, behavior can be shaped and modified by applying the right kinds of rewards and punishments at the right times. If one wanted to encourage a particular type of behavior, it would be to one's benefit to reinforce that behavior with the appropriate reward - say praise or money. Skinner took these principles and envisioned an entire society based upon them, a society in which the right kinds of behavior - lawful, productive, kind and helpful, etc. - would be cultivated and normalized by the establishment of a system that rewarded that behavior. The ethical issues that cropped up in response to this were issues related to the control of citizens by the powers charged with the issuance of those rewards. It was felt by some that people would lose their freedom. Another ethical issue that was raised was the possibility of abuse by those same powers, abuse whereby the kind of behavior that would most benefit society would no longer be rewarded and only behavior serving the interests of those powers would. Skinner's response was really very simple. He said that these abuses would not be made possible by the implementation of his program for rewards and punishment; rather, they are made possible by rewards and punishments left to their own devices - that is, without being regulated by his program. The stripping of freedom from the individual and giving unfair advantage to those whom the highest powers hold in favor happen all around the world all the time. He pointed out that the means by which this happens are precisely the rewards and punishments he spent a lifetime studying - that is to say, there is a sort of unregulated reward/punishment system governing all societies whether we know it or not, whether we like it or not. The only difference he proposed was that we harness this system and regulate it, wielding it to our control rather than allow it to run our lives in a haphazard and unpredictable manner. The principles of operant conditioning were thought to be the basic underpinnings of human behavior in all situations, and so it seemed that to control it and use it for good was the only reasonable thing to do. Precisely the same argument can be made for our proposal. It seems clear that our behavior, individually and as a community, is largely determined by our thoughts and beliefs, and if such behavior can lead to things as devastating and horrid as war, violence, oppression, terrorism, and so on, it seems that no worse harm can come from regulating those thoughts and beliefs. In fact, it seems like the only reasonable - and imperative - thing to do.
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Having said that, it should be noted that not all technologies are just as easily used for the wrong purposes as for the right ones. Take democracy for example. Although this is more of a sociopolitical technology, as opposed to a mental one, it is difficult to fathom how it could be used for evil purposes. The benefits it yields, however, are enjoyed by the great majority of subjects who use the system. Whether or not the same can be said for mental technologies depends, it seems reasonable to say, on the particular mental technology in question. But I would venture to say that if we begin our quest to build a world based on mental technologies with due care and diligence, we can put in place all the precautions necessary for avoiding its abuse by future users. We have already mentioned the first issues that ought to be addressed in this pursuit - namely, that all matters of safety and ethics be thoroughly considered - and it may very well prove fruitful to yield, at the end of such deliberations, a set of mental technologies geared towards the curbing and prevention of abuse and other dangers. After all, it seems likely that those well versed in such a practice would understand human psychology and the principles underlying mental life well enough to forge a clear path towards mental health on both a personal and social level. If these matters are dealt with first, then it seems logical to suppose that the pursuit of mental technologies will already be catapulted in the best direction, and with enough momentum, the aim towards mental health and prosperity for all might just take care of itself - that is, it may be self-fulfilling. After all, it only seems logical that one of the basic principles underlying mental health is the very pursuing of mental health, and that to pursue otherwise would not only deteriorate one's mental health, but destroy any prospects of effective and long lasting mental technologies all together. In other words, it doesn't seem likely that a citizenry could share in advanced mental technologies without those technologies being used for the common good.
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The Royal Society
OPEC
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But in what way could such a system begin? What would a group of philosophers do in order that their ideas or "programs" take root in the minds of as many people as possible? The first thing they ought to do is to organize themselves into a formal group, a social network that each member recognizes and commits him/herself to. This network need not be as formal or institutionalized as, say, the Royal Society or OPEC, but the members of the group ought to recognize themselves as such and to act unanimously in their common goal. They need not even physically congregate at a common center. The internet is now a fertile ground for social networks to form and ideas to pass around among and from them. I know from personal experience that several like-minded individuals meet everyday on forums specific to particular interest groups. There are forums for science, philosophy, spirituality, mental and physical health, religion, and so on. There is no reason an electronic network can't be setup and participants recruited to partake in discussions and exchanges of ideas, the sort we'd be interested in if our goal was the production of mental technologies. The members of such groups need not be philosophers per se - they might be from all walks of life such as scientists, spiritualists, psychologists, health professionals, sociologists, etc. - but they would have to have a propensity for a philosophical style of thought. One thing they would have to suspend, if they harbor it, is their own personal agendas as philosophers. The less-than-philosophical type who doesn't really have his/her own views to preach would not have much trouble with this, but the hardnosed philosophical types might - that is, assuming their views clash with the purposes of the group. But as long as they don't clash, or one is willing and able to keep them at bay, the group should welcome all sorts of people. The more backgrounds from which these people come, and the more diverse the skills they bring with them, the better.
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So let's suppose we had a group of such individuals. What might they do to, say, combat terrorism in the middle east? Well, as philosophers and mental technologists, they might trace the roots of terrorism back to its psychological source - namely, the indoctrination of terrorist ideals from corrupt religious leaders. One tactic that is often used is to read passages from scripture - from the Qur'an in the case of middle eastern terrorism - that promote the smiting of enemies by brute violent force. Often these passages are taken out of context, with certain key segments of text not explicitly cited. The following quote, taken from Al-Anfal 8:60, is a good example:
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And make ready against them all you can of power, including steeds of war to threaten the enemy of Allah and your enemy, and others besides whom, you may not know but whom Allah does know. And whatever you shall spend in the Cause of Allah shall be repaid unto you, and you shall not be treated unjustly.
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On the face of it, this sounds as though Allah encourages merciless and unremitting revenge against one's enemies - that is, unless the following quote, taken from the very next verse (Al-Anfal 8:61), is included:
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Al-Anfal 8:60-61
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But if they incline to peace, you also incline to it, and trust in Allah. Verily, He is the All-Hearer, the All-Knower.
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Jihad
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There is also this passage, taken from Al-Baqarah 2:190, which speaks against the role of the aggressor, encouraging Jihad in self-defense only:
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Al-Baqarah 2:190
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Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not do aggression, for Allah loves not the aggressors.
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Salim Yaqub
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But Muslim preachers and clerics with terrorist leanings rarely ever refer to this. Likewise, they would probably not emphasize the many peaceful and self-directed applications of Jihad such as the struggle to improve one's spiritual or inner life. Even the prophet Mohammad said, "The most excellent Jihad is that for the conquest of self." and, "We have returned from the lesser Jihad (battle) to the greater Jihad (Jihad of the soul)." Salim Yaqub, an expert on US/Middle East relations, relays the definition of Jihad as
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Literally, the word means religious struggle, and it can be interpreted to signify either an outward physical struggle or an inner spiritual one - that is, as an actual war against non-believers or as a personal attempt to make oneself a better Muslim, such as by avoiding temptation or by pushing oneself to be more concerned about others.
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On top of that, there are numerous passages from these same books that promote love, kindness, and peace as the proper mode of conduct. Now, if these religious leaders can cultivate followers, some willing to sacrifice their lives in the act of killing thousands of others, then why couldn't followers be cultivated to adhere to the messages of love, kindness, and peace given in the more benevolent passages? Why couldn't they be taught to observe the "greater" Jihad that Mohammad himself encouraged? One would think that such a message would be a thousand times more appealing than strapping a bomb to oneself or flying a plane into a building. It would be up to the preacher promoting these passages whether or not to take them out of context or exclude the more violent passages, but the point is it could be done.
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So if our group of philosophers and mental technologists wished to pursue a maneuver like this, they could find someone among them, perhaps a Muslim with a skill for philosophical argument and a willingness to see his people rid themselves of the terrorist undertones in their midst, and offer him the assignment. He would have to be passionate about it and able to remember the goal of the community who assigned him the task. What would be his approach? Well, as a philosopher, he would have to argue as many strong cases as he could for kindness, love, and peace as noble Muslim virtues - that is, he would have to render such virtues believable to those belonging to Muslim groups. As a religious follower, he would substantiate his arguments by citing those passages mentioned above, as well as any others promoting love, kindness, and peace.
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He would not have to be shipped over to the middle east to preach his philosophy as a contender to the native clerics already there. He could begin his campaign in the comfort of his own home country. It is fortunate that the internet has such a deeply entrenched infrastructure - so deep that it spans the world over, giving access to billions of people from all nations and all ethnicities. Of course, not everyone has access to the internet - refugees in Darfur, for example, have barely enough to eat and drink, and no shelter, let alone internet access - but the internet has certainly spanned far beyond the borders of North America and other free countries. And with any luck, the organization from which this Muslim philosopher comes might also extend into the many countries of the world, with members in the middle east willing to serve as liaisons for him. To them, however, the outspoken promulgation of his philosophy would likely be much more dangerous, but they need not work as public speakers or supporters of any kind. They might simply work as reporters for the organization, giving feedback as to the general opinion and sentiment of the people in regards to the ideas inherent in his philosophy, or philosophies of that kind. A very important function they might serve is to find out what kinds of ideas the people are willing to listen to, or at least tolerate, and how radical they can be before the people start rejecting them. It is important, after all, to understand what values the people hold, for that, to a great extent, determines whether they will accept or reject alternate views. A view that seems conservative and innocuous to us might come across as too radical to people from a different culture. For this reason, the most practical approach would be to persuade such cultures away from destructive and self-defeating views by very small steps, rather than by interjecting ideas so revolutionary and unheard of that the people barely even understand them.
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Now, it might at first seem that our Muslim philosopher doesn't stand a chance against the masterminds behind the brainwashing of Muslim warriors since they were children - especially when those masterminds are armed with weapons they are willing to use against any opposition - including those brash enough to preach alternate views. But this is why the battle against terrorism is never done directly and overtly - we'll leave that to the militants - but through the age old method of expressing ideas in a society that protects the right to free speech. But even then, it doesn't seem likely that a message of love, kindness, and peace will have much of an effect. Otherwise the hippie revolution would have been a resounding success. But this is more a reflection of my own shortcomings, not those of our Muslim philosopher. That is to say, I was not able to put forward a very convincing philosophy banked on love, kindness, and peace - I only suggested that our Muslim philosopher had an armory of arguments to support his message. As a philosopher, it is his task to put on his best creative thinking cap and come up with some decent arguments that do sound convincing, something that would appeal to his target audience. He should use whatever tactics he can - appealing to their emotions, their values, their reason, or anything that works (so long as the greater purpose is kept in mind - to spread more healthy views in the hopes of ameliorating life for those willing to accept such views). The strength of this approach, after all, is not in the people's willingness to listen and act upon novel philosophical ideas, but in their sensitivity to ideas they can relate to, such as, in the case of the middle east, messages that come straight out of the Qur'an, as opposed to sermons on freedom and democracy, a subject they are relatively unfamiliar with, noble as it may be. It might take a genius to contrive the sorts of arguments that they are most sensitive to - certainly not me - but that would be the point of organizing and recruiting members from all cultures. No one knows a people like one of their own members, and to gather as many members as possible and to form a think tank of sorts is the most conducive way of cultivating genius. When great minds get together and go through brain storming sessions, the best of ideas come forth. But it also requires patients. We shouldn't expect brilliant ideas to come out of every meeting. As we mentioned earlier, even though ideas are powerful tools for changing the world, they take effect very slowly. But the point of organizing and amassing a large member base is to apply the principles upon which such ideas do take effect in the hopes of increasing the rate at which they come.
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Furthermore, it shouldn't be expected that this one Muslim philosopher would be able to overturn old attitudes and understandings single-handedly. In reality, if the dissemination of ideas is to have any effect at all, it will be over several years - perhaps decades, perhaps centuries - and it will be delivered by a whole multitude of philosophers and thinkers. The point of offering the example of the Muslim philosopher was not to demonstrate how a single idea put forward by a single individual could have that much of a dramatic effect (although there's no necessary reason why it couldn't), but to show the approach that should be taken - that is, to show where to start - namely, from within the context of the beliefs and values of the target people, and preferably by one of their own. That way, they can relate much more appreciably and be much more likely to consider the ideas offered to them. The overall goal of the organization from which these ideas originate would not be so much to solve sociopolitical problems in the more immediate context (although they might as well try if it seems at all feasible), but to root out their sources on a much deeper, and psychocultural, level. The process by which they do this is by the application of key principles defining the relation between philosophy and its impact on society and culture. From what we know of history, this impact can take a very long time to come into full effect, but when it does, it can be powerful. These principles - the lengthy gestation period and the power of the final impact - are what ought to guide the conduct of such an organization. That is to say, they should focus on the invention of good and healthy ideas for the sake of guiding society overall in the right direction, and although they should certainly help out, if possible, with some of the more immediate sociopolitical problems of the world, they are best suited to overseeing the course philosophy takes generally as well as its highest purposes. In other words, their primary function in society is to apply philosophy for the common good, as opposed to the personal gains individual philosophers may be motivated to acquire. So although there may be little such a group can do to alleviate the plight of those who suffer under the more immediate catastrophes of the world, what I'm proposing is that philosophy, or at least a special group of philosophers, switch gears so that its orientation is towards the alleviation of the more profound and steady sources of these problems in the hopes that in the long run, society will gradually emerge from the darkness of war, oppression, and of course terrorism.
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It should be noted, however, that the principles behind which ideas spread and gain popularity are not always intrinsic to the ideas themselves. A large factor in their propagation is how much press they receive - that is, how much publicity. There would probably come a point at which our organization of thinkers would need to invest money so that their ideas could be marketed - books would need to be published, interviews would need to be aired, professors might need to be hired at local universities to teach the organization's ideas, and so on. Where they get the finances to do this is another question - some of it may come from the members' own pockets, some may come from donations, yet more may come from government grants (although how involved the government should be is another question that deserves extended thought). But this is a concern that should be addressed when the time comes - after the group has had time to grow and establish itself, perhaps even gaining credibility by helping to solve certain domestic problems. We ought to always keep in mind the slow pace at which this organization takes effect.
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Determinism or Free-Will
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Yet, this brings up another ethical concern. If money is being spent on the promotion of certain ideas, then it might be construed as the manufacturing of agreement - that is, controlling what others think. This is indeed a cause for concern. The problem with this objection, however, is that it wrongly assesses what the money is being spent on. Absolutely no money is being spent on the manufacturing of agree; rather, it is being spent on increasing the availability of ideas to the public and the opportunities for people to take them in. As we mentioned above, people spread their ideas like this all the time, and people receive these ideas and judge for themselves whether they hold merit or not. Authors, whether they are philosophers or not, advertise their works, promoting them as worth reading, and sometimes of the utmost importance. We see government sponsored messages on television all the time, as well as messages sponsored by private groups and organizations. To form a network of thinkers whose goal is to spread as many positive and healthy philosophies as possible is really no different from what individual writers and speakers do all the time. Apart from annoying in-your-face advertisers and solicitors, no one ever accuses these writers and speakers of unethical conduct. They are not accused because people by and large understand the difference between expressing ideas and being made to agree with ideas. Indeed, we are often encouraged to speak out and express ideas. And if the goal of our organization of philosophers and thinkers is to help make life better for mankind, not only are they refraining from "manufacturing agreement" but it could be said that they are "manufacturing health" - a most ethical pursuit indeed. If the majority of people end up agreeing with these ideas, it will only be because they have deliberately and freely thought it through and decided such ideas are sound. If consent were made into law, such as in the case of totalitarian regimes, this would be a different matter. This is the real treachery against human rights and freedoms. It is these cases that truly count as the control of public opinion. In the organization's pursuit to promote good and healthy ideas, their methods should never exceed that allowed to them by a free and democratic society, by a free market where the consumer's right to own his/her choice of intellectual material is protected. In other words, the organization's goal of promoting good and healthy ideas should never be made into law, for only then would one have a good case to argue against the organization's control over the thoughts of the masses.
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In fact, there really isn't a strong case with which to charge the organization with deception or sophism. The group wouldn't be doing anything fundamentally different than any other philosopher in history. The only difference is in the ends they wish to attain, not the means to those ends. So if a certain philosophy is put forward by the group to some target audience, that audience will judge the philosophy based on the merit of the arguments and the weight of evidence offered to support it. This is the way philosophies have always been judged. Remember that the organization builds and uses these mental technologies upon the principles of cognition and mind, and insofar as those technologies take the form of philosophical arguments, the principles underlying their efficacy are simply reason and logic - that is, they are the same principles by which one typically judges ideas as sound or unsound anyway. To put this another way, there should be no difference between one's reasons for accepting or rejecting the ideas put forward as a mental technology intended to bring about a better world and one's reasons for accepting or rejecting those same ideas as a genuine belief intended to convey truth as the philosopher sees it. So if there were any deception at all, it would not be the listener who is deceived, but the one inventing the ideas. He/she would be the one who would have to work at convincing him/herself of a more healthy truth in case the one he/she currently believes in is not as healthy. He/she would be the one bearing the burden of altering his/her reality. As a mental technologist, however, he/she would be more suited to the task than any other, and such deception, ultimately, would be more accurately described as proactively re-programming his/her own mind in accordance with his/her highest goals.
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More On Shelf Ideas
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By no means should the organization ever shriek the responsibility it would inevitably take on given its lofty aspirations. Before any investment goes into the public promotion of ideas, the organization ought to deliberate over the possible dangers of each idea. The type of work they are engaged in is more than that of the typical philosopher. The typical philosopher wishes only to voice his/her views in the hopes of gaining a wider base of followers. The aims of the organization, however, go beyond that - they want to have positive effects through the views they promote. The typical philosopher can satisfy his/her goal simply by arguing good cases for his/her view. But the highest priority for our organization must be the welfare of their target audience. This means that they need to consider, before anything else, whether the ideas they've crafted are safe and conducive to the prosperity of the people to whom those ideas are directed. The organization must carefully decide which ideas are safe, which are dangerous, and which don't fall into either category. As it concerns the latter, it could be that such ideas need to be revised or that they are not right for the time and place - that is, the task at hand - but that they are good ideas nonetheless. In this case, they are what I call "shelf ideas" because although they may not be suitable to the organization's present purposes, they do possess certain merits for other conceivable purposes, and should therefore not be thrown out - rather, they should be left on the shelf, so to speak, there to wait a later use.
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Can a group of philosophers and similar thinkers be responsible enough to put aside their own personal views and ambitions and remember the ethics that go along with the organization's purpose? Hopefully they can, but not without a set of core mental technologies to ensure this. This harkens back to our earlier suggestion - that such an organization ought to settle all its ethical and methodological issues first, and to build mental technologies out of these decisions for the purpose of securing them. These mental technologies can, and ought to, be more than simple philosophies and value systems that the group unanimously agrees to. Because there are bound to be interpersonal and social dynamics going on within the group, these mental technologies ought to extend into the sociopolitical arena - that is, into the social and political dynamics that play out within the group - the aim of which would be to work out a system built to settle any antagonism before it gets out of hand and leads to the group's own undoing. The democratic system serves as a good example of how this can be done. It demonstrates the efficacy of a sociopolitical technology that began as an inquiry into the nature of human sociology and politics and a carefully thought-out design for a system based on the principles that came out of this inquiry, a system that seems to work. There is no reason our organization can't put their heads together and, by the same process of inquiry, come up with a design for a system that effectively preserves the ethical conduct that such a group ought to observe.
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Subjectivist and Objectivist Theories
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But couldn't such an organization carry out these tasks without subscribing to MM-Theory, or any subjectivist theory? After all, all it would be doing is, somewhat crudely speaking, changing people's minds? Technically speaking, yes it could be done independently of MM-Theory or any other subjectivist theory, but the key question would then be: What should the people believe? That is, what is the ultimate truth that determines which beliefs are the right ones to have and which aren't? Every person with one objectivist theory or another will have his/her own answer to this. They will all differ on what ideas such an organization should be putting forward, but at the same time, they will all agree that whatever ideas come out, they should reflect the Truth. After all, a healthy belief system, most will agree, is one that reflects reality as it is. Albeit, most people would probably see reason in taking baby steps towards the Truth - just like our Muslim philosopher would have to do in his quest to bring his people out of the terrorist frame of mind - but where the final destination should be is sure to be a contentious matter indeed. Scientists would like to see the world conform to the scientific worldview, Christians to the Christian worldview, Jews to the Jewish worldview, Platonists to the Platonist worldview, Marxists to the Marxist worldview, and so on. This is more than a matter of stubbornness on the parts of objectivists, more than just willful ignorance of alternate views; it is the only manner an objectivist can justifiably see fit to solve problems. That is, in order to solve any problem, they feel they have to know the world as it really is, for only then can they effectively bring about the proper solution. For them, consciousness and knowledge serve their problem-solving functions best when they are employed for the mental replication of the world as it really is. An objectivist could never, if he/she is to be consistent, utilize consciousness and knowledge in another way - say, to fabricate a whole new model of reality - as a means for solving problems, for in that very act, he/she would necessarily go against his/her own objective views. This is not a problem for subjectivists, not only because they all agree on their subjectivist worldview, but because for them, there is no ultimate Truth towards which the world should draw nearer. For them, the goal is to disseminate healthy beliefs regardless of their truth. But surely a healthy belief is a true belief, one might argue. For the most part, yes, but as we will see in the next section, this is not always the case, and in fact, for a subjectivist, it is beside the point. The more important point is that health and prosperity should come before truth as a priority. At least health can be measured by objective standards - economic growth, reported happiness, physical fitness, etc. This might be hard for an objectivist to concur with. If the beliefs that meet these criteria so happen to be true, all the better for the objectivists, but for the subjectivist, this is of secondary importance only. So although an objectivist certainly could partake in the mission of the proposed organization, he/she would have to get used to the idea that truth doesn't matter when the utmost concern is the health and welfare of the citizens of the world.
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Projection
The Transience of Reality
Gravity
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To say that truth doesn't matter might be somewhat of an overstatement. Of course truth matters, in most cases anyway, but its importance is contingent on health. All we mean to say by this is that truth should not come before health as a priority when building mental technologies. To the subjectivist, truth is always dependent on one's beliefs anyway, but there is a sense in which we can judge a belief to be true or false even when it projects itself fully and convinces the believer of its reality. What sense is this? It is in how well it stands up against observable evidence. We should recall from Reality and Perception the principle of The Transience of Reality and our customized definition of gravity. What these tell us is that although one's perceptions may depict a genuine reality for him/her, that reality may still be preempted by another reality, one with more gravity. Observable evidence is certainly a powerful source of gravity, bringing one into a reality firmly grounded on that evidence. What's important about this in regards to health is that because observable evidence is such a powerful source of gravity, we always ought to be wary of a reality exerting such powerful gravity, for to be wrong in relation to such a reality might prove fatally unhealthy indeed. Take, for example, the now outdated view that certain illnesses could be healed by bloodletting. Bloodletting was the pre-modern technique by which doctors would allow a patient to bleed, ridding the body of significant quantities of blood. It was thought that the cause of the illness was in the blood, or the blood itself gone bad, and so to empty the body of at least some of it would expedite recovery. The actual results were contrary to this and often fatal. Patients would often die of blood loss. This serves as a good example according to which observable evidence conflicts with traditional belief, and the former takes precedence over the latter - that is, the former (the observable evidence) is a better, that is more healthy, source to anchor one's beliefs on. So it is certainly true that truth, or at least what can be demonstrated by observable evidence, is essential to mental and physical health.
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But the more important point is that we are seeking health, not truth, in our quest to bring about full recovery from illness and mental plight. There are certainly other examples we could offer according to which one's health doesn't depend on truth. Let's suppose, for example, that a woman who goes in to see the doctor for a routine checkup gets diagnosed with a fatal disease, a disease for which there is no cure except the natural hormones her own body produces when her mood is uplifted and her spirits are high. It so happens to be a fact that the body will produce more of one type of hormone, such as serotonin, than another, such as cortisol, depending on one's mood. The doctors, then, must make a decision. Do they tell her she has this fatal disease, risking its exacerbation by the shock and subsequent depression she would undoubtedly undergo, or do they keep the truth from her, telling her she is in full health and do everything they can to keep her in a good mood, hoping the abundance of hormones released from her happiness will be enough to fight off the disease and bring about a full recovery? The choice, of course, is theirs, but it certainly wouldn't be unreasonable to take the latter course of action. Assuming there really is no alternative, it would seem, in this case, that the woman's health depends on the suppression of truth, at least temporarily. This may be a deeply troubling ethical dilemma for an objectivist, especially if he is the doctor, but not so much for the subjectivist. For the subjectivist, this need not be regarded as lying - it could, and should, be regarded as the creation of a truth, an alternate one, that the patient urgently needs in order to recover from the disease. It is not deception for the subjectivist, it is the cure.
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Subjective Realities
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Now, the reason why this example works is because it involves a mental state having effects on the physical world. If the ultimate sign of physical health is something we can observe and verify, then in the pursuit to sustain health, we ought to trace the cause of those signs back to their source and do the bulk of our work there. If this source so happens to be a state of mind, then our approach should be no different - we ought to do our work there - that is, we ought to change that state of mind to one whose effects are those of a more physically healthy state. What guarantee is there that such a change will be one by which the subject is made to believe the truth? Is it not conceivable that to take the subject's state of mind away from the truth (by whatever measure truth is determined) is the surest way to attain those observable states of physical health? It should be these physical states that are the deciding factor in how we change the subject's state of mind, not whether that state of mind matches some predetermined truth. And if this is true for physical signs of health, it is surely true of mental signs as well - that is, signs indicating states of happiness, confidence, social functionality, and overall wellbeing. In fact, in many cases, it might even be more true. But one's state of mind almost always comes back to the physical world, if by no other means than by one's behavior. Thus, ultimately, one's state of mind determines how one engages him/herself in the world, and so the truth of the physical world, determined by observable evidence, ought to weigh heavily in the determination of what constitutes a healthy state of mind. If there is a general rule that ought to be observed, it is that scientific facts - that is, those gathered by the empirical method - insofar as they are relevant, ought not to be ignored in the crafting of healthy beliefs. The physical world is perhaps the most crucial of guides for determining mental health, for it is our engagement in it that we most saliently depend on, not only for our mental and physical health, but our survival as well. Thus, unless extraordinarily exceptional circumstances call for it, the world that science has built for us ought not to be tampered with in the act of building mental technologies and altering our subjective realities.
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But does science leave anything to the imagination? Does it allow us to form belief systems that can be neither confirmed nor falsified? Certainly it does. One can have a whole variety of spiritual beliefs that don't conflict with science - MM-Theory, if it is considered spiritual, is a case in point - as well as other philosophical ideas. There are even an abundance of ideas that are better described as perspectives rather than beliefs - that is, beliefs in the sense of being either true or false. A glass which is either half empty or half full is a good example. As far as truth is concerned, both perspectives are true - if the glass if half empty, it is also half full - but these two perspective represent different attitudes towards the same thing - one optimistic, the other pessimistic - attitudes that usually aren't adopted simultaneously, and thus one is often faced with choosing between them. If we are to put health ahead of truth, then the choice should be made based on which perspective is the healthier one, not on whether or not it is true. So there is plenty of ideological material for a programmer-philosopher to sift through and choose from, material that remains untouched by science, in building more healthy perspectives and theories.
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If we are to imagine a whole society whose highest enterprise is that of mental technologies, it would undoubtedly subscribe to the medical approach as its most prized ideal, the scientific approach coming in at a close second. What is the medical approach and how does it differ from the scientific one? Well, certainly medicine and science go hand-in-hand. Since the beginning of the modern age, medicine has depended on science for its success. Science gives us the firmly grounded facts that guide us in the pursuit of healing ourselves from sickness and disease. But the medical approach is different. Whereas the approach of science is to conduct controlled experiments in order to test a theory, and thereafter accept or reject the theory as fact or fiction, the medical approach is to test methods of healing to see what effects they have. If a certain method seems to have a good and long track record for bringing about health, then it is considered reliable and doctors and other health professionals invest much into it. But they are not after why it works so well, at least not as a primary goal, but only that it does work so well. That's not to say that they have no interest in why it works, just that the reasons why are the province of science, not medicine, and although this fortifies a tight relationship between science and medicine, one by which medicine depends on the reasons that science so effectively provides, the two should not be confused, and neither should their primary approaches. Science looks for facts, for truth - medicine looks for fitness, for health. It does so by looking at correlations and patterns of success in past approaches to medical problems. Those patterns are found all the more readily when science provides the insights into why they work, but these insights are means towards ends - namely, health - and not ends in themselves as they are for science. Thus, because our goal in building mental technologies is health, we ought to take the medical approach, evaluating our technologies based on the effectiveness shown by their track record, counting on the scientific method, of course, to point us in the right direction.
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Truth and Health as Equals
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This, I believe, would be the major paradigm shift that a truth seeking culture like our own would have to undergo to become a health seeking one like that which I envision in the distant future. Our culture seems (to me at least) to be hellbent on discovering truth, on gaining ever greater knowledge, at no matter what cost. I've encountered many who actually expressed a preference to know the truth even if it killed them. It sometimes strikes me as an obsession - as if still trying desperately to overcome some traumatic experience from the distant past. There's no doubt in my mind that this stems, at least partially, from a radical reaction against the deception of corrupt religious leaders - that is, against the old religious regimes of medieval Europe, the one the scientific revolution eventually overthrew. We had believed them for so long, and when science began to bear fruits contradicting their doctrine, we felt betrayed and without guidance. Science became our new beacon, our new crutch with which we rejuvenated our sense of security in knowing the truth. It was certainly a good thing that science prevailed over the tyrannical and oppressive despots of religious fanaticism - society, at the time, definitely needed it - but there is such a thing, and it happens quite often, as swinging too far in the opposite direction, and I sometimes feel - although I certainly could be wrong - that we, or at least some of us, are just as fanatical in our materialistic/atheistic leanings as the religious monsters of our past. Of course, as I said before, science is a vital part of any healthy society - at least insofar as that science serves the welfare of the population - and I would ardently speak out against anyone who downplayed science on this ground, but I feel our society needs to strike more of a balance between our need for knowledge and truth and our need for mental health. I feel that in these times, it is in large part due to the neglect of the social sciences - particularly psychology and other fields related to mental health - that this imbalance, and consequently many of our social and political problems, exists. We need to switch paradigms. We need to recognize the value and importance of mental health. We need to recognize that we have been investing too much focus into gaining knowledge and truth for their own sake, and consequently allowing mental health to starve of attention. I believe a society can function - and indeed function better - if it were to focus primarily on mental health as opposed to bland scientific facts exclusively, and that is what I advocate - that is what we need.
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Psychoanalysis
Sigmund Freud
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A lot can be learnt about this very issue - that of truth versus health - from the field of psychoanalysis. Although most of Freud's theories have been discredited, his basic discoveries - namely, the unconscious mind and the fact that we use defense mechanisms to manage its contents - are still accepted by almost all psychiatrists and psychotherapists. We do indeed partake in the manipulation and distortion of truth and reality on a daily basis - usually in accordance with cultural beliefs, values, and perspectives - and on occasion, we repress and outright block content out of our conscious minds. This is actually a normal function of the human mind, and is a sign of mental health when practiced in moderation. What Freud and those psychoanalysts who followed him treated were extreme cases, or cases in which the typical use of defense mechanisms didn't suit the particular situation the patient found him/herself in. They were cases in which the defense mechanism in question was being used to excess, or in the wrong way, resulting in neurosis and other symptoms of mental illness. But under normal circumstances, these defense mechanisms are a normal part of a healthy functioning mind. They are a part of our evolutionary development. They come with us as tools for survival. The mind is not simply a data gathering instrument that uses that data to replicate the outer world - it also manages the data and molds the world so replicated in whatever way it must in order to function at its best. Sometimes, this requires the distortion of specific pieces of data, or just a flat out denial of them. Therefore, we obviously function at our best when we are able to distort or deny certain aspects of the world when we need to. Thus, to open one's mind completely to the truth, to reality in all its horrific and overwhelming intensity, to the fullest extent we can without precautions, is probably not the best thing to do. We need to know when to open our minds to truth, when to distort it into something healthier, and when to simply ignore it for our health's sake.
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And if psychoanalysis isn't your cup of tea, take the athletic frame of mind as an example. Athletes - the ones that rise above the rest - bank on a whole slew of psychological techniques for their success. A very common one is to dismiss all thoughts of doubt and to believe that one will win the gold medal.
But if one wanted to be more factual in their beliefs, one really ought to face up to the fact that he/she is up against unfavorable odds. In the 100m sprint, for example, one competes against eight other athletes, each one equally prepared and apt, statistically speaking, to win first place, and so the odds of winning are 1 in 8 - slim indeed. But the best athletes don't think this way - rather, they recognize the difference beliefs make to these odds - namely, that the conviction that one will win, as though it were written in the stars, raises the odds in his/her favor - not as much as his/her beliefs would have it, of course, but they are raised nonetheless. But this obviously takes one's frame of mind away from the facts, away from reality. Nonetheless, it is the best frame of mind to be in when the goal is to succeed in such events. Thus, it could be said, based on this fact, that success in whatever pursuit - health, survival, self-actualization - requires more than just an acute awareness of the conditions for success, but the deliberate tuning of one's awareness to a perspective or a set of truths - either objectively gathered or invented - that in part actually causes success.
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Stress and Performance
The Placebo Effect
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There are numerous other examples that demonstrate cases in which knowledge of the truth compromises health or performance. There are, for instance, the relation between stress and performance and the placebo effect. It is a well documented fact that as one experiences increased levels of stress, his/her performance improves up to a point. Beyond that point, however, further increases in stress degrade his/her performance. This performance can range from making a good impression in a job interview to handling emergency situations, from writing an exam to meeting a deadline at work. The graphical representation of this relation looks like figure 1 below. What the graph tells us is that we perform at our best under moderate levels of stress. What this means, however, is that one could be made to perform more efficiently just by being convinced that certain moderately stressful repercussions will ensue if he/she performs poorly. This could be a blatant lie. A boss, wishing that a certain employee would work harder, could tell him/her that if he/she doesn't finish some project before the week is out, the company would lose millions of dollars, even though in reality he/she has a whole month to finish. Likewise, someone with a tendency to buckle under the slightest pressure could be helped to perform better if he/she were told that there were few negative consequences for a bad performance, however much a lie it would be. In extreme circumstances, such lies could save one's life, such as when the Nazis would periodically pay the working Jews a surprise visit for the purpose of weeding out those who performed below the expected standard. Under such pressure, there's no doubt that a significant portion of the Jews were exterminated for poor performance whereas they probably would have performed better if the Nazi investigators simply didn't show up, or if the Jews were simply uninformed that the Nazis were watching. In such situations, and others involving life and death consequences, or simply consequences to one's health, what's of utmost importance is what one believes about the stresses and pressures he/she is under. It is clear that for one to perform at his/her best, it can sometimes be better for them not to know the truth.
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Figure 1: Stress vs. Performance
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The placebo effect is another good example. Experiments have shown that when subjects are told they are taking a pill that will alter their moods, sometimes bringing about elation, other times anger or other negative emotions, a large portion of them will actually experience the emotions they are told to expect. For some of these subjects, the pill is a genuine mood enhancer, whereas for other subjects, the pill is nothing but sugar - the placebo. Even the latter group of subjects experience the changes in mood they are told to expect. What this shows is that one's expectations alone can have a powerful influence over one's emotions. What this means is that one can be brought into a healthier psychological state simply by believing some mechanism is bringing him/her into that state. Such a belief could be the farthest thing from the truth, but in being held, it brings about a healthy state of mind. It might be interesting to conduct experiments to see whether the placebo effect could knowingly be used on oneself - that is, used as a pure mental technology (i.e. without mixing with a physical technology like a placebo pill) that triggers its own processes of healing. For example, suppose an experimenter told subjects about the placebo effect and how it works (which wouldn't involve lying), but then added that it has been shown that one can use the placebo effect on him/herself by simply telling him/herself to use it as a means for enhancing their mood (which, as far as I know, would involve lying). Then the experimenter would tell them to do so - that is, subjects would say to themselves, "Okay, I know the placebo effect can be used on myself - that's what they told me - so I'm going to do so. I am going to be happier," and then let the placebo effect take its course. If it works - that is, if they do become happier - then not only would this prove that the placebo effect can be used on oneself, but it wouldn't even be a lie anymore. If in subsequent experiments the experimenter told the subject that one can use the placebo effect on him/herself, and this study showed that they indeed can, then the experimenter would be telling the truth. If this can be done, then there's no telling how many other feats we can accomplish using the placebo effect on ourselves - a truly powerful mental technology it would be. Getting back to the classical experiments on the placebo effect, however, they give us yet another example of how oblivion to the truth can actually induce a healthier state of mind.
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So if in the last section, we entertained the notion that the philosopher's function was to provide the programs for the masses to choose from, then in this section, we entertain the notion that the philosopher's function is to be a healer to society - a sort of medic on a grand social level and with respect to perspectives and beliefs. That would be the philosopher's function if he/she were but willing to use his/her skills for the good of the community. Of course, many philosophers aren't nearly as altruistic or concerned about the welfare of others - they would rather voice their views and give not a damn about how it affects society at large. Of course, everyone, in this free world of opportunities, has the right to pursue whatever livelihood they see themselves fit for and able to take pleasure in, and so there is no law determining the obligations a philosopher has to society. But it is clear that the philosopher has the potential to affect society greatly, and if he/she has any sense of social responsibility, I say to him/her that you can be a healer. You can remedy the woes and plight of mankind. You must recognize the depth of your function, the lofty heights you are called to as a philosopher, the tremendous responsibility that weighs down upon you, as one who can have such a profound effect on society, one who has the skills and insight to craft better worldviews and perspectives that can bring society into better standards of living. You are the guides of mankind, leading him slowly into different worlds as history progresses, worlds that can raise him up to new and unforeseen heights or drag him down to the depth of poverty and despair. It is up to each philosopher, each on his/her own, to decide what's more important for the people: the truth as he/she sees it, or their health and welfare. Hopefully, and if his/her philosophy is right, both priorities can be satisfied, but one should not take this for granted - one must think on this matter very carefully and over a long period of time. However much the philosopher can bring society into a better state of mental health, it is most important that the orientation of his/her priorities is set straight - in accordance with his/her social function as healer.
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What follows are a few of my suggestions for what would make for a healthy system of cultural beliefs. I say these are only my suggestions, and are by no means undebatable. I take these suggestion from two sources: 1) from history as I understand it, and 2) from my own personal experiences as one who has monitored his own thoughts and values and has done what he can to steer them in a healthy direction. As an example, we might recall the admonition given earlier that science ought not to be ignored when the beliefs in question pertain to how one behaves towards and reacts to the physical world. We also mentioned how the application of mental technologies ought not to be made into law - for precisely the same reason that church and state ought to be separated. There are other rules of thumb that ought to be discussed, some more debatable than others. Those that are highly debatable may never be settled, but it is nevertheless important to discuss them and make clear what a healthy stance on the matter would probably be.
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Let's first say a thing about the apparent conflict that some readers may have noticed between our sanctioning of science and the message of love, kindness, and peace voiced by our Muslim philosopher. This conflict becomes apparent when one considers the religious background from which the latter comes. Islam, as with many other religion, conflicts with science on many points. So how are we to reconcile this problem? Well, it really comes down to a matter of which view is most effective in nurturing the health of the society it is aimed at. Although the maxim that science ought not to be ignored would be the ideal, we must take seriously the prospects that the target society may not accept such a maxim after all. If the prognosis for this seems bleak, then we are better off crafting a philosophy that they are more likely to accept, and this is where our Muslim philosopher has placed his bet. Furthermore, this maxim should be read carefully - it does not sanction the indoctrination of scientific truths upon a society, whether or not it is willing to accept them, but simply the avoidance of conflicting views - and even then, only those views that have a reasonable chance of incurring consequences from a subscriber's interactions with the world (whether Pluto is a planet or just an comet, for example, seems irrelevant to life here on Earth).
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Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Consequentialism
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Besides science, there's morality. I feel that every society should have some moral compass. An amoral perspective on reality could too easily be abused - that is, taken as an excuse to sanction any behavior whatsoever. But what specific actions or states of affairs are deemed to be moral is another matter. It would all depend on the specific circumstances surrounding the society at the time. We will not get into these specifics, but we will say that, although it should be left to each society to decide its own moral standards, there is a small subset of morals that, in my view, can be universalized to almost all societies under almost all conditions. It's perhaps the most simple, and desirable, moral precept one could keep in mind: not to harm one another. The reason this precept applies so universally is not only because of how important human wellbeing is, but because there is a firm logical grounding from which it can be defended - and that is utilitarianism, the philosophy that pain constitutes that which is wrong and pleasure that which is right - not merely for the individual in his selfish ways but for all humankind impartially. We will not argue too rigorously for a utilitarian philosophy, partially because we have already done so elsewhere in this website, but also because our concern is not to focus on the truth of particular philosophies such as this, but to demonstrate their usefulness in helping mankind. In other words, regardless of whether it is true or not, it does support reasons to defend the wellbeing of everyone - in terms of their happiness and the prevention of harming others - which is something we not only all want, but we all have a visceral moral sensibility for. It only requires the construction of solid arguments by professional mental technologists in order to be put into full effect. Of course, as a mental technology, a utilitarian philosophy ought to be understood as conditional (as should every philosophy used as a mental technology), for there are bound to be certain circumstances when harming others is necessary - such as justified war or the punishment of criminals. But under ordinary circumstances, utilitarianism certainly strikes at the heart of the more universal - and human - sentiments of morality.
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That being said, I also think it's unrealistic to expect that a society can rid itself of evil in all its manifestations. In fact, to believe it is probably quite dangerous - it would be tantamount to believing that one can fully abstain from certain acts considered to be wrong, such as lying, and attempting to do so. Not only is one bound to fail every now and again, but it might be unhealthy or damaging under certain conditions, such as lying to a murderer about the whereabouts of an innocent victim he/she is pursuing. The attempt of a society to repress and eradicate all its vices to the utmost extreme - that is, exhaustively - is sure to backfire on more than just a few occasions. Brute and direct repression of something that is so natural and immutably forthcoming only works for a short while after which time it usually explodes with unpredictable and catastrophic force. Thus, the best a society can do to manage its vices - foremost crime and injustice, but other problems as well - is to keep it at a workable minimum - or better yet, an optimum - that is, the level at which it can be most effectively managed and the general good preserved. In fact, if possible, there ought to be mechanisms put in place to convert such vices into benefits - for example, while prisoners are kept behind bars, it might do society some good if they were put to work, producing goods or even services useful to the public (with quality control firmly in place, of course). They - criminals and society alike - might even benefit if psychotherapy and education were made available to them in the hopes that their criminal streak might be corrected. Of course, these specific measures are already in place in a lot of systems, and in those particular cases, I applaud those charged with installing and maintaining them, but in other cases where these measures are not taken, I strongly encourage those who oversee these systems to consider reforming their methods.
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Waste, Crime, Psychological Problems, and Old Useless Ideas - Byproducts Galore
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In general, society ought to invest much time and effort into the construction of systems that convert vice into virtue, not only in criminal cases, but in any context where vice lurks about. For example, ADHD children are commonly known to have problems paying attention and sitting still in school, their education being compromised as a consequence. Rather than impose harsh discipline on these children, however, many education systems are implementing special learning environments that are better suited to these children, environments that really do grab the elusive attention of these children and inspire them to learn. By and large, then, systems - whether economic, political, environmental, or whatnot - that convert to good or "recycle" their undesired byproducts rather than dispose of them - byproducts such as waste, crime, psychological problems, old and useless ideas, etc. (see sidenote ) - fair better in the long run than systems that don't. Thus, it is to our advantage to take a "recycling" approach, not only to social vices, but to all systems whose "waste products" are harmful or undesirable.
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At the same time, however, society must be wary of becoming too dependent on the benefits of a recycling approach, for then the demand for the vices it is intended to minimize increases. Without such vices, the benefits they are converted into may no longer be possible. The utilitarian perspective still stands - that is to say, vices are still vices, the pain and suffering that ensue from them still evil. To put this another way - the reverse way - we should never equate pain with good or pleasure with bad. Many of the cultural blunders in history can be traced back to this mistake. The old medieval Christian notion that to suffer was good, that to be a martyr was pleasing in God's eye, caused so much unnecessary flagellation and torture. It was thought that to go through, or to put one through, so much pain and suffering was permissible because it meant not only redeeming one of sin but securing one a place in Heaven, but this reasoning was highly unknowable - that is, mostly based on scripture and faith - and upon which much doubt was cast when science disproved many of the foundations upon which the religion rested. Another example of the equating of pain and good was the Nazi's treatment of the Jews throughout the 1930's and the second world war. In medieval Christian Europe, it was one's own pain and suffering that was considered good, and in Nazi Germany, it was the pain and suffering of a class of people thought to be inferior. But it was plain to the rest of the western world that the Nazi's treatment of the Jews was outrageously wrong, and they took action against the Nazi army when Germany made aggressive strides towards conquering Europe. I am confident in my assertion that the culprit in these, and many other, ideological catastrophes was the equating of pain with good, in one way or another, and pleasure with bad. As mentioned before, however, we do need to recognize those occasions when such an equation is necessary, such as abstaining from the pleasures of a destructive substance or habit (like drugs), but even in the midst of such occasions, it should be understood that the abstinence of pleasure or the endurance of pain is a necessary evil, not an inherent good.
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Another major religious blunder is the reliance on an afterlife to solve problems in this life. The afterlife, like the faith that pain and suffering will be rewarded in Heaven, is too much of an unknown to invest any dependence on. Too many important things in this life get ignored or lose their perceived value when one counts on an afterlife to set them straight. That's not to say that a belief in the afterlife is dangerous - simply a reliance on one. MM-Theory suggests there is an afterlife for all of us, one in which our experiences continue in a different form and in which we most probably will lose our sense of individuality, but nothing is posited insofar as what we will encounter therein or whether it will have any bearing on this life and its many problems. So long as such a belief does not drag one's attention away from the important things in this life, that belief is rather innocuous and may in fact provide a bit of needed spiritual vitality to one's earthly journey.
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Values Like Marriage
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One ought not commit oneself to certain principles or values too tenaciously or over an entire lifetime. Principles and values are important, and we ought to observe at least a few healthy ones, but we also have a tendency to commit ourselves to these principles and values as if they hold under all conditions and for all time. This is not true, for the world is a place of change, and as one set of circumstances gives way to others, the principles and values that work best in helping one through will also change. We often find that certain principles and values we hold dearly bring us into conflict when circumstances seem to work against them, and a lot of the time, we feel we must fight to uphold our principles and values only for the sake of those principles and values themselves. That is to say, if only we didn't feel so strongly about those principles and values, we wouldn't have a problem. Therefore, the best attitude to take is to allow our principles and values to bend under exceptional circumstances and to be dropped all together if at a later point in our lives they prove more problematic than helpful. This may be difficult, and down right inappropriate for some, because principles and values are often thought to be universal or unconditional, and thus to defy them is simply immoral. Well, it's obviously quite difficult to sway one away from this view if it constitutes one of his/her principles or values, one he/she holds onto just as tenaciously as those principles and values dictate, but if one feels the need to sustain a permanent hold on a particular principle or value, one that works well with the flexibility we are espousing here, it ought to be to allow oneself this very flexibility. That is to say, to be flexible with one's principles and values can be upheld as one of the foremost principles or values one commits him/herself to. And if this can be done on a personal level, it can also be done on a social level. We will have more to say on this in the section The Migration of Value below.
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Brought to a social level, this flexibility of principles and values can do wonders to help us through times of change, times that often result in violence and suppression of uprisings. If both citizens and government take the perspective that change is inevitable, and that our principles and values are adopted to help us deal with the particular conditions characterizing recent times, and that these conditions won't hold forever, it would instill an understanding of what our principles and values are best used for and a willingness to prepare for change when it seems immanent. What a healthy society needs is a political system that works through changes as smoothly as possible, as opposed to the more common violence and bloody revolution that results from groups of people holding onto principles and values that are responsible for the violence and bloodshed rather than for making our world a better place. Such a system may very well be in place already - going by the name of "democracy" - and if this is so, then all the better. Such systems work on the principle of open discussion, and this is key to working through change smoothly and peacefully. If this is what it takes to secure a healthy society, then democracy should certainly be put in place, but in any case, the system should be geared towards handling change in an effective manner beneficial to all.
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In a world rife with mental technologies, flexibility of mind is of the utmost importance. The one mistake we as humans make, and we do so way too often, is to attach ourselves to a particular belief system. We sink our roots into our chosen beliefs so deeply that we become dependent, like an addiction, on it. This is not to say that we must dispense with all beliefs and never sanction anything as true, but there's a difference between adopting a belief and becoming addicted to one. How does the latter happen? We become addicted to our beliefs when we invest our identities and our sense of self-worth into them. That is to say, when we define who we are and what makes us important by our beliefs. It is the difference, for example, between saying that one holds Christian beliefs and that one is a Christian. The reason this makes a difference is because when one identifies him/herself with his/her beliefs, any attack on those beliefs is taken as an attack on him/her. Thus, a very important rule of thumb for being flexible with one's beliefs, and also one's values, is to keep one's identity and one's sense of self-worth separate from those beliefs and values.
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The Objectification Process
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This is obviously easier said than done, and there is reason to believe that it is in our nature to identify ourselves in terms of some belief system. After all, beliefs and other cognitive tools, such as ideals, mental models, principles, and so on, are what we have always used to survive. It is what makes humans unique among the animal kingdom. We have talked at great length about this, tying it into the objectification process and its function in our survival, elsewhere in this website. It should be no great surprise, therefore, that we see disagreements in beliefs rising to the level of full scale violence and warfare. The tearing apart of those beliefs is experienced as a threat to one's own security - that is, as though without those beliefs, one's survival is no longer secured. The experience ends up being one according to which someone's survival is in jeopardy - either one's own or that of one's contender - and one ends up feeling as though one has no choice but to either sacrifice his/her own life or that of his/her contender. Of course, it isn't either one's life that is in jeopardy, but their beliefs. The point, however, is that in the identification of those beliefs with oneself and one's sense of self-worth, anything that is done onto those beliefs, like an attack, is felt as though it is done unto oneself. The question left lingering is whether this identification of beliefs with self is genetically hardwired into our nature - so that we are driven to fight for our beliefs as though we were fighting for our survival, and thus salvaging those beliefs so that we can utilize them for our survival - or if we can suspend our most prized beliefs without feeling a profound sense of insecurity and threat. But this may not matter in the end. If we must commit ourselves to a particular belief system, it might as well be one that allows for optimal flexibility in our other beliefs and values. If we can invest our identity and sense of self-worth into the belief that we can, and ought to, be flexible with our beliefs, this may be the key to a secure belief system, one that handles conflicting beliefs by adapting to them rather than defending itself against them or even attacking them head-on. And if it is possible to abstain from attaching our beliefs to our identity and sense of self-worth all together, much like the Buddhist strive to do, all the better. But either way, there are ways of avoiding such attachments, and this is vitally important for remaining flexible and refraining from death-match style confrontations with those who oppose our beliefs.
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These are a few of my suggestions for bringing a society, and individuals, into a healthy mental state. But as suggestions taken from personal experience and opinion, they are nowhere near as reliable as the hands-on historical experiences that we as a species have been through. It would help if an in-depth study was conducted investigating the relationship between religious and ideological beliefs across the world and throughout history and the state of psychological and sociopolitical health enjoyed by the societies holding those beliefs. It seems fairly clear to me that those religions that encourage the tenacious commitment to the defining precepts upholding them don't fair too well over the long haul. When times of change bear upon them and induce pressure to adapt or face bloody uprising and warfare, they make life miserable for their devotees. Other religions that promote tolerance of diversity and tranquility of mind in the face of adversity, on the other hand, seem to deal with sociopolitical stress and turbulence very well (or as well as any society facing such stress and turbulence can). But this is, again, one man's opinion. The confirmation of these conjectures ought to be established by more scientific means, such as massive historical and sociopolitical research projects. The extraction of correlations should be attempted, correlations between beliefs and health. Unfortunately, there are bound to be too many confounding variables. Cultural beliefs, politics, and sociological climates, although bearing tight causal connections to each other, are too complex and change too abruptly for any clear trends to stand out. And even when they do stand out, it is difficult to say whether a causal relation can be deduced or if it is simply a correlation. But this is no reason not to try. It may be extraordinarily difficult to discern any definite results, but even hazy results are better than nothing. Studies might even be done on small groups of volunteers in controlled settings whereby the interactions between beliefs and social dynamics can be objectively observed. And if history were kind enough to allow us to persist in such studies, after a few millennia, we might have enough data to draw some clear pictures after all (it is a slow process recall).
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Objective studies are important when it comes to these matters. Many of us in the modern western world agree that the old archaic way of indoctrinating truth - namely, by preaching it dogmatically with severe legal consequences for any dissenters - is tantamount to tyranny and atrocious human rights violations. But many of us disagree on what were the precise elements of the underlying belief systems that allowed it to be so. Many hardnosed scientists and atheists, for example, point the finger at the belief in God. Others blame it on a belief in metaphysics. This seems rather silly to me. It seems to me that the major culprits are, as mentioned above, the equating of suffering with good, excessive reliance on an afterlife, and a reluctance to adapt one's beliefs to changes. A belief in God or a metaphysical extension to reality seems all too general to me, too indirect, and too common across a wide variety of different people and cultures to be as dangerous as these scientists and atheists claim. The three elements just cited, among possible others, seem much more specific, direct, and common among the more destructive belief systems. To point the finger at something so general, and often vague, as God, metaphysics, or religion itself is like blaming a bug in a program on the whole program itself - as if to say that Microsoft Word or Internet Explorer themselves are bugs and are the root cause anytime a computer running them crashes. Another common scapegoat that is thrown around, one that I actually agree with in this case, is the root of the problems with Marxism. The problem is often blamed on the lack of competition that exists in the commercial and industrial sectors, leading to a lack of motivation to produce high quality goods and services. I say again that I'm inclined to agree with this one, mostly due to how specific, direct, and measurable it is, but my opinion is no more reliable than the sweeping claims of those scientific and atheistic types who hold the belief in God and metaphysics accountable for the dark and disturbing side of religion we've seen throughout history. My opinions, like theirs, ought to be scrutinized for their objective and scientifically verifiable validity. The best way to do this is to conduct major studies over a vast array of religions and ideologies from across the world and throughout history and look for correlations between very specific commonalities in beliefs and values and states of sociopolitical, as well as individual, health.
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Greek Enlightenment
Italian Renaissance
The Social Instinct
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A much more promising approach would be to look back at certain eras in history rather than particular religions and ideologies. We should look back at those times in history when great strides forward were made in the conditions man lived in. Two periods in particular that come to mind are the Greek Enlightenment and Italian Renaissance. These were certainly great periods of improvement for mankind. But what instigated them? What ideas and ways of thinking fueled the progress of these times? The common factor in both periods was an openness to explore new and unconventional ideas, and novel perspectives of reality that were unfamiliar and even overly eccentric for some people's tastes. It seems obvious, when we stand back and think about this, that this is the sort of courageous thinking a society needs when it finds itself steeped too deeply in a traditional and habitual mode of thinking, a mode that grows harder and more inflexible the more set the establishment is in its old ways, a mode that seems to be driving society, not along the road of progress it once was on, but along the road of decline, and ultimately disaster. People must learn to be brave and speak out when the path they see their own society headed down leading away from true progress and the ideal state that characterizes a happy and healthy society. Society must foster an open atmosphere for such voices to be heard. These voices are the beacons harkening their own society back to its ideal state. When the atmosphere is open enough, there will be numerous voices, and of all different sorts, tugging society in many directions at once, but the collective human instinct is such that the bulk of those voices will be tugging in the right direction, and the bulk of ears that listen will know which voices those are. All other times in history, at least western history, were characterized by a shortage of courageous voices and intolerance for those few that did exist. We know these times as dark ages. But, again, this admittedly opinionated view of mine ought to be tested against hard objective research and careful historical analysis. It still remains my hope, however, that out of such research and analysis will come recognizable trends in the type of thought motivating certain historical periods and movements, trends that we can use to push ourselves towards a brighter future.
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Let me just leave the reader with a thought to ponder over before ending this section. Societies are very much like individuals. In fact, it might even be said that the cultural beliefs and practices of a society represent the cultural beliefs and practices of the average individual of that society. So in a way, societies are nothing more than a resonation of the average individual's personality. The average individual embodies the values, beliefs, customs, and skills that his/her society holds dear. Thus, whatever he/she is inclined to do or say is also what the society at large is inclined to do or say - on the global scene that is. It would make sense, then, to propose that whatever is good for the average individual in terms of his/her psychological health and wellbeing is also good for the society. I would like to end on this note because it leaves us with a general rule of thumb for conjecturing other suggestions for a strong and healthy society - namely, that in questions of what's psychologically healthy for a society, it is useful to consider what's psychologically healthy for the individual. If it would be good for the average individual to stop stressing over every little demand that life throws at him/her, then it would probably also be good for his/her society. If it would be good for the average individual to nurture his/her self-confidence, then it would probably also be good for his/her society. Anything that a competent social worker or psychotherapist would recommend to individuals would probably work on society as a whole as well. We should think about this and what it implies about our own society. What sort of traumas have we been through in the past and how are we coping with them today? Are we dealing with our problems in a constructive manner or are we, like many-a-drug addict, escaping from them through dependence on material pleasures? Are we primarily motivated by fear of failure and burdened by self-doubt or are we a confident society that thrives on new challenges and the excitement of engaging in life? All this, of course, assumes that the society in question runs perfectly democratically - that is, with all its decisions and actions on the world scene reflecting the will of the people - and not the whims of a dictator who represses the will of his people in order to exert his own (even then, however, such sociopolitical dynamics might be compared to the psychoanalytic dynamics of repression and other such defense mechanisms). Nonetheless, a psychotherapeutic approach may be just what the doctor ordered - each society taking it upon itself, or, if appropriate, another society suited to the job taking it towards a different one - and if such an idea catches on, it just may mark the beginning of a long and much deserved healing process.
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Hoppers
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We spoke earlier about the importance of being flexible in one's values. We also said this was easier said than done. Therefore, we need to devote a section to expounding how to make this easier. The deliberate alteration of one's values is exceedingly more difficult than the alteration of one's beliefs (assuming those beliefs aren't attached to any values or emotionally laden in some other way), for it is just the nature of values, not only to drive one to uphold them, but to drive off any thoughts of changing them. They are intricately intertwined with our emotions. This section, therefore, could also be considered a bridge from our discussions on mental technologies of the cognitive variety to ones of the more emotional kind. Taken to extremes, emotional technologies would be such that one's mood can be switched on or off like a light switch, but technology of this caliber is unfortunately far beyond my expertise, and so I will not be able to shed any light on how such a feat might be accomplished. Citizens of a more advanced society, like those hoppers we entertained earlier, might be able to, but not us, not yet. What I do intend to propose, and have tested on myself with some measure of success, is that with disciplined practice and due diligence, one can gradually bring him/herself into a more tranquil state of mind in which turbulent and violent emotions are experienced less often. This is accomplished by what I call the "migration of value" - that is, a systematic and carefully thought out method by which one "reprograms" his/her values to exist in harmony with his/her lifestyle and common surroundings. Because one's surroundings are always in flux, however, this is an ongoing, and sometimes slow, process. But as long as one stays focused and doesn't drop the ball, it is well worth the effort.
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Not Just For The Depressed
To Hold Back On Happiness
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Before we get to the heart of this technique, however, let's outline the two circumstances under which one can attempt to alter their emotions - 1) in the midst of those emotions, and 2) before they arise. In my own experience, which of these circumstances one attempts to alter his/her emotions under makes all the difference in the world. It is numerous times easier to curb one's emotions before they begin to stir than after. I have yet to find a truly effective method for neutralizing my negative emotions once they're in full force, but I know I stand a much better chance of preventing them from arising if I think the right thoughts beforehand. And these thoughts are all the more easy to believe if I've programmed my values in the right way - by the method of migration we will explore shortly. This is not to say that the neutralizing of negative emotions is impossible once they've reared their ugly heads, nor that their prevention beforehand is a sure fire solution. There have been many times when I've been able to overcome miserable moods by thinking the right thoughts, and there have been times when despite my best efforts, my positive thinking gave way to an all-to-powerful flood of depression and anguish. When nothing seems to work, like in the latter case, I strongly advocate talking to someone you trust. Nothing beats another human being who cares enough to listen with a sympathetic ear and offers his/her support and love. I advocate this first and foremost, above all other techniques, but when we're alone in our emotional struggles, or if we simply feel competent enough to take a stab at their alteration, there are certain mental technologies we can use, the ones that follow. So let's explore the dynamics at play here in more detail, starting with the first circumstance - the alteration of emotions when they are in full swing.
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Serotonin
Oxytocin
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Speaking neurologically and chemically, what's probably happening when one's mood takes a dive is that the brain becomes depleted of certain key neuro-chemicals. The one such chemical, or the lack thereof, that neuroscientists implicate in depression is serotonin.
When found in abundance in the brain, serotonin usually makes us quite happy, but when levels are low, we are usually depressed. Thus, it would make sense that serotonin has an inhibiting effect, either directly or indirectly, on the neural circuitry corresponding to the negative thoughts that flood our minds when we're depressed. Oxytocin is another chemical whose depletion might play a role. Oxytocin is mostly correlated with feelings of love and interpersonal bonding. It is noticeably released when two people embrace each other in a hug, for example. Either way, the experience of depression certainly feels as though there is an ever-present void in the background - something missing, some emptiness longing to be filled - and this void is conveniently represented by the absence of serotonin. This makes sense when our attempts to bring ourselves out of the muck of depression through positive thinking fails, because positive thinking corresponds to the firing of neurons, and unless this firing can supply the serotonin we need - it will have no effect. It may have the effect of inhibiting our negative thoughts, but not our mood. To inhibit negative thoughts, all these neurons need is to forge inhibitory connections, but to truly make us happy without the gravity of depression pulling us back down, these neurons need some extra help. They need the release of serotonin, the effect of which would be the permanent inhibition of those neurons corresponding to negative thinking and depression. Their inhibition would be on "auto-pilot" so to speak, and the brain would be freed to think of other things. But this can be difficult, and without the support of serotonin, our brains must exert a lot of effort to inhibit our negative thoughts by keeping up the firing of those neurons corresponding to our positive thoughts.
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Of course, this is only my experience, and there are indeed those who seem to have a knack for killing their negative moods with positive thoughts, or keeping their minds on other things - or so they say. These individuals undoubtedly have neural mechanisms in place for more effectively releasing the right neurotransmitters. But it is not as though these mechanisms are completely lacking in all other individuals. Although it is more difficult for me to think myself out of negative moods, it has worked on occasion. There seem to be two techniques that work in this way. First, there is the conjuring of thoughts that I can fully believe. It's one thing to tell myself positive things, but it's quite another to believe them. But if I can tell myself something I can truly believe, it seems to work - sometimes more effectively than others, but it works. Belief requires more than just thinking the right thoughts; it also requires seriously considering their plausibility. If I were to think "Life isn't so bad because such-and-such", I usually have to follow that up with "Well, is such-and-such really true? Can I really believe that?" and I attempt to answer those questions seriously and honestly. One must be careful not to sabotage such an exercise - there is a tendency to want to wallow in one's own misery, after all. The point is to see if you can believe in these thoughts, not whether you currently do or want to, and this requires discipline and self-honesty. The second technique I use is to think of something creative - something I have not thought up before and strikes me as insightful. I suspect it is the creativity of these thoughts that works to bring myself out of sullen moods because I usually can't use these thoughts more than a few times - that is, they work the first time, maybe even the second time, but after that, it is no longer a creative act to think them - it's just repetition - and therefore the joy of creativity withers away, and all they become is empty and powerless thoughts that must rely on their believability if they are to have any lasting effect. Thus, in order to make good use of this technique, I must be creative enough to conjure up something new every time. Creativity is a hard beast to train however - it doesn't lend itself to a rigorous methodology that easily - and therefore I more often have to wait for this technique to make itself available to me, which doesn't happen that often, before I can apply it. But when these techniques do lend themselves to easy use, they are effective, and I suspect either one or the other (or both) are the primary means by which the brain releases the neurotransmitters necessary for happiness, and which those fortunate enough to wield their emotions with skill and control do it so efficiently.
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There have been a few times when, after succeeding in halting negative thoughts with something more positive that I could believe in, I still felt quite irritable. In these moments, I feel as though I've settled the matter that was bothering me, but I still feel unusually sensitive to adverse stimuli such as hurtful words or misfortunes - even mild and trivial ones that I would normally brush off without batting an eye. If these positive thoughts worked in virtue of releasing the necessary neurotransmitters, why would I still feel so vulnerable? It could be because not all positive thoughts that work necessarily negate our negative thoughts, and so those negative thoughts might still have some vitality to them, although they would be inhibited. For example, if someone called you a nasty name, and it got to you, you might tell yourself that this person doesn't really matter, and that there are a lot of other people who like and respect you. Focusing on those people who like and respect you, you might be able to put those hurtful words out of your mind - but it doesn't negate the fact that the person said them to you. In such situations, your positive thoughts may be able to keep your negative thoughts inhibited, but because there is still some truth to your negative thoughts, they may still stand a chance of overpowering the inhibition keeping them suppressed. All they would need is a subtle push, a mild stimulus, in order to ignite. With enough stimulation, they may turn the tables on your positive thinking - from being the inhibited to being the inhibitor - and thereby stop the production of the neurotransmitters associated with happiness. It is not the lack of believability that is the weakness of our positive thoughts - there is little question they are true - but their inability to falsify our negative thoughts. In order to permanently shut off our negative thoughts, and thereby allow the production of positive neurotransmitters to thrive, we must not only think alternative thoughts that are more positive, but mutually exclusive thoughts that completely deny the validity of our negative thoughts. Nonetheless, focusing on the positive, even if we are left vulnerable and more sensitive to negative stimuli, is better than wallowing in the negative.
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This might also shed some light on the psychoanalytic understanding of repression. When we repress negative thoughts, we might succeed in turning them off - and at that point, our conscious mind can go on to think of other things, much like I would do when I felt as though I "settled the matter". But because psychoanalytic theory says that those repressed thoughts remain in the unconscious, and actively haunt us from there, we may have an account of this if those thoughts are kept alive by the fact that they still hold some truth for us. If that were the case, then those thoughts would be unconscious only so long as we inhibit them with our more positive conscious thoughts, but as soon as the mind meanders, it runs the risk of stumbling onto those negative thoughts, at which point their revival can be difficult to undo in virtue of the remnants of validity that still linger. When that happens, it requires some effort to bring our positive thoughts back in and thereby repress them once again.
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Formal Settings and Procedures
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But as I say, the techniques outlined above for alleviating depression and other negative moods don't always work - not while in the midst of those emotions anyway. Even so, there are still things one can do to prevent things from getting worse - in the short run and the long run. One of the most important things, in my experience, is to maintain flexibility in one's thoughts and values - the same notion as discussed in the last section. It is common for one to want to make commitments to certain principles under emotional duress. We often hear children, for example, uttering "I'm never gonna play with Toby again!" after a friend (Toby) makes them angry. Even though such rash decisions are far less often made with adults, the impulse is still there to some degree. Emotions, whether one is a child or reaching old age, have a tendency to want to place a hold on our principles, reprogramming our thought systems, such that their decree can be satisfied even after they have dissipated. It is important, especially when the emotions in question are negative and highly irrational, not to commit to any principles or values they tempt us with - at least, not in the moment. There might be occasions when the principles or values they pressure us to adopt are worthy and actually beneficial, such as when fear warns us not to venture into a shady neighborhood, but the decision to commit to these principles and values can be made with much better judgment and soundness when our emotions have blown over and our clear and rational thinking has returned. I find, in my practices, that this is not as hard as it sounds. It doesn't seem necessary to fight against my thoughts in these cases, just to remember that it's okay to change my mind after I've cooled off. I allow my thoughts and propensities to commitment to pass through my mind, as if merely watching a show rather than participating in any real drama, and if they urge me to commit to certain principles or values, I let them take their toll - but I also remember that these commitments won't feel nearly as justified after the emotional turmoil has left, and I tell myself, in those moments, that it's okay to break my commitments if I ever feel like doing so, for I know I'm not in the best of states in these moments, and to hold true to any commitment I make could be to my disadvantage and detrimental to my health.
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Fortunately, dealing with our emotions while they are in full force is not the only way to live a life of minimal anguish. If we can get to our emotions before they get to us, our chances of success multiply. Emotions are like a ball of snow rolling down a mountainside. As it collects snow, getting bigger and bigger, it gains momentum, and the more momentum it gains, the harder it is to stop. The best time to exercise control over our emotions is right at the beginning, when we first encounter the stimuli that trigger them. This is not quite the technique of the "migration of value" that we will be talking about soon, but it works a lot better than trying to think our way out of sulky moods after they've already settled in. One would use the same techniques mentioned above - to try thinking of something more positive and believable, or something creative and insightful - and if these work, one's mind should have successfully inhibited any negative thoughts that would otherwise have gained a strong foothold over the mind and dominated it for an indefinite amount of time. But if these techniques don't work, one ought to seek out someone to talk to, and always remember not to commit to rash and unreasonable principles or values too hastily.
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One need not wait for the stimuli of emotions to surface before he/she takes measures to mitigate them. The migration of value is something that can be, and indeed must be, applied before any negative emotions stir. In fact, it is an ongoing process, like eating right and exercising to keep one's health up and avoid illness more readily. But what is the migration of value? Well, let's spell it out. We are not mere logic chopping, thought processing, data collecting and storing organisms. We are very emotional creatures. Our emotions tend to get attached to things - they get attached to objects, to people, to ideas, to situations, to memories, and a whole gamut of other things. Take people, for example. We have loved ones. If a loved one dies or departs from our lives in some way, we get affected emotionally. That reflects an emotional attachment to a person. We call these emotional attachments "values". We value the things we're emotionally attached to. To put the point succinctly, then, the migration of value is the process by which the value attached to specific things gets transferred, or "migrates", to other things. A simple example might be getting a better computer. If you like your computer - that is, you value it - and then upgrade to a newer, better, faster, more powerful computer, all of a sudden you don't value your old computer as much - in fact, you wouldn't mind giving it away or throwing it out. At the same time that you've lost all value for your old computer, however, you've gained the same amount of value, or more, for your new one. It is as if the value migrated from your old computer to your new one.
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| Definition: The Migration of Value | | The process by which our emotional attachments to things, ideas, situations, etc., which constitute our values, get transferred, or "migrate", to other things, ideas, situations, etc. |
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Of course, nothing literally "migrates", but there certainly seems to be some re-programming in the brain such that the MODs corresponding to our values - that is, our emotional states - have their connections to the MODs corresponding to our experiences of the things they're attached to - like a new computer - reconfigured. If we were to demonstrate this graphically, we might draw it out as in figure 2a. Most likely, however, there aren't individuated MODs corresponding to each and every entity we could attach value to, but the more abstract illustration of figure 2b demonstrates the abstract notion of value detaching from one entity and attaching to another. It demonstrates, in a metaphorical way, what's happening in the brain. What's literally happening therein is a little more vague, but we can be certain that a specific process is indeed going on that bears a full correspondence, in all its details, to the experience of value and how it migrates.
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Figure 2a: The migration of value (brain)
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Figure 2b: The migration of value (schematic)
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Now, this process occurs with more than just computers and other material things. Our values are attached to much greater and more abstract things, like ideas and social arrangements. As an example of the latter, we make arrangements with others when there is a task to be accomplished, arrangements that guarantee fairness in terms of work load. For example, if a husband and wife were cleaning the house, they might agree that one sweeps the floors and vacuums, while the other cleans the bathrooms and washes the dishes. But if the one charged with washing the dishes only does half of them and does a shoddy job of cleaning the bathrooms, and the other does both his/her chores thoroughly, the latter would be understandably upset. Why? Because he/she values fairness, and if that fairness has been compromised, he/she will feel his/her values have been betrayed. But suppose the one whose job it was to wash the dishes and the bathrooms makes amends by promising to get to them tomorrow. His/her spouse could accept this and thereby feel better. In this case, the value attached to the chores of today has been transferred to the chores of tomorrow. It has been transferred from something compromised, causing hurt, to something uncompromised, alleviating the hurt.
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Other examples can be found in international politics, particularly when antagonizing nations sit down to negotiate terms by which an arrangement agreeable to both sides can be met. For example, in the early 1960s, when Kennedy was president of the United States, Egypt and Israel had been antagonizing each other for quite some time. At the time, the US was trying to play a key role in the eradication of such animosity, and Kennedy's strategy was to show goodwill towards Egypt (by supplying surplus wheat and other grains) in the hopes that Egypt would appease the US by forgetting its issues with Israel. To put this in terms of the migration of value, we would say that Egypt forsake its belligerent tendencies towards Israel in exchange for continued economic support from the US - that is, it migrated its values from its affairs with Israel to its affairs with the US - from militant aggression to economic influx. By focusing on the supply of US grains instead, Egypt was able to forget about its issues with Israel (at least temporarily), and for the time being, Israel was not a major concern of theirs - that is, there was no "emotional" stirrings (if nations could experience emotions) from Israel, whereas before there was plenty.
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In general, the migration of value can be seen anytime one sacrifices his/her values but falls back on different values to compensate. It can be seen when one says things along the lines of, "All right, I can accept my losses, but I want certain conditions met." or, "All right, you win the argument, but you didn't have to be so rude." In the former case, the speaker is sacrificing his/her losses in exchange for the conditions he/she insists be met - that is, his/her values migrate from the losses to the conditions. In the latter case, the speaker is sacrificing his/her point in the argument in exchange for his/her contender apologizing for rudeness - that is, his/her values migrate from winning the argument to receiving an apology. It is clear, then, that the migration of value is an intrinsic part of our basic psychology and happens all the time.
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It would seem, then, that value is like a parasite that latches onto our attachments - onto our material possessions, our beliefs, our life situations, the people we're surrounded by, and so on. When any one of these attachments gets compromised - that is, something happens to it such that we become emotionally distraught - the value attached to it suffers - that is, like a parasite, it starves. It has an insatiable drive to survive, so when the compromised attachment fails to sustain it, it pushes us to either fix the compromised attachment - to remedy whatever it is we're emotionally distraught about - or to abandon that attachment for another one. The latter course of action is what we're calling the "migration" of value. It seeks out attachments that are ideal for its survival - that is, attachments that are uncompromised and thus capable of sustaining positive emotions and peace of mind.
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In the above examples, the migration of value occurs naturally - unconsciously in a sense. If we are to make it into a mental technology, we must apply this process to ourselves deliberately rather than passively waiting for it to overtake us, and that means being very conscious of how it works. If allowed to go unchecked, our values can migrate into dangerous territories, characterized by attachments to unhealthy objects, ideas, and lifestyles. It can also lead us into insoluble conflict with our surroundings and circumstances, such as when retaliation between warring parties escalates to more and more violent and deadly levels. One side accepts defeat in exchange for revenge at a later time. If we can control where our values migrate, we can be more assured that they attach themselves to healthier things and lifestyles. Over time, if we successfully steer them in such a direction, valuing things that are healthier for us and allowing us to live in harmony with the circumstances we find ourselves in, there will be much fewer stimuli triggering our negative moods. Everything, or nearly everything, in our lives will be synchronized with the conditions for a happy life. This certainly can be done, as my own experience proves to me, by the proper programming of our thoughts and careful attention to the attachments we find ourselves making. There is a fair degree of control we can exert over the forging of these attachments even when they are in the process of being formed. With the right cognitive programming, we can monitor these attachments and determine whether particular ones are good for us or not. We can also deliberately, and gradually, change our unhealthy attachments to more healthy ones. To understand more clearly how this works, a few examples are in order.
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Let's suppose that a Christian moves to a new nation - say because of a new job - and the nation is predominantly Muslim. Back in his/her country of origin, it may have been the norm to look down upon other religions, judging them as wayward and sinful. Let's suppose our Christian immigrant carried this prejudice with him/her as he/she pursued this irrefusable, and necessary, job opportunity. He/she is now in a sticky predicament in which religious folks he/she has been brought up and indoctrinated to scorn surround him. What is he/she to do? He/she can go two ways about this. He/she can focus primarily on the differences between his/her religion and that of the nation he/she just moved to, those differences striking him as reproachable, or he/she can focus on the similarities, the values he/she and they share in common. Surely, Muslims and Christians aren't so different as not to share any values in common. Both believe in the same God, both observe and respect the ten commandments, both believe in the sacredness of Christ and the message of love that he preached, and so on. Therefore, it would be to the Christian's advantage to guide the migration of his/her values in a pro-Muslim direction. Indeed, it would be to his/her personal advantage, as sulking in his/her contempt for Muslims ways, which now constantly surround him/her, would undoubtedly embitter him/her and harden his/her heart as the years go by. Unfortunately, however, this is often the route taken by the values held by many who find themselves in similar situations - whether they are Christian or otherwise. People often feel that a strong defense of their values needs to be upheld lest they be compromised by the circumstances they find themselves in. It takes an enlightened and courageous soul to rise above this propensity and approach his/her new surroundings with an open mind. If our Christian newcomer were such an individual, he/she might focus on those points in Muslim culture that he/she shares in common with them. If Muslims value the worship of the same God as he/she, for example, he/she might take that to be a commendable quality. He/she wouldn't even have to change his/her values in order to recognize this, for it is something he/she values already. The ignorance of those points in Muslim culture that he/she finds less commendable does not have to be taken as a betrayal of his/her own values; since there is nothing I can do about it anyway, he/she could tell him/herself, it wouldn't be a betrayal of my own values to ignore it. Focusing on all the positive points he/she can, he/she may grow to like his/her new Muslim neighbors. No doubt this will require some effort on his/her part, the effort of monitoring his/her thoughts, being sure not to slip into resentment and quick judgment, but it wouldn't be long before this effort becomes meager and soon disappears entirely. By that time, his/her values will have migrated from opposing Muslim ways to accepting them - if not celebrating them. Indeed, he/she may choose to carry on the migration and not only learn to celebrate Muslim ways, but partake in Muslim culture and values him/herself. The choice of how far to go with this is, of course, his/her own - he/she need not fully convert to Islam - but, indeed, why not? If the purpose is to harmonize one's values with one's surroundings and new life, what better way than to blend in completely. But, of course, a healthy dose of tolerance and respect for the religions and ways of life of those with whom you live is probably sufficient - the point is that the power to choose one's values, and thereby live an emotionally comfortable life, is in our hands.
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Of course, it is not enough to simply invest value into the things we share in common - otherwise, we could learn to love Nazis because, like us, they care for their children. We can't ignore the points on which we differ, not indefinitely. What can the Christian in our example above do to migrate his/her values away from those points on which he/she opposes the Muslim's ways? Well, the example of Egypt and Israel above gives us some insight. If we must tolerate something that we're inclined to despise, then the best way to proceed is to exchange that something for another thing. In the example of Egypt and Israel, Egypt exchanged the perpetuation of belligerence against Israel for the perpetuation of economic aid from the US, allowing their values to migrate from the former to the latter. In the example of the Christian, he/she might choose to overlook certain Muslim differences - say their lack of reverence for the Pope - for respect for his/her right to go to Church every Sunday. In that way, the value he/she holds for universal reverence of the Pope migrates to something more realistic. It is far more reasonable to expect that a society of Muslims respect a Christian's right to go to Church than for them to bow down to the Pope and revere him. Therefore, the Christian in this case stands a far greater chance of avoiding the experience of his/her values being betrayed. It's not guaranteed, of course, for if the Muslim nation he/she has just moved to is an especially militant one, particularly against all opposing religions, there is a chance that his right to go to Church may not only be disrespected, but made impossible due to a bombing of the very Church edifice that he/she frequents. But if they are this militant against other religions, it is surely absurd to suppose that they would adopt their values and practices - such as venerating the Pope - far more absurd than to suppose that they would keep the peace. But assuming the society is a peaceful one, this psychological move is very wise indeed.
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If I personally were to make this move, I would need some kind of standard by which to determine whether my new Muslim neighbors did indeed respect my right to go to Church, some kind of milestone. Unless such a milestone presents itself, I know I would have trouble finding closure on the issue - that is to say, I would not know how to decide whether my Muslim neighbors could officially be said to respect my right to go to Church. Therefore, I would recommend a specific time interval - say three month. If within three months, I encounter no opposition to my Church going, I would decide to interpret that as an indication that they do indeed respect my right to go to Church, and thereby let my issues with their lack of reverence for the Pope to dissolve. Of course, the risk is that if I do encounter such opposition, it becomes all the more difficult to attain the closure I need. One might reduce the risk by shortening the time interval, but this might also reduce the believability of the reasoning behind it. Nonetheless, if such opposition does come to pass, one can still salvage his/her goal of aligning his/her values with his/her new circumstances by refraining from committing to detrimental interpretations too rashly. One should always leave the possibilities open to new opportunities for healthy self-programming and avenues down which one's values can migrate. One might, for example, keep in mind that not all people are the same, even amongst a group of Muslims, and although some might hold unfair prejudices against other religions, others might be more tolerant. He/she might even seeking out the latter and form new social relations with them.
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Let's look at another hypothetical scenario. There are three people: person A, person B, and person C. Person A is friends with person B, but not with person C. In fact, person A and C are sworn enemies. Person A holds the motto: Any friend of my friend is a friend of mine. Any friend of my enemy is an enemy of mine. Little does person A know, however, that person B is friends with person C. Now what does person A do when he finds this out? Well, he has two mutually exclusive values to choose from: either make amends with person C or sever his ties with person B. Supposing both values are held with equal strength, he can either vacillate between the two, or decisively commit to one over the other. If he wasn't keen on actively applying mental technologies upon himself, he might naturally wallow in the former for a while, not knowing what to do, but if we was aware of the power of mental technologies and the migration of value, he may choose to do the healthy thing and invest all his value into cementing a bond of friendship with person C. Would he struggle with the value "Any friend of my enemy is an enemy of mine"? Probably - but if he were to think of it as - that is, if he were to run the program of - upholding the value "any friend of my friend is a friend of mine", then he could think of it as sacrificing the value "any friend of my enemy, is an enemy of mine" for a noble cause, and thereby transfer the value from upholding the latter motto to defending the former one as a cause. Once the friendship bond is formed, person A could seal the friendship by deliberately programming himself with the notion that now that he is friends with person C, there is no need to uphold the value "any friend of my enemy, is an enemy of mine", for no such enemy exists, thereby killing any remnants of value still clinging to that motto.
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Now, there are certain common techniques that seem to be at play here. First, it seems that values migrate most easily when there are other things they can migrate to, things that one already values to some degree. In the example of the Christian in a Muslim land, his/her values could migrate to those practices and beliefs that Muslims and Christians share in common, such as the belief in God or respect for the ten commandments. In the example of persons A, B, and C, person A's values can migrate away from animosity against person C to benevolence because person A values such benevolence under the conditions that so happen to hold in this case. The next step is to recognize that any sacrifice of the values one is trying to migrate away from is not in vain. Because he/she has invested all his/her value into the target attachments - like the commonalities between Muslim and Christian ways, or a friendly alliance between person A and C - he/she can think of such a sacrifice as being done for a higher cause - namely, the target attachments. If there is any remaining resentment over the sacrifice, one can migrate the compromised value that remains onto something else through an exchange. The Christian, for example, exchanges his/her need to see others revere the Pope for respect for his/her right to go to Church. Finally, one needs to bring closure to the migration by some official sign, something by which it can be decided that no values are being violated - such as the three months of tolerance the Christian hopes for, or the disappearance of an enemy for person A. This procedure may be carried out a multiplicity of times, allowing one's values to migrate from one attachment to another as they find their way to a healthier arrangement. This can take a long time because we're not infinitely creative - that is, we can't think of the most effective programs or the best things to attach our values to on the fly - nor are the circumstances defining our lives at the moment always optimal for the best values to hold. Therefore, one usually has to wait for certain opportunities to arise, opportunities like insight or moments of creativity, and also more social and tangible opportunities in one's life. But it's usually enough just to adopt the attitude that one ought to steer one's values in a healthy direction. That way, when the opportunities do arise, one is prepared to make the right decisions, and thereby bring him/herself gradually into a healthier lifestyle.
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To make this easier, and quicker, a first priority for one who hasn't much experience in the migration of value - that is, the deliberate control of it - would be to value the alteration of his/her values. That is to say, it becomes so much easier to apply this mental technology when one favors the notion of being able to change his/her values so lucidly. That way, there is far less resistance to such changes as is usually the case with most people. Values are quite steadfast, as we mentioned already, holding their positions in the mind against all kinds of pressures. Therefore, if one of our highest values is to skillfully guide the migration of values within ourselves, we can hold steadfast to that highest value while our others move about more fluidly. Such a state of mind makes life so much easier. It helps to bring our emotions in alignment with our daily situations and demands, and in that way reduces the risk of arousing our negative moods. We end up gaining the upper hand when the challenge is to adapt our lifestyles to new and unforeseen changes. We become flexible and agile so that we can get by in a much wider array of circumstances. But most importantly of all, we struggle far less with life and learn to enjoy it. We learn to appreciate the abundance of opportunities in life, for we are not bogged down with fears and aversions - rather, we are filled with a sense of freedom, with a sense that there are no predicaments that can get us down, for we have the dexterity to see ourselves through them without the overbearing weight of painful emotions. We know how to see the positive in everything, to see the value, and with that, a whole diverse world of opportunities opens up to us.
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We have explored how mental technologies can be used to improve one's personal life as well as life for whole societies. Now we will broaden our scope to include the course society takes through history to see if mental technologies can be used to guide us through. If they can, then it may not only be history over which we have control, but our very evolution. In this section, we will draw the links between cultural beliefs and values and the course history takes as it molds our environment and consequently our evolution. This link is, of course, not exclusive - that is, there are an abundance of other causal factors determining history and our evolution - but we will argue a case according to which the influence of our beliefs and values are obvious significant players. As such, we can exert some degree of control over where we go. At a certain point in this section, we will deviate from this broad outlook and focus again on the neurology of thought, taking a "programming" perspective once again, with the aim of proposing the ideal mindset for engaging in history in light of these ideas. But the main theme of this minor section will be foremost human history, how it can be interpreted according to MM-Theory, and what that implies about where we're headed and how much influence we can exert over our destiny.
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So what is this perspective that MM-Theory offers for a new look at history? History is the story of the countless worlds man has ventured through. Every people through every era held different religions and ideologies. They held different convictions about morality, cosmology, theology, the soul, and the origins of life, the afterlife, and human nature. The interpretation of history we get from modern science is similar except that these "worlds" cannot be understood as anything more than a metaphor - or perhaps psychological. According to the scientific vantage point, man is an animal that evolved from primates, and the modern species homo sapiens appeared on the scene approximately 200 thousand years ago. About 50 thousand years ago, he invented language, and along with that, art, religion, and a whole smorgasbord of imaginary constructs. About 10 thousand years ago, he invented agriculture, and around 3,000 B.C., he invented writing. Writing was a significant invention because it allowed complex and very specific ideas to take material form. We call this material form "documentation", and the power of documentation is that it changes very little over extremely long periods of time and can be disseminated to a wide range of people. Therefore, one can promulgate powerful ideas, rich in details and specificity, with the assurance that they will be received by a vast array of people completely unaltered and permanently fixed so that it can serve as a constant reminder - much like a computer on a network can broadcast programs, downloading them on each and every other computer without differences or alterations. This is a very powerful tool by which one can build whole civilizations and empires, which is exactly what emerged on the world scene after 3,000 B.C. Because writing served as one of the great cornerstones of civilization from this point on, religions and ideologies became quite standardized and flocks of citizens all believed and viewed the world in nearly identical ways. Thus began the great migration of whole societies through the myriad of religions and ideologies throughout the ages, bringing us to the modern age we are familiar with today.
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The Transience of Reality
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But according to the scientific worldview, this migration was not a pilgrimage through actual realities in the literal sense. According to MM-Theory, however, it was. MM-Theory does not deny the scientific position that all of history, and pre-history, unfolded in the same world we inhabit today, but it does emphasize the exclusive context in which this position holds - namely, the reality that science erects for itself.
That is to say, science is correct in the context of the modern worldview that it creates. This is true of all worldviews that we have seen throughout history. The medieval Christian view was true in the context of the adopted worldview of that era. The ancient Hellenic view of the Greeks was true in the context of the adopted worldview of that era. The same reasoning applies to the views of the ancient Hindus Valley Civilization, the ancient Incans and Mayans of Middle and South America, the ancient Egyptians, and so on. Essentially, all eras and cultures have their own histories. We ought to recall from Reality and Perception the principle of The Transience of Reality which says that every reality comes with its own timeline - its own past, present, and future - and thus each one can write its own customized history onto the tablet of its past. So although we are deep into the age of science, and our history is told in part by the findings of the scientific method, this is not the only story that can be told. By adopting different worldviews, we bring ourselves into different realities, and with each one comes a different history.
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Poseidon
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Needless to say, we have two interpretations to choose from - the scientific one, because that is the age we find ourselves in, and the one that MM-Theory provides, because that is the context from which this website speaks. According to the scientific one, history and pre-history take place in one single reality. According to MM-Theory, however, history takes place across the whole gamut of worlds that the fertile human imagination has collectively constructed. According to science, history takes place in the physical world. According to MM-Theory, history takes place in the mental world - in the minds of the individuals who were there. Looking at history from this perspective, our species migrates across more than just physical territories; we are nomads traversing a series of universes, a whole line of diverse and fantastic realities that merge together in a seamless continuum. There will always be a correspondence between the elements of these worlds and the events and facts that our modern scientific account of history gives us. For example, the god Poseidon of the ancient Olympian religion corresponds, in the scientific view, to a mere belief held by the ancient Greeks, however erroneous it is taken to be. This is the main strength the modern scientific view affords us - that it can boast strong correspondences between its accounts of historical events and the elements of the subjective cultural worlds coinciding with those events. It doesn't falsify these worlds, at least not from within their own contexts; it only illuminates a path from them to our current world.
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These correspondences become more scarce the further back in history we go. The scientific account of history is only as rich in detail as the documents that have unveiled it. The further back in history we go, however, the fewer documents we have. In fact, going back into pre-history, when writing had yet to be invented, the availability of documentation drops significantly. We have artifacts like ceramics and tools, as well as paintings on walls and rocks, but these hardly count as written accounts of specific events and ideas intended solely for communication or information storage.
Thus, back this far in time, our past becomes hazy. We don't have enough relics to determine from whence we came. Ironically, this point in our past is relatively recent compared to how old our species is. As mentioned above, we are approximately 200 thousands years old, but our retrospective foresight grows dim only a few thousand years ago. There are 200 thousand years of past worlds and experiences we have been through that are lost to us. Anthropology can shed some light on the major turning points in our history (or pre-history) - the challenges and leaps in evolution, the major migrations to far-off lands, the advent of things like tool building, language, art, and so on - but we are left asking questions like "What did we believe at one time or another?", "How did we experience the world?", "How deep and of what quality was our spirituality?", "How diverse were our realities, and how often did they change?" Our past is shrouded in mystery, and there is certainly a much wider array of events and experiences that we have been through than our written history affords us, events and experiences that may be just as amazing, if not more, than those events and experiences within the last handful of millennia. This diversity may not seem like much to the scientific viewpoint, for it has always taken place in the same physical world, but it is undoubtedly far beyond the grasp of our imagination according to a subjectivist viewpoint like MM-Theory, for our journey has been one throughout which we have seen countless worlds of all kinds and the origins of which can only be vaguely speculated.
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This journey through a myriad of worlds will continue indefinitely. We will continue to see the rise and fall of a whole slew of religions and ideologies as history marches forward. The world runs on change, and so does the human mind - that is, the human perception of reality and understanding of how the world works. Even we in the west, with our deeply entrenched scientific view, will face one change after another. Change need not overthrow the institution of science, nor any other religion or ideology, for much of the change we see in culture takes place within the context of those very views. The branching denominations of Christianity - from Catholicism to Protestantism to Anglicanism - all fall within the same general religion. Modern science itself has changed since its inception at the start of the scientific revolution - from classical to quantum. It is quite dangerous to assume, therefore, that the truths we hold at any particular time in history are fixed and here to stay - as a strong Platonic view would have it. It is dangerous because it underlies a gross misunderstanding of human and social nature. Societies must change. Human understanding must change. To expect otherwise is to be unprepared for the waves of change, or worse - to stand steadfast against it. We all too often fall into this trap as we expect the fashionable religions and ideologies of the day to be our final destination - that is, the final view for humanity, the view that all the world will eventually embrace - as soon as proponents are able to convince everyone. We are much better off surrendering these expectations - at least insofar as they clash with society's need to change - and instead live in accordance with the dynamics of change, anticipating and being ready for them rather than fight against them.
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The organization of mental technologists utilizing philosophy as a healing tool could play a substantial role here, not only in supplying the right programs in response to the winds of change, but by periodically reviewing the basic assumptions and most valued maxims of the world's societies to assess whether they still fit well with the contemporary world. For example, we have argued against the Lockean model of consciousness elsewhere in this website partially on account of its contention with MM-Theory but also on account of its contentions with modern neurology (which is what MM-Theory stems from in the first place). As we saw in Preliminary Concepts, under the section It's All In The Head, modern neurology tells us something more akin to Kant's phenomenological theory of consciousness whereby even Locke's primary qualities have neural correlates equally susceptible to manipulation as those correlating to his secondary qualities. On another issue, many philosophers and political scientists in today's globalized world argue against the four-century-old principle of National Sovereignty. National Sovereignty was regarded as a laudable standard back in the latter half of the 16th century, but a few centuries later, when universal human rights became extraordinarily popular, the violation of them, even in countries with little relation to or impact on others, became an immense concern for free and democratic countries the world over. The moral permissibility, even the obligation, of intervening on behalf of the oppressed and victimized was soon brought into question. Whether the reader agrees or disagrees with these positions is beside the point; more relevantly, these old, sometimes archaic, views may have worked for the time and the sociopolitical climate from whence they originated, but as the world changes, so does their usefulness, and we need to review them periodically, assessing whether or not they still hold promise and afford us advantage in the world as we understand it today.
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Thus, we need a method by which we can undertake transitions from one cultural system of beliefs and values to another as smoothly and with as little bloodshed as possible. We need to recognize the signs of change and handle it gracefully. As mentioned already, however, the system we call "democracy" may be such a system, and if so, then all the better. But the main focus of democracy is to give the citizenry equal opportunities to voice their concerns and opinions, thereby providing a fair hearing to all who might have some useful insight on where society should be headed. If possible, however, democratic systems should be modified by, or supplemented with, an additional layer of regulation, one whose aim is to anticipate change and prepare society for it. In other words, democracy should perform a twin function - to provide citizens with equal opportunities to voice their views, and to prepare society for change. Perhaps democracy already carries out these tasks sufficiently well - after all, an effective democratic system should steer society in the direction dictated by the majority (so long as such dictates are constitutional), thereby creating the changes they embark on - but there is more to maintaining social and psychological health than simply granting the citizenry whatever they want. Socrates himself certainly understood this when he argued that a polis governed by a handful of wise men was better off than one governed by a thousand buffoons. Of course, we will not follow suite and hand society over to an elite of philosopher kings, but we ought to devise a system whereby the majority are well suited to make wise decisions on behalf of the community.
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The education system is where to start, naturally, and at a young age is when. But what should be taught such that future generations grow to be well informed and sophisticatedly wise decision makers on social and political matters? If social change is what we want to be ready for, then we ought to educate our children about the realities of change. We ought to instill an overall sense that change is inevitable, not only in the social and political arena, nor in ecology and technology, but also in the psychology of the individual as well - that is to say, in the beliefs, perspectives, and understandings of each and every person. It should be taught that such changes readily occur in one's own perceptions of reality, so that each pupil will expect that it will happen to him/herself from time to time, and that such changes are okay. In other words, the old Platonic attitude that one's beliefs ought to match eternal and absolute Truths should be abandoned - not in all academic faculties, of course, for many such as science and mathematics are naturally founded on Platonic (or quasi-Platonic) Truths - but the general view that the world is unchanging - or worse, that it ought not to change - is counterproductive to the cultivation of young minds primed to take on changes of all sorts.
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Subjectivist Theory
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Such an education need not rely on teachings straight out of MM-Theory or some other similar subjectivist theory - not necessarily - but it would serve the purposes of such an education immensely if young students were brought up with the understanding that a subjectivist perspective on reality could consistently be taken, and that such a perspective underlies a comprehensive understanding of how one can bring him/herself through holistic changes in perception using a suite of mental technologies as tools. Perhaps, then, the best approach, if feasible, would be to educate young adults with both perspectives - the objectivist perspective for a solid understanding of the traditional doctrines of the modern western world, which still prove unremittingly useful, and also the appropriate subjectivist perspective for more lucid adaptations to psychological, social, and political changes. Assuming that all this is possible, I would now like to switch gears and contemplate what such an education, when taken to extremes, would entail about the programming of the cognitive centers in the brains of those future generations who are so educated. So let's turn our attention away from sociopolitical matters, and once again focus on neurology.
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Donald Hebb's Theory of Cell Assemblies
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In the newborn, the brain begins completely devoid of any social and intellectual programming. The interconnections between neurons are all more or less the same - every neuron reaches out to as many other neurons as possible, within its local vicinity, forging connections that have yet to be programmed with specific receptor types - that is, either inhibitory or excitatory. The reader might recall from Preliminary Concepts Donald Hebb's theory of Cell Assemblies. To repeat, the theory says that when two neurons frequently fire in synchrony, the synaptic connections joining them become stronger excitatory connections. When two neurons frequently fire in mutual exclusion, the synaptic connections joining them become stronger inhibitory connections. Hence, over time, the newborn's brain develops more and more specific neural connections and pathways - some allowing signals to pass through, others prohibiting them. In other words, the configurations of the neural interconnections become more and more specific and differentiated.
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ROM chips
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This is very much like how a ROM circuit is programmed. For those who aren't familiar with the computer lingo, ROM (Read-Only Memory), which is usually contrasted with RAM (Random Access Memory), refers to computer chips that are non-programmable. This means that the manner in which ROM chips process incoming signals is fixed - that is, given a specific pattern of input signals, the chip will compute a pattern of output signals specific to the input pattern. This output pattern will always be the same given the same input pattern. Contrast this with the manner in which programmable chips process input signals which may vary, even with the same pattern of input, depending on how the chip is programmed. In other words, the chips ability to be programmed renders its output less predictable than the output of ROM chips.
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Of course, the newborn's brain, or any human brain, is highly programmable, but the sense in which it is like a ROM chip is in how the interconnections between its neurons are formed. A ROM chip starts out with all its input and output lines interconnected like a grid (see figure 3a), so that a signal entering on any input line can find its way, like a car through a grid of streets, to any output line (and, in fact, it would find its way to all output lines as that is the nature of electric currents). As it stands, this is somewhat of a useless circuit. It would be more useful if it could actually compute something meaningful, some specific output pattern given a specific input pattern. The way computer engineers do this is by building these ROM circuits with fuses at each intersection. Through a complex procedure by which it is determined which intersections should block incoming signals and which should allow them to pass (depending on what you want the ROM chip to compute), certain fuses are selected and blown while others are left alone. They blow the selected fuses - literally exploding the intersections - making it impossible for any signal to pass through that intersection. It would be like a car approaching an intersection and finding a giant hole there. This results in only certain pathways down which the signal can travel, and thus only certain output lines at which the signal can arrive. For example, in figure 3b, you can see that an input signal on line 3 results in output signals on lines 4, 7, and 9. Put in binary notation, we would say that the input 0010000000 (where the 0's mark no input signals and the 1 marks an input signal) results in the output 0001001010 - or that the ROM chip computes 0001001010. You can also see, by manually tracing it out, that an input of 1010001110 results in 011001010, and that an input of 0101000100 results in 0111000000. By blowing a different set of fuses, the ROM chip would compute a different set of output for these input.
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Figure 3a: ROM circuit (before blowing fuses).
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Figure 3b: ROM circuit (after blowing fuses and signal on input line 3).
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Once the fuses are blown, the ROM chip is packaged into a computer and shipped to the end user. The end user has no way of blowing additional fuses or repairing the ones that have been blown - thus the non-programmability. However, the neural pathways that are packaged in our brains are not beyond our ability to program, but a lot of us rarely take advantage of this. For the purposes of this discussion, let's limit our talk about the programming of the brain to the frontal lobe, assuming once again that it is there where our cognitive centers are concentrated. So a lot of us have the tendency not to program our frontal lobes.
We allow others, and society in general, to do it for us. In the most extreme cases, therefore, it could be said that our frontal lobes are like ROM circuits, and society blows the fuses. Of course, there are no fuses in our brain, but there are excitatory and inhibitory connections. Which ones are which is determined by the ideas, beliefs, values, and perspectives that culture indoctrinates us with. These connections either allow or deny access to the signals jumping across them, thereby creating only a certain subset of pathways by which those signals, starting at particular points, can reach other particular points - just like ROM chips. Only certain pathways are allowed just as, with any cultural worldview, only certain assumptions and truths are accepted and can therefore be used in reasoning. The process of blowing up fuses to make ROM chips takes less than a second, but the process by which these frontal lobe paths are fortified takes an entire childhood and often extends well into adulthood. The task of solidifying these pathways is usually completed when one graduates from school and is ready to be packaged and shipped into society to be used for whatever function he/she was programmed for.
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We are, of course, being extreme and overly simplistic. There is way more to the programming of the frontal lobe than the cultural indoctrinations that come down to us through the education system, and a lot more to the purpose of this process than just to make us into cogs in the social wheel. But for the purposes of this discussion, this doesn't matter all that much. If we were to succeed in the kinds of social reforms we are espousing - namely, to be more prepared for change and willing to go through it - then to look back at ourselves as we are now would, by comparison, make us seem much more as though our brains were running on ROM circuitry. What we need to do, therefore, is learn what it takes to heighten the programmability of our frontal lobes, at least when it is called for. We need to remember what it was like in childhood when there was so much to learn and so many questions to be answered. It was in childhood, and throughout adolescence, when our minds were most fertile and open to programming. It was also during these times when our self-programming skills were at their best - we could make believe anything and fully immerse ourselves in our imagination. This is the state of mind that is needed for dealing with change. It is this state of mind that melts away the frozen neural pathways that would otherwise remain in place like writing on stone. The process of becoming an adult should never mean the death of the child. It should mean the end of our child-like dependence, the dispensing of childish immaturity, but not the freedom that children exude so openly. This freedom, the freedom of the mind to break the shackles of cultural indoctrination, to seek out one's own beliefs and ways of understanding the world, to never stop questioning and learning, is vital for anyone who wishes, not only to confront change and embrace it gracefully, but to never stop growing intellectually and spiritually. It is simply the openness to alternate possibilities and new realities, the exploration of which exercises our intellect and adds to our repertoire of spiritual experiences.
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The Flynn Effect: Intelligence On The Rise
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The social system intends for us to stop growing by the time we become adults or graduate from school. At that point, we are expected to stop questioning and seeking greater knowledge. We are expected to accept whatever education we have been given, taking it as all there is to learn, or that if there is anything more, it is not important. The only thing that is important, at that point, is to apply what we have been taught to a position in society - a job - such that we serve a socially sanctioned function that keeps the system going. We are finished products at that point. Our only use is to perform our function; not to change, not to grow. To keep the child within us alive passed this point is to oppose the will of the system. It is to rebel against the molding pressures of society and to keep the system guessing as to what we will become, what we will learn, what we will produce, what we will do, and what we will ultimately contribute. Having to guess is infuriating to the system because it means we are a loose cannon, a wild card, a slippery fish that keeps wiggling out of its clutches and back into our own familiar waters. But of course, we are once again being overly simplistic and extreme. In reality, society, at least western society, is much more tolerant of the child-like spirit, even encouraging it in some cases. In most free and democratic societies, we aim for a healthy balance of adult-like seriousness and dedication to one's social role and child-like freedom and play. This is perhaps why these societies see so much progress across a wide range of areas - on a social as well as individual level - and why the average intelligence seems to be gradually increasing (see link ). As we said above, after all, the child seeks perpetual intellectual and spiritual growth. So we are fortunate that our western ways don't aim to crush our inner child when it dares to survive into adulthood, but it is my general impression that the value of the child is not appreciated nor its social use understood.
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Its use is, of course, to make transitions through change as smooth as possible. Children adapt to change very easily. They are not attached to religious and cultural beliefs. They don't hold relentlessly to values and matters of principle. They are flexible and inventive. It is true that children can be very stubborn and do throw tantrums from time to time, but this comes from childishness. We are not advocating childishness or any sort of immaturity. We must maintain the wisdom and responsibility that comes with adulthood, but it is the child-like sense of wonder, curiosity, and open mindedness that must also be maintained. If everyone were to think like this, we would see far less war, oppression, and hate. The world would become a grand playground in which we all get along, make believe, and share in each other's worlds of fantasy without worrying about whose is the best match for reality.
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Subjectivist Theories
The Essence of Realness
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As wonderful as all this sounds, it is difficult to fathom how it could be practiced in a realistic sense. Mustn't life be taken seriously, and mustn't we play by the rules at times, even when they seem absurdly unfair? Well, we already said that it is not the maturity and seriousness of adulthood that must be abandoned, but it is still hard to imagine how this can be balanced with the child-like frame of mind. Speaking from my own experience, a subjectivist perspective helps a great deal. With a subjectivist perspective, I am able to take any cultural belief system, and with greater effort, its values as well, and adapt myself to it. That is to say, I take the perspective, first, that the belief system in question is foremost a fabrication of the mind - not an illusion, for the essence of realness still resides therein - and is therefore like a world of make believe that a child enthusiastically partakes in. Once engulfed by that world, I can then choose how seriously to take it. I can take it as a form of temporary entertainment or I can commit to it with all my heart and soul. Of course, this process, especially in the latter case, is not instant. It takes time for me to re-program my mind, exploring the many facets of the ideology, entertaining the possibilities that they might be true, focusing exclusively on those points that feel most convincing, inventing additional points that add to its convincing allure, and so on. As time goes on and I maintain this practice diligently, I sink deeper into this new world as it gradually evolves into a reality.
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The process begins with an openness to the possibility that the world I'm about to enter could indeed be real, and this is the sort of attitude a child takes, whether playing fantasy games or otherwise. This is indeed the sense I get when I engage in these activities - that is, I feel I am at play. It is as though the beliefs, values, and perspectives I am dealing with are my toys - not truths and principles that mandate my full allegiance, but the building blocks with which I construct mental content. When the matter is more serious, I balance this approach with a demeanor of adult-like seriousness, and in that case the toys become more like tools. They become the gadgets with which I work out a solution to the problem demanding my focused attention. But whether they are toys or tools, the beliefs, values, perspectives, and all other experiences I am constructing a reality out of are like tokens I can figuratively hold in my hand and manipulate according to my will. In other words, they are subject to my control rather than the other way around.
They don't tell me what to believe and perceive, I tell them what I want to believe and perceive. The most synthetic experience of the child- and adult-like mind that I can think of is the way professional sportsmen must feel when they play their game. Take football, for example. In professional football, there are high stakes involved indeed. There are millions of dollars to be won or lost, and the job hazards are certainly great, painful injuries abounding at least once or twice a game. Emotions stir and boil up, every victory bringing elation and ecstasy, every defeat, devastation and anguish. The players certainly take the game seriously. But throughout it all, the players love what they do. It's a rush. The feeling is not one of coercion or adhering to a job description because one has to; it is one of enthusiasm, playful recreation, and fun.
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Real Things
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Of course, football players have very few toys to play with - just one, in fact - the ball - but for a subjectivist who builds realities from within his/her own mind, everything is a toy. His/her mind is essentially a giant sandbox, every thought, perception, and experience a potential tool with which new real things can be molded. He/she finds him/herself at the center of his/her own mind, like a cockpit, a personal command center, where decisions can be made on behalf of the rest of the mind. This would literally be a splitting of the mind into two partitions - one the self, the other the rest of the mind. The self would have to make use of the subjectivist methodology and belief system, and thus hold at least one doctrine constant, but it could nonetheless apply this same methodology to this very doctrine, thereby changing it and perhaps even obliterating it. In the latter case, one would cease to be a subjectivist and adopt a more traditional objectivist framework. This may be necessary, depending on the circumstances prompting this move, but because the subjectivist view will always be remembered and understood, it can again be resurrected should it be deemed appropriate. This much should be clear. But let's come full circular and ask what sort of neural configuration a mind like this would correspond to.
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If a subjectivist theory is to be utilized in the regulation of one's reality, then that theory should correspond to a small cluster of highly organized neurons in the frontal lobe. It wouldn't constitute the entire frontal lobe, for much more space would be needed for all other beliefs, values, mental models, and other networks of thought. The circuitry that these correspond to would surround that corresponding to the subjectivist theory. And if the subjectivist theory plays the role of governing all other bodies of thought - the command center so to speak, the central processing unit - then the corresponding MOD would have branches reaching out to all other major centers in the frontal lobe, functioning as the prime programmer for the entire cognitive system. In essence, a simple hierarchy would emerge in the frontal lobe - there would be the base level, consisting of most of the frontal lobe and corresponding to the general set of beliefs, values, and other cognitive systems of the mind in question, and there would be the higher level, consisting of the subjectivist system of thought (or whatever mental technology is used to control the rest of the mind) and corresponding to a small concentrated nucleus in the frontal lobe.
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Acknowledgements
Epistemic Awareness
The Superior Frontal Gyrus
Projection
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We might even get away with calling this center the "self". It is a different self than that which we defined in the Advanced Theory - namely, a "set of experiences that entail acknowledgements about themselves, the epistemic awareness of which is bound in the same 'cognitive database'". In other words, whereas the self defined in the Advanced Theory was essentially equivalent to the mind as a whole, the self in this case is that which is left over when all our experiences are objectified as tools at our disposal. But is there anything left over after objectifying our experiences? Well, to be sure, there must always be something that we are in the midst of experiencing, something that we currently take as real and not a tool at our disposal. But if the objectification of our experiences is simply to slip into the subjectivist frame of mind and regard them as tools, then the only reality that exists for us in these moments is the subjectivist one.
Where is the self in these moments? One possibility is that the self is in the superior frontal gyrus. We touched on this brain area in Preliminary Concepts, and we mentioned that it seems to correspond to a heightened sense of self-awareness (as opposed to "losing one's self" in tasks). It may be this area that bestows us with the ability to self-reflect. Such an activity is very much what the subjectivist does when he/she objectifies his/her experiences and treats them as tools. He/she reflects on his/her own experiences and recognizes them for the mental entities they are. Contrast this with the experience of succumbing to the reality our experiences project. This is what we do when we engage ourselves in our experiences rather than reflect upon them. Therefore, the self that remains when all our experiences are objectified may be the experience that corresponds to the superior frontal gyrus. All our other experiences, the ones we objectify, may still be sporadically diffused throughout the rest of the frontal lobe and other brain areas, but the superior frontal gyrus would have to extend its reach, branching out with numerous axons, to various points therein. It would bear a special relation to those centers corresponding to the subjectivist theory it relies on - namely, one by which those centers don't change - but all other centers would have to be subject to change. Thus, the self that sits inside the superior frontal gyrus is like a guard in a watchtower overlooking the rest of the mental landscape and watching out for any activity worthy of interest and perhaps modifying.
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Neuroscientists tell us that as the brain develops, it seeks out optimal neural configurations - that is, arrangements for the interconnections between neurons to take - such that the consequent behavior of the organism most conducively ensures its survival. It seeks out these configuration by trial and error - if one pattern of neural firing or one particular pathway fails to meet this end, it tries another, and whichever works best sticks. These configurations can stick so well, in fact, that they could accurately be described as "hardwired" - that is, unchanging like a ROM chip. It is said that this is how all neural configurations are formed - even those areas that one would assume are fully guided by genes. The visual system, for example, seems to work this way as it builds its line detection, color detection, depth perception, motion detection, and other MODs. These MODs seem so common and vital to our survival that one would think they are genetically pre-determined to form. But indeed they do emerge after a potentially long series of failed attempts. This is not to say that genetics play no role - they obviously do - but only in setting up the parameters by which this trial and error process can occur. Now, given that the brain forms its neural configurations in this way, would it not be reasonable to suppose that the frontal lobe also works this way? It would certainly seem plausible when we consider its highly programmable nature. A programmable network of neurons could be taken as a sign of a configuration that is still in the process of finding its optimal arrangement of interconnections and pathways. It also seems plausible when we consider the ROM-like inflexibility that some people's frontal lobes take on when they settle on a particular belief system and grow out of their child-like frame of mind. It is as though these people feel that their chosen belief system is the one that works, and is true enough of reality as to be fully reliable without further modifications - much like the visual system, or any other brain area, decides that its final configurations are the ones that work, and can therefore be relied on "as-is" for all future tasks.
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This would be all well and good for the frontal lobe if indeed there was one ultimate belief system that worked for all individuals under all conditions in today's global environment. But the fact of the matter is, when we become fixed in our ways, obstinate in our religious and ideological devotions, we are often more willing to partake in brutal oppression and outright war with others when they, with equal obstinacy, openly deny our views. For most brain centers, the ROM-like stability of their final neural configurations is vitally important for our survival, but it would seem, based on the blood spilt in war and the cries of the brutally oppressed, that the same rigidity applied to the frontal lobe is less than optimal for our survival, and a resistance to settle on any particular configuration might be best. Those who don't succumb to such belligerent childishness are those who are willing and able to see things in a different light, to be open to the possibility of alternate truths - in other words, those who refrain from settling on a particular belief system for good, or at least are willing and able to reprogram their beliefs when circumstances seem to call for it. These are people whose frontal lobes maintain some measure of programmability, or the ability to once again become programmable. They are the ones whose inner child never fully died, or at least are able to revive him/her for the sake of exploring alternate possibilities and perspectives. In extreme cases, they are the ones who are never satisfied, always curious, always yearning for more and clearer knowledge, unable to ignore the flaws in the contemporary beliefs of his/her culture and therefore finding it difficult to bring closure to the perpetual process of his/her frontal lobe programming, and thus never feeling quite ready to let the inner child go. So long as the child is not dead, the frontal lobe is not a ROM chip.
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It would be understandable for one to think that we have no say in the effects that the mechanisms of evolution exert upon us. One would think it absurd to suggest that we could control our evolution. But evolution is a natural phenomenon like any other. When our understanding of a particular phenomenon becomes sophisticated enough and near exhaustive of the whole phenomenon, our ability to apply our understanding in a practical setting becomes much greater. This is the process by which scientific enquiry leads into technological proliferation. If we understand evolution thoroughly, then in principle we should be able to exert some control over it. In practice, however, this task seems so much more daunting. There are simply too many variables at play, the majority of which are just too elusive for us to control in any expedient manner. But what about inexpedient approaches - rather, I should say, complicated and gradual approaches, ones that may take centuries and a whole society cooperatively engaging in them?
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Francis Galton
Eugenics
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Could society as a whole, with centuries of dedicated resolve, forge a path of its own crafting through the realm of evolutionary possibilities? Well, certainly we could do so by brute means - we have seen various attempts in history, such as Francis Galton's proposed eugenics program or Hitler's "cleansing" of the Arian race - but we are not so vulgar and inhumane as this. The sort of control over our evolution I wish to propose is one that naturally occurs in human societies all the time even without our planned intervention. The justification is much like the Skinnerian argument we put forward above whereby the deliberate regulation of ideas was sanctioned on the grounds that we are affected by ideas naturally and quite inescapably anyway - we might as well master the process and use it to our advantage. And by "our" advantage, I mean all of mankind, not just one race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, or anything of that sort. There would be neither a single human extermination nor the prevention of issuing offspring under any condition. What I wish to propose is the possibility of programming society with systems of belief that induce, not only a healthier and more prosperous way of life, but the foundation from which the processes of evolution can give way to the emergence of a line of human beings whose neurological disposition is such that they naturally think, behave, and interact in a peaceful, amicable, tolerant, and psychologically and sociopolitically healthy manner. As it stands now, we are capable of programming our brains - particularly our frontal lobes and the corresponding ideas - to live in this manner, but it requires great strides and immense effort on the part of politicians, educators, philosophers, psychologists, health experts, and the like to foster that kind of programming on such a mass level that we finally achieve the peace and philanthropy that we so desperately want. It would be so much simpler if human beings were born genetically predisposed to behave and think in the manner required for this, "hardwired" as it were to instinctively see peace, love, and respect for any human being no matter the race, ethnicity, nationality, religious leaning, and whatnot as a fundamental necessity and perhaps even a pleasure. But how does a society go from fostering such an attitude within the province of culture to enjoying the benefits of having that attitude encoded in our genes?
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Deception
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What culture does for a society is create cast systems, or at least different classes of people. These classes are usually hierarchically organized according to socioeconomic status. The primary criterion for placing people into these classes is almost always how effectively one exudes and promotes the values and principles that his/her society holds dear. A large part of culture is just these values and principles. A society that values intellectual and academic talents will feature university graduates, Ph.D. earners, contributors to science, literature, and other thought provoking disciplines, and so on filling high socioeconomic ranks. A society that values military might and imperialism will feature high ranking military officers, aggressive and strategic individuals, men of courage and bravery, and so on filling high socioeconomic ranks. A society that values altruistic behavior and martyrdom will feature saints, charitable people, and those willing to sacrifice themselves for those less fortunate filling high socioeconomic ranks. They are promoted more readily because society willingly lifts them up and supports them. It caters to them. It wants to see those who uphold its values and principles succeeding. Therefore, those who are most capable and willing to uphold society's values and principles are most likely to do well in their particular society. This is not to say that one's ability to promote and hold true to his/her society's values and principles is the only relevant factor deciding where he/she ends up among the social ranks. For instance, wealth also plays an important role, as does deception, luck and brute force. Sometimes, in fact, these factors eclipse, quite significantly, those of values and principles, but the latter are always forces to be reckoned with nonetheless. Needless to say, values and principles are much more effective the more democratic a sociopolitical system is. But all else being equal, sociopolitical systems included, those who uphold society's values and principles stand a far better chance than others of making their way into prestigious positions and lofty social strata.
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What culture therefore gives us is an environment. It sets up a sociopolitical arena in which those who most dexterously play by the rules, or are clever enough to manipulate them, stand the best chances of surviving. It is a survival game just like the biological one at play in natural evolution, but built on top of this biological layer such that the meaning of "survival" takes on less perilous connotations. Survival in the sociopolitical environment entails attaining social acceptance and wealth. It very rarely entails a fight for one's life, although in extreme circumstances - where one's psychological dispositions and personality make it difficult even to afford a home, food, and medical care - the game can become this brutal. But even if one is able to make decent earnings and live comfortably, there is much room for improvement. If one has what society values - whether it be intellectual skills, knowledge, talents of some other kind, or just the right attitude - he/she can climb further up the ladder of social status and not only survive in this sociopolitical environment, but leave others in the dust. This is a process of natural (or sociopolitical) selection, and as with the dynamics of nature, those who survive depend greatly on the specific elements and configurations of the environment. One rich in institutions favoring capitalistic markets, for example, will be more conducive to the success of capitalist types. One rich in institutions favoring socialist markets, on the other hand, will be more conducive to the success of socialist types. At the very least, this success is given by the commoners of such societies in the form of support, praise, and recognition of their outstanding dispositions, and this can sometimes be enough (as we will see below), but usually success comes more generously than this; usually it comes as a higher abundance of lucrative jobs (since those jobs would be in high demand), more impressive resumes and portfolios, greater opportunities for social networking and contacting important people, and so on.
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Now, although the stakes in this survival game are rarely one's own life, they do consist of the resources needed to live. The spoils that one reaps as he/she climbs the ladder of success consist of money, shelter, security, food, health care, and so on. Those who find the climb more difficult will acquire fewer of these - they will usually get enough to stay alive, but in a lot of cases, just barely. Evolution theory tells us that although a whole colony of a given species can survive on a disproportionate distribution of resources, only a negligible margin dying off, such disproportions can be the key factor in nature selecting the cream of the crop when the environment becomes extremely demanding. Having more resources means a greater chance of survival, and in the long run, these chances make all the difference.
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Furthermore, survival of the individual is not the end that evolution aims for, despite the misconceptions of a great many, but a means only. The ultimate end is survival of the species, and the survival of the individual is important only insofar as he/she has yet to reproduce. Once the individual has issued progeny, however, his/her own survival takes a back seat. Of course, in the case of a species like our own - a species that fairs better when its individual members reproduce more than once and stay alive to nurture and protect their offspring through to adulthood - it is still beneficial for individuals to stick around for a good while after they have reproduced. Nonetheless, the point of the individual's survival is not self-contained; it is for the sake of reproduction and the continuation of the whole species. Therefore, if a particular individual manages to reproduce without climbing to higher socioeconomic levels, then this too can serve the purposes of the evolutionary process and bring about the genotypic changes we would expect. So if an individual displays the phenotypic expressions favored by his/her society - that is, congruent with its values and principles - then it may be enough that he/she is recognized and admired for it, for such recognition and admiration go a long way in raising the likelihood that he/she will be selected by the opposite sex for reproduction.
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But what we want to entertain is how this selection, or the disproportional distribution of resources alluded to earlier, can lead to a biological leap in evolution. A culture that upholds certain values and principles will more readily invite those who can and do exude those values and principles to the highest ranks it has available, but the genetic makeup of these individuals doesn't change on account of this. In fact, many of these individuals have to work extraordinarily hard to make it into these positions - that is, it doesn't come naturally, as though they could do so without even trying. Thus, in a sense, they must work against their natural dispositions. So what does it take to breed a line of human beings who are genetically predisposed to find the behavior and manner of thinking required for top positions in society easy and natural?
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Well, there are two means by which the genotype required for this biological leap can occur. First, if the population from which this genotype is supposed to emerge is sufficiently diverse - that is, with a wide variety of different genetic profiles - then it will be highly likely that the particular genotype we are looking for is there already. In that case, carriers of the gene need only the time and opportunity to make their way into those social positions most conducive to their survival and that of their offspring. Because society would cater to such individuals, and indeed have an interest in seeking them out and assisting them into those positions, the opportunities they would need would be fairly abundant. But even if the genotype didn't exist as yet, there is still a chance, given enough time, that genetic mutations could give rise to the genotype of interest. It shouldn't be overlooked, however, that we could be in for a long haul if we were simply to await the arrival of a mutation of the sort that matches the genotype in question. Nonetheless, with a large enough population and wide genetic diversity therein, the chances of such a mutation occurring increases. Also, if such a society, with the particular values and principles we're interested in, turns out to work noticeably well, it could have immense staying power. This tends to be the case when societies manage systems that yield substantial and conspicuous benefits - systems such as scientific institutions or democratic processes - and such benefits can fuel the motivation needed to carry on with these systems even when the key players driving them don't have the natural instinct - that is, the genetic disposition - to do the work without even trying. If such societies carry on with these systems for long enough, it may give evolution a reasonable chance to churn out the necessary genotypes that would do well in these societies, genotypes that would be able to do the work without even trying.
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This process is a very common one in evolution. The transition from the jungle dwelling species that survived by climbing trees and swinging from one branch to another, as we once did, to a planes dwelling species that survived by standing erect and building tools and weapons out of its now freed up hands is an excellent example. One theory, out of many, about our evolution into bipedalism says that when we left the lush jungles of Africa roughly 3 million years ago, presumably because it was receding, we had to learn new strategies for surviving on the grassy planes of the savanna. It was convenient to live among trees because of the easy escape routes they provided when predators were close upon us, predators that could not climb as nimbly as we could. But on the savanna, there are very few trees, and even when there are, they are so scarce and far apart that, once climbed, there is nowhere else to go, unlike in the jungle where we could leap from one tree to the next.
We had to come down eventually, and so predators simply had to wait us out. The trick was to take advantage of the thick tall grass. We learnt to lie low when predators were in the vicinity, and not to move. This was easy enough, but we needed a way to spot predators. We needed the advantage of standing straight. This allowed us to see over the top of the grass, and with our binocular (three-dimensional) vision, we could discern different distances, thereby recognizing when predators were either far or near, approaching or retreating. And if we had to run, bipedal locomotion proved much faster than trotting along on our hind legs and knuckles. Standing on our hind legs also freed up our hands so that we could fend off predators with rudimentary weapons, such as rocks or sticks, and maybe even catch prey. This was certainly a dramatic shift in the lifestyle we were used to, so much of a shift that we were barely fit for it, genetically speaking, and would have to quickly make a major transition in order to survive.
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This is not to say that such a genetic transition was absolutely vital, for we managed for a while to get by with our old jungle dwelling predispositions. But it would take a radical stretch away from this predisposition for us to survive, a stretch that was surely uncomfortable and made life difficult. For a species built to climb trunks and swing from branches, standing on its hind legs for the greater part of the day must have been excruciatingly painful, not just for the lower back muscles which would have grown in strength over time, but for the bone and joint structures in its lower body and spine. Not to mention the fact that if they did get spotted by a predator, their stubby little legs and lack of gate would have made it difficult to flee. For all this to be the common mode of behavior, much longer legs would be needed as well as a better aligned torso for standing and moving erect. But in order for such a phenotype to emerge, these pre-human primates would have to survive for a sufficiently long time, which requires the sort of brutal and agonizing lifestyle that survival in the savanna demands of a once jungle dwelling species like we were.
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We can easily construe this lifestyle, if not as a cultural shift, then one requiring the sort of cortical flexibility and insightful depth that cultural shifts often need. That is to say, the transition from swinging from trees to walking upright in the savanna, perhaps using our hands for weapons and tools, was not one triggered by a genetic mutation, not at first at least. Instead, it was the result of intelligence. We were intelligent enough to recognize that in order to survive, we would have to deviate from the style of behavior we were naturally inclined to engage in - that is, behavior that our genes were best suited for - and adopt a completely unnatural style of behavior (or so it felt). We valued our survival, and so we valued whatever it took to survive. Thus we valued standing upright and using our hands for weapons and tools. If this does not pass for a sort of proto-culture, then it should at least be recognized as a rudimentary value system, which, in virtue of being implemented behaviorally, eventually gave way to homo erectus, the first man to be genetically predisposed to stand on his hind legs.
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Thom Hartmann
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To give another example, Thom Hartmann, an authority in the study of ADHD, has proposed a well supported theory about the origins of ADHD. ADHD, he argues, is a genetic disposition remnant of an earlier stage in human evolution. If this is true, then the evidence for when the ADHD gene emerged points to around 40,000 years ago. Hartmann believes the gene was an adaptation to the tribal lifestyle that humans were growing accustomed to, a lifestyle that hinged on the hunter/gatherer approach to securing food and resources. ADHD, he argues, with its symptoms of distractibility, impulsivity, and novelty-seeking/risk-taking, are ideal for tribesmen on the hunt. But the gene was overtaken quite rapidly by what Hartmann calls the "farmer" gene. This gene emerged about 10,000 years ago during the agricultural revolution. The advent of agriculture gave way to a whole new environment, the first sociopolitical ones we described above. This happened for two reasons: 1) agriculture allows for tribes to settle for extended periods of time with plenty of food to go around, permitting the population to grow extraordinarily fast, and 2) the great abundance of food that agriculture provides can be used for trade, making the settlement a popular economic center, thereby bringing in more settlers and extending the settlement as well as the market. The changes this brings about, mostly sociopolitical in nature, are ideal for Hartmann's "farmer" type. The farmer types are those who don't mind repetitive and "boring" tasks (such as farming or memorizing flash cards), listen attentively to authority figures (such as citizens who follow the rules of society or students who do well in the classroom), and seek security and predictability over novelty and risk - in other words, the opposite of ADHD.
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Here we have two evolutionary leaps, one into the ADHD gene and the other into the "farmer" gene. Forty thousand years ago, or thereabouts, when, anthropologists believe, the first signs of culture emerged, life within the tribe became ideal for the ADHD type to thrive. Some believe the pivotal factor in this transition was trade, and that those who carried the ADHD gene, able to think in more symbolic and abstract terms, understood the value in certain artifacts whose worth was not concrete or immediately obvious, such as a painting compared to a screwdriver. Thus, as soon as the ADHD genotype emerged, it began to dominate the gene pool and proliferated itself far more than its predecessors until it became the norm. Then, only ten thousand years ago, the "farmer" gene took over. Due to the agricultural revolution, culture took a sharp turn, crossing the bridge from tribe to civilization. Civilization constituted a new kind of environment, one which was less suited to the ADHD gene and more suited to the "farmer" gene. It most likely began with ADHD types learning that they could tend simple gardens large enough to feed only a few households. But when farmer types, who didn't mind putting in long hours and repeating the same simple actions over and over, foresaw the benefits in planting fields of certain crops and therefore did so, they gained the upper hand by being the ones with the most food, a resource that could be used not only for energy, but as a bargaining chip for power and social status. After the first few humble farmers demonstrated the fruits of their labors, many followed suite and carried the trend through to the complete unfolding of the agricultural revolution. Thus, the environment had changed in such a way as to make life easier for the farmer type and harder for the ADHD type. The farmers' genetic agenda is to cultivate and perpetuate order and predictability in society, which are two things the hunters' genetic agenda is poorly suited for - they do better when they can expect to be confronted with mystery and surprise. Once customized to the formers' genetic agenda, society was then more suited to the successful climb of the farmer type to higher social positions, reap greater quantities of resources, mate more often and with genotypes better suited to the new world they were embarking on, and, over time, dominate the gene pool.
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Hartmann also adds, in his book The Edison Gene, that the ADHD gene must be adaptive even in today's world. Otherwise, the agricultural revolution would have wiped them out completely. Chances are the farmer and hunter types form a symbiotic relation with each other. The farmers provide and govern the modern day sociopolitical systems that we, farmers and hunters alike, depend on, and the hunters, with their creative skills and innovative drive, are there to change society when needed (much like Thomas Edison's inventions did - hence the name of the book). But regardless of the present day relation between hunters and farmers, Hartmann gives us two excellent examples of how changes in social standards - more specifically, in behavior and values - can lead to biological leaps in evolution. These changes in behavior and values usually begin as an arduous struggle, but in virtue of the importance of trudging on, such changes provide ample opportunity for future generations who find it much easier to thrive. The kinds of sociopolitical changes we typically see in today's cultures are a lot more subtle, but so are the genetic alterations that follow from them.
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I'm sure some readers will have reservations about this on ethical grounds. It may sound as if we are encouraging the extinction of certain bloodlines in the human race. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The ultimate goal we hope to achieve in promoting better control over our evolution is to solve global problems of such magnitude that their destructiveness is more detrimental to human life and wellbeing than anything that could befall us in trying to steer our evolution in a desirable direction. Besides, the kinds of cultural changes that have a chance of altering the gene pool very rarely wipe out certain subsets of the population. At worse, it can only make life a little more difficult for those subsets (for example, the shift from a religious to a secular society lowered the standards of living of most clergymen - from power and wealth to humility and meager earnings - but none are so destitute as to be dying on the streets). Life will always be more difficult for some than for others, and in no small part due to disproportional advantages given to those who fit well into their particular culture versus those who don't. As tolerable as this problem may or may not be, it is indeed a problem, but it's not the sort we are aiming to solve. We are aiming to solve those problems that stem from differences in religious and ideological beliefs, the failure to understand one another's ways of experiencing the world, and our difficulty in moving gracefully through times of change. Indeed, if we were able to build a society like this, it may bear mental technologies advanced and numerous enough so that the differences in living standards across different social classes won't matter nearly as much. The great majority of people may be able to live, regardless of their social positions, happily and healthy, using such mental technologies for this very purpose. In short, the program we are envisioning can only solve more problems than it can create.
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It should be clear, at this point, what we should expect if a genetic shift in human populations was to occur in response to a cultural shift like the one we're proposing - namely, that we take on a more subjectivist worldview, fostering a child-like frame of mind for the sake of cognitive flexibility and adaptability, and focusing our energies on solving global problems that plague us in the social and political spheres of life, such as war, oppression, prejudice, and crime. What we should expect, were we to adopt the way of life of the subjectivist, is that eventually men and women would emerge carrying a genotype best fit for survival in this kind of environment. Reflecting back to our discussion on the neural configuration most likely to be found in the frontal lobes of those who practice the subjectivist way of thinking and perceiving the world, this genotype would probably be expressed by a wiring of the brain much like this, except that instead of having to be programmed this way - by parents, schools, media, and society in general - this neural wiring would develop naturally. It would be much like the visual system and its manner of becoming wired into more or less fixed pathways in that the process has nothing to do with social or intellectual indoctrinations. Under normal, and almost universal, circumstances, these pathways form quite naturally, and can be traced back, in large part, to genetics. If such a genetic profile is indeed in our future, then there is hope that the human race will finally see a generation of individuals capable of merging different cultures and value systems smoothly, sustaining a mind open enough to grasp the perspectives of a divergent range of people, and keeping the inner child alive so that we are more inclined to play, not war, with each other even when we are complete strangers.
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Independent vs. Dependent Models of Reality
Subjective Realities
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In an age of strict objectivity and materialism, it is hard to fathom how a science of experiences could be practiced seriously and efficaciously. Experiences are the epitome of subjectivity, and subjectivity is the bane of the ardent scientist. So how can experiences be studied scientifically, let alone mental technologies made from it? Well, this question indeed seems daunting, but it makes a critical difference what kind of model one understands reality under - a dependent or an independent one. According to an independent model of reality, the phenomena that are the subject matter of science can be studies, not only objectively, but once and for all - that is, that the findings of just a single study done onto one such phenomenon are valid for anyone and everyone. This is because such phenomena, and the scientifically uncovered facts about them, are independent of any observer, of the manner in which individuals experience and perceive them. Therefore, it comes across as absurd, to an objectivist, to say, "Water is H2O... so long as Sally thinks so." But to a subjectivist, this is not only meaningful, but at times necessary. Of course, this is not to say that we as subjectivists will reject any scientific claim insofar as it has not been tested for each and every observer. Rather, it is to say that we recognize the discreteness of each observer's experience, and that each experience constitutes an element in a different subjective reality. We don't assume that each observer will experience objectively verifiable phenomena in wildly different ways, at least no more than an objectivist would, but what we do assume - that each experience, for all intents and purposes, is the same - is duly recognized as an assumption.
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There's no good reason to doubt this assumption, of course, other than the fact that no one person experiences the world exactly like any other, but the assumption rests on such discrepancies being small enough to ignore for the great majority of people. Nevertheless, the objectivist might still retort: by privatizing all our experiences, and the whole world along with them, we have rendered any utility the scientific methodology might have had groundless. But the utility of the methods of science have not been tampered with one iota. It reveals a grave misunderstanding to assume it has, for no theoretical model on the nature of reality can influence or alter the efficacy of the scientific method. It may demonstrate the utility of science, or the lack thereof, as great or meager, but such utility will be as it always has been. If it follows from one model that science is extraordinarily useful, then according to that model, it always has been, and if it follows from a different model that science is tragically useless, then according to that model, it always has been. We don't change its utility by adopting a different model. On the contrary, we are better off knowing exactly how useful science is, and this requires strict adherence to the reasoning of one particular model or another, not our attachment to and pride in more traditional models.
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Having said that, the implications that a subjectivist model like MM-Theory has for science are not at all disappointing (unless you're steadfast against science). We may disappoint the objectivist when we propose that science doesn't connect us with a single common world - that we are each living in separate universes ensures this - but it proves to be no less reliable than the objectivist's view would have it. After all, modern philosophers of science hold that it is its ability to predict observable phenomena - which can be translated into sensory perceptions - that is science's stronghold, and nothing of this ability is put into doubt by a subjectivist perspective. If it's a question of whether one scientist observes the same phenomenon, or reads the same measurements, as another - that is, whether one has the same experiences as the other - then of course there's no fool proof means by which to determine this, but the objectivist is in no better position to answer this question than the subjectivist, for no one has the ability to access another's personal experiences - not according to a subjectivist's view or an objectivist's. As an objectivist, I might hold tenaciously to the conviction that the objects I see in the outer world, or the measurements I read, are one and the same objects or measurements that everyone else sees or reads. But this is different from the conviction that everyone else sees or reads them the same way. Of course, if anyone doesn't, and if the objectivist is confident in his own sanity, then he might dismiss those others as insane, suffering from some form of psychosis or drug-induced alteration of consciousness. Even if we grant the objectivist this assessment, it still stands, in principle at least, that these are the perceptions he must deal with as a scientist. That is to say, if it is community agreement that the scientist depends on, then he/she must accept the community he/she is dealt, rife with hallucinating head cases as it may or may not be. The likelihood that this would actually be the case is the same according to a subjectivist view or an objectivist's.
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The more troublesome issue is what to say about observing experiences themselves (or perhaps "feeling" is a better term) as opposed to objects and measurements in the outer world. There is always a riff, in the objectivist paradigm, between perception and reality. It assumes that reality, because it is common to all, is the one we can faithfully observe and record, whereas perception, because it is private and possibly different for each person, is hopelessly beyond public observation and record keeping. But subjectivism, at least the brand MM-Theory represents, puts a twist on the perception/reality dualism by converting it into a monism. So then we are left asking whether this single perceptual/real entity inherits the character of something observable and amenable to science or an entity illusive to observation and intractable to science. Well, to be perfectly straight, this is not quite the right question to ask. The reader should know by now that, according to MM-Theory, experiences are by nature open to observation - as open as logically possible, for that is just their essence - but a more pressing question is whether the experiences of others is any more (or less) observable within a subjectivist framework than within an objectivist one. Without pondering this question too deeply, the simple answer seems to be no, they are not any more observable. How, then, do we get by this hurdle?
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In fusing reality with perception, we have gone further than the objectivist towards overcoming this hurdle, and if we don't set our standards too high, this may be enough. We have gone halfway to be exact - that is to say, by fusing reality with perception, the question of how one observes his/her own experiences becomes moot. By observing the actual entity in the external world, one is really observing his/her own experience of it. So experiences can be observed (or, again, "felt"). To go the other half, one must not only observe or feel his/her own experiences, but those of others as well. But this seems blatantly impossible - and indeed it is. We therefore won't attempt to argue in favor of the possibility, but instead show that through this direct access to our own experiences, we have every reason to extrapolate and predict the quality of the experiences of others. This might at first seem trivial, for no one, except perhaps radical materialists and solipsists, doubts that others have experiences and that they are, for the most part, qualitatively the same as one's own. But what we want to argue is that we have sound reasons to claim that our knowledge of this can qualify as genuinely scientific.
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Acknowledgements
Epistemic Awareness
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A couple points should be made before we go on with this. First, it is not only sensory experiences that we can claim to know, but all experiences common to the human mind. This is true more of our personal experiences, but with a stretch, of others' experiences as well. Our justification for this claim stems straight from the Advanced Theory - particularly, the concept of acknowledgement and epistemic awareness. Whatever experiences we are capable of acknowledging - that is, whatever we can be epistemically aware of - we can claim to know about. That is, we can claim to know we are having such experiences. This argument can be strengthened by considering the neurology behind epistemic awareness.
As we showed in the Advanced Theory, one becomes epistemically aware of an experience when signals coming from the MODs corresponding to that experience converge in the cognitive database, channeled through MODs corresponding to the experience of acknowledgement, and finally morphing into the experience of knowledge. This is the same process whether the original experience be sensory, emotional, cognitive, or anything else. Signals must originate from MODs corresponding to that experience, whatever it is, and find their way to MODs corresponding to knowledge of that experience. Therefore, what reason is there to hold true to a bias favoring those processes associated with sensory experiences and their consequent knowledge over those associated with other kinds of experiences and their consequent knowledge? What is the essential difference that makes the former "true" knowledge and the latter "false"? If we consciously feel an experience, it is because we are acknowledging it, and this is only possible if we are informed about them by the signals that reach our cognitive centers and bring about epistemic awareness. This is how all human experiences work, and how all knowledge is established. Thus, no mental content, so long as we are conscious of it, is any less knowable - that is, any less "observable" - than any other.
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The second point is that, although some experiences seem more "fuzzy" and others more "crisp", this is only a matter of degree. Emotions tend to be fuzzy - we often don't know exactly how we feel - that is, for example, whether we feel more depressed or angry, or exactly how depressed or angry we feel. But no experience, not even sensation, not even sensations of an exceptionally precise measurement, is absolutely crisp either, for there is always some fine degree of ambiguity about it. Consider, for example, a measurement taken by a standard ruler. A typical ruler can measure length right down to the millimeter. It can measure the width of a box to be, say, 13.5 cm. But suppose that the one reading the measurement is rounding down. Suppose that if he/she looks very carefully, he/she notices that the measurement is really 13.51 cm.
Well, because the typical ruler he/she uses has no tick marks less than a millimeter apart, someone else could come along, take the same measurement, and assess the length to be 13.52 cm. Now, they may quibble over what the exact length of the box's width is, but because the ruler lacks these tick marks, they have no objective way of settling the matter - each one's claim is no more than an opinion. If they had a more precise measuring device, they may end the debate after another measurement, but even that device cannot be infinitely precise (What if they end up arguing over whether the exact measure is 13.510923047 cm or 13.510923048 cm?). This is true of any measurement, and it is true whether such measurements are quantitative or qualitative (comparing a particular shade of blue to a color chart, for example, might result in a dispute if one person discerned an infinitesimally small contrast between the measured blue and the color chart blue whereas another person didn't). Therefore, although sensory experiences and the measurements they allow us to take are, in comparison to other human experiences, extremely acute, this does not pigeonhole them into a class all their own - namely, the class of "knowable" things. Rather, it puts them on the far end of a spectrum, a spectrum labeled "crisp" and "fuzzy" at each respective end. They are found at a spot close to the "crisp" end, but not precisely at that end, for no experience can be that far over. In contrast, other experiences like emotions, vague memories, unclear thoughts, and so forth are found near the other end - that is, near the "fuzzy" end. But likewise, no experience is absolutely fuzzy, for there is always some degree of clarity. In general, then, whether an experience is felt as fuzzy or crisp is a matter of degree, only determinable in comparison to other experiences, and there is no objective or "real" line dividing those that are formally crisp from those that are formally fuzzy.
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Reason
Justification
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So how does this help us in predicting the experiences of others? Well, the first criterion for making reasonable predictions is to have a sample of data that can be used to extrapolate those predictions. We have that by way of bare exposure to our own experiences, which allows us to claim knowledge about them. The second criterion is that we can reasonably claim to discern correlations between those experiences and certain observable behaviors, including speech and other forms of expression, made manifest in other people. For example, if every time I perform some physical act, or bring myself into some physical state, I feel pain, chances are I'll physically react in such a way as to halt that physical act or bring myself out of that physical state. The correlation between that physical action or state, along with the reaction that ensues from it, and the experience of pain I feel, is probably going to be fairly strong. Thus, I have good reason to suppose that when others display the same pattern of behavior, or the same speech or body language, they also experience pain. I can even go so far as to say, they experience pain the same way as I do. MM-Theory in particular gives us reason to say this. The Basic Theory specifically says that whatever the behavior, or whatever the neuro-chemical activity in the brain mechanically causing that behavior, the corresponding experience will serve as the reason for that behavior. Thus, the particular pattern of behavior we observe, or the speech and body language we are impressed with, is the result of an experience whose qualitative essence is such that it acts as the most fitting justification for that behavior, speech, or body language. What is required of such a justification in order to be most fitting is precisely in how it feels. In order for the experience driving the behavior, speech, or body language to be sufficient reason, it must feel very much like what I or anybody else feels when we engage in similar behaviors, speech, or body language. Thus, I have good reason to suppose that the experience driving someone else's behavior, speech, or body language is the same as my own when I engage in similar behavior, speech, or body language.
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David Hume
The Problem of Induction
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Of course, correlations can't be used to make perfect predictions, even when the correlations themselves are perfect. Hume taught us that the best we can hope for is inductive leaps of faith. Predictions that such-and-such experience will accompany such-and-such behavior, based on our familiarity with our own experiences and behavior, can always be wrong, for there is always the possibility that certain variables in the equation have not been taken into consideration, and indeed it is almost always the case that such variables are too numerous to be taken into consideration in any practical sense. Such is the nature of correlations and the predictions we extrapolate from them, but this is no less true of the natural sciences than it is for a science of experiences. The problem of induction that Hume presented to the rationalists and the empiricists nearly three centuries ago challenges all of science, not just the social ones or those of experiences. Admittedly, it is much more of a challenge to the social and experiential sciences, but the same approaches used in the natural sciences can be taken, just with greater precautions, more patience, and mountains more of data. Consistent results do emerge after a long stretch of diligent work and iron patience, but only over a much longer time frame. So just like the matter of precision as it stands for measurement and observation - namely, that there is no such thing as absolute precision, nor a complete lack thereof - the difference between the efficacy of the natural sciences and the social and experiential ones is a matter of degree, not in the quality of results but in the rate at which they emerge. We fully admit that the natural sciences are by far the better players at this game, but the social and experiential sciences play by the rules, and do make headway, all the same.
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Nevertheless, there are certain advantages to partaking in a science as precise and consistent as the natural ones. For one thing, experimenters take it for granted that whatever observations they make individually, or whatever measurements they read, all other experimenters will observe and read the same things. They see no point in asking "I read 13.5 cm. Do you?" The possibility that there could be diversity across different observers is taken as ridiculous. For the same reason, it is taken as equally ridiculous to entertain the possibility that one experimenter lies when he/she reports exactly the same observations or readings as another's. But these possibilities are taken more seriously when it comes to reports of one's own private internal experiences. Although a subjectivist perspective interprets this difference - between natural and experiential science, that is - as a matter of degree, it is such a significant difference that a different approach may be needed after all. When it comes to exploring one's own internal experiences, especially non-sensory ones, there is a need to question whether others feel the same experiences and in the same way - even when they report such experiences exactly as you do. There is reason to believe that the words one uses to describe, say, an emotion like happiness are the same words that everyone else uses but refer to different experiences. If, for example, I have always experienced the color you call "red" as something other than what you experience as red, say blue instead, there would be no way for either you or I to know the difference exists, and there would be no basis upon which I would come to refer to it with any other word than "red". Also, when it comes to very personal and sensitive issues, which comprise a large portion of our internal mental states, there is good reason to believe that others would lie, or be in denial, about what they really experience. For example, homosexuals might feel ashamed to report feelings of sexual arousal when presented with erotic images of same-sex people. So even though, in principle, the differences between the natural and experiential sciences are only a matter of degree, in practice, such differences can introduce confounding variables that are difficult to control.
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Is there anything we can do to mitigate these confounding variables? Well, for one thing, we have already mentioned what implications MM-Theory has for questions of whether one feels certain experiences the same way as another. Taking the example of whether I experience red as you do, MM-Theory would say that if there is indeed a difference, this difference should be potentially expressed through a difference in behavior. When it comes to color, however, the behavioral difference would be so subtle as to be almost impossible to detect. There is, for example, a tendency for us to prefer certain colors over others. Red may be a more tantalizing color to me than any other color, and I may therefore prefer red things over things of other colors. But it would only be in virtue of how red feels to me that I have such an affinity for it, for if I were to experience red as others experience, say, blue, I would probably loose my liking for it, and my behavior would change accordingly. But to what extent such behavior is exclusively determined by how I experience red or any other color is still extremely difficult to detect. There is no doubt a whole myriad of other factors - psychological and neurological - influencing my behavior in these cases. Another approach MM-Theory allows for is to scan one's brain and observe the activity therein while one experiences certain colors or any other experience. What MM-Theory tells us is that if the neuro-chemical activity and the structure of the particular MODs of interest are exactly the same as someone else's, then the corresponding experiences will be equally the same. But to draw such a conclusion is to depend on a theory - MM-Theory in this case - which is somewhat different than the approach taken with the natural sciences, which is to gain direct empirical exposure to the phenomena under investigation. As much a reliable theory as MM-Theory may be, it doesn't get us any closer to actually feeling the experiences of others - the primary subject matter it concerns itself with - whereas the natural sciences have ample opportunities to empirically observe their subject matter.
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It should be noted, however, that as it concerns the experiences of others, the natural sciences are in the same boat, for neither do they bring us any closer to feeling such experiences, and they too would have to rely on a theory of consciousness to suppose that we all experience the world in the same way. But this is beside the point. The more crucial point is whether or not this matters. To the natural sciences, it matters very little - so long as community agreement is voiced. But as we noted above, community agreement is not enough for an experiential science, for there are things like lying or denial to consider - not to mention the fact that a science of experiences concerns itself with experiences themselves, and so what it aims to uncover is, unlike the natural sciences, exactly what experiences feel like. For a natural scientist, it matters not whether I experience red the same as you or anyone else - so long as I call "red" all those things that you and everyone else call "red". But what an experiential science is precisely interested in is what red feels like - to me, you, or anyone.
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Perhaps, then, the solution to this problem is to change what an experiential science should be interested in. Mental experiences are the private subject matter of the individual, and so maybe an experiential science ought to concern itself with one's own private experiences - that is, the experiential scientist ought to study his/her own mind and nothing more. The reports given by others ought to be taken into consideration only as a guide to exploring one's own experiences rather than the grounds on which to claim knowledge of those experiences - at least, in a deductive sense (the inductive method that relies on correlative trends is still reasonable - it is not perfect, however, which is what concerns us here). As a guide, the reports of others can be used in experiments on one's own mind. For example, if one reports that a certain pattern of positive thinking helps to alleviate depression, then another could try thinking the same pattern to see whether or not it induces the same alleviation of depression. Whether the first person lied or miscommunicated wouldn't matter all that much, nor would it matter whether he/she experiences positive thoughts, depression, or its alleviation the same way. What matters is that the second person, in testing this report on him/herself, learns something about his/her own mind in the process. It is still fair to assume that there will be some degree of congruence, at least most of the time, between the reports and what one actually experiences in testing these reports on him/herself. We aren't so different, in other words, that what is reported to work for one person is bound to fail for everyone else. We can assume, for the most part, that what one reports is genuine and accurate enough so that another can make use of such reports for his/her own self-directed experiments.
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This is not to say we can ignore the possibility of lies and denial, for there are bound to be a significant portion of reports that are of just this sort. Whether one feels certain experiences the same way as another wouldn't matter if the experiential scientist is concerned only with his/her own private experiences, just as it doesn't matter to a natural scientist how others experience their observations and measurement readings so long as there is agreement, but it can make a difference if the reports are based on lies or denial. If one claims that jumping up and down ten times makes him/her smarter, then others who take this seriously would be inclined to try it out. Without experiencing the expected results, however, they would not know whether they were doing it wrong, the technique simply doesn't work for them, or the original report was an utter fabrication. Again, however, this may not even matter. If the experiential scientist is only concerned with his/her own experiences, then it shouldn't matter what the motives of the reporter were - to lie or to tell the truth - for it is the results that he/she incurs that are the crucial elements. The responsibility of this breed of scientist is simply to report whether such a technique worked for him/her, not whether they believe it worked for anyone else.
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But then we are faced with a dilemma: how can we trust the words of any experiential scientist? This is where the point we made above - that the concern should be exclusively one's own experiences - applies to the general public. In this sort of science, it is not what the community of such scientists reports that we ought to rely on, but our own experiences - and this holds even if one is not a part of this community. The words of the professionals in this field are to be used only as guidelines for one's own personal experimentations. This is unlike the attitude taken by the natural scientists and those who heed their every word. According to this attitude, the claims made by the natural scientist are, in principle, verifiable by any ordinary layman (assuming he/she has the means). That Jupiter has 63 moons, for example, can be verified by anyone with a strong enough telescope and the knowledge of what to look for. We don't expect to observe anything to the contrary, and so the general attitude is that we can take the natural scientist's word on faith. But this attitude must change when it comes to experiential science, for in that case, one cannot verify the reports of those who describe their own private experiences. Nevertheless, one can verify whether those reports, and the techniques described therein for inducing the reported experiences, work for him/herself. And in taking the subjectivist perspective, this is really no different than the verification of reports on natural phenomena like the moons of Jupiter, for in that case, one is simply applying the reported method - namely, the utilization of a telescope - to see if he/she can induce the same sensory experiences - namely, the observation of Jupiter's moons. This is a visual experience, one that can be verified for oneself but never for anyone else, however reliable we take their claims to be. The difference, of course, is that such a visual experience is bound to always be replicable. The common person, therefore, prefers to take the natural scientist's word for it, and refrain from verifying that word for him/herself. We therefore say "Well, the scientists say so, so it must be true." We have to change our tone when it comes to the experiential sciences. We have to say, "The experiential scientists say so. I wonder if it's true for me?" - and then go try it out.
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It is nonetheless important to stress honesty in one's conduct as an experiential scientist. There is ample opportunity to fabricate results and so many conditions under which the motivation to lie would be irresistible (as in the case of the homosexual given above). The experiential scientist would have to be confident in the value his own honest reports would have for his community, and all feelings of shame over embarrassing results along with all pressures towards group conformity would have to be resisted with an iron will. The community that relies on these reports would have to conciliate by taking such reports with an objective and non-judgmental frame of mind. This is perhaps more important than honesty in experiential science. Whereas the ethics that apply to the natural scientist are mostly concerned with honesty, the ethics that apply to the experiential scientist ought to emphasize an atmosphere of openness and safety for those who have potentially sensitive and embarrassing reports to give. If this can be established, then the chances that honesty will follow will be greater. In fact, it should be encouraged. It should be taken as a sign of courage, perhaps rewarded somehow, and those who give such reports ought to be recognized among the great contributors to the field. There ought to be annual prizes for such reporters, much like the natural sciences have the Nobel Prize for their major breakthroughs. Unique and eccentric reports also ought to be encouraged, for no two people are ever exactly alike, and there are bound to be some experiences that one person, but no other, can have. These scientists ought to feel proud and motivated to give such reports, not hesitant. There should be no impetus to conform to the common trends of the majority, no reason for the scientist to want to skew his/her own results. In a way, the mission of this brand of science ought to be the discovery of novel and mysteriously bizarre experiences, and should such experiences be unique to just one or a handful of individuals, then the aim ought to be to discover ways by which as many people as possible, assuming such experiences are beneficial, can share and utilize it.
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Epistemic Awareness
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Besides matters of honesty and courage in reporting the experiences one has, there are matters of safety. One must take precautions where precautions are due. In this science, we experiment on our own minds, the one feature we rely on for our sanity and proper functioning in the world. It seems hard to fathom how, in this sort of science, one could conduct such hazardous experiments that one's own sanity is endangered, but under the assumption that many years into the future, we progress in our experiential science and mental technologies to the extent that they become recognizably powerful, standards for care and safety ought to be laid out. We already covered most of this in the section on Hoppers above, so we will not go into any more details here. We will simply repeat that it would be best that volunteers partake in such experiments, that a group oversees the one undergoing self-experimentation, a group that can take on the responsibility of caring for the experimenters psychological health and wellbeing, that an additional group of therapists and counselors be available just in case something does go wrong, and that the process can be likened to an astronaut taking a space walk, his suite providing a protective environment and his cord a secure means by which to return. With these protective measures in place, we can go ahead with a new scientific enterprise - we can practice experiential science just as natural and social scientists practice theirs. It may not be as efficient as the natural sciences, maybe not even the social sciences, and it may not produce results at the same generous rate, but this is no reason not to begin. It is no reason to lay back and make no progress. Something is better than nothing. We have argued that knowledge of experiences is possible, foremost one's own but even those of others, and the basis for such knowledge is exactly the same as for the social and natural sciences - namely, the neural pathways that allow all human experiences to be converted to epistemic awareness. Because of this, science in general can be extended to all kinds of phenomena - to the whole gamut of human experiences, and on the off chance that we are able to expand the scope of experiences we can induce in our own minds, maybe more.
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For a paper titled "Practical Applications", one has to ask how practical it really was. Although we can't say that MM-Theory is as applicable as, say, a new design for a computer chip or a faster, more fuel efficient, car, we can say that it is much more applicable than most philosophies and metaphysical theories. Perhaps what this paper has shown is that its most relevant domain of application is psychology. We have also shown how it can be worked into politics, sociology, and even back into philosophy - not so much to spawn further ideas (although it could certainly be used for this purpose), but as a tool philosophers can use to construct and disseminate good and healthy ideas. As already stated, the implementation of any of these ideas would undoubtedly take years to fully get underway, probably centuries, and quite possibly millennia. This is no 5 year plan. If it is to have any lasting impact, it would have to be through the means by which ideas naturally have their impact - organically, covertly, and slow.
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What this paper intended to do was to lay down a subjectivist perspective, and attempt to sift through the possibilities that this perspective gives us, so that having explored these possibilities, whosoever reads this paper will be given the vision that I see, the vision of a future rooted in mental technologies and the benefits they can afford our world. It's this vision that I want to establish, for a vision that seems doable, even in principle, and desirable, will, when apprehended by a great many people, make strides, however small and for however long, towards actualizing. Of course, it also requires the will of the people - that is, it requires that a large enough portion of society believe in it, want it, and are willing to play an active part in its realization. If this is lacking, then it becomes all the more difficult for such a vision to become a reality, and it ends up taking away from its practibility. This is a matter of choice, and it is not mine to make. The only thing I can do is to show how the principles of MM-Theory can be applied practically, and I believe I have accomplished this. This is really the central aim of this paper - to show the possibility - and it is certainly hoped that society will chose to take it from possible to actual. Even if this is merely a pipedream, however, we have at least addressed the question of MM-Theory's practicality, and shown it to have some. Ultimately, that's what matters.
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To say the least, it is a "shelf idea". The reader might recall this term from the section The Philosopher's Function above. A shelf idea is an idea that might be good in certain circumstances, and has the potential to be implemented, but as things stand at the time it is brought up, it is either inappropriate or questionable, and so its best place is to remain on a figurative shelf where it can await a better time or a better application. The uses towards which MM-Theory should be put, suggested in this paper, are worthy of consideration indeed. I don't just say this out of pride in my own opinions, but out of heartfelt hope for the prosperity and happiness of mankind. Any idea, no matter how impractical, no matter how poorly thought through, should, so long as it supports positive changes for all humanity, be respected and avenues down which its implementations can be realized seriously considered. And it ought to be reconsidered - time and time again - just in case the opportunity to apply it in practice opens up. The ideas proposed in this paper can only benefit mankind, and so I passionately urge readers not to brush them off for one reason or another, but to keep them in mind for the sake of improving the state of our world just in case they turn out to be applicable in some future circumstance.
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Having said that, I would also like to express my confidence in the feasibility of the proposed applications. As I mentioned above, the only thing that stands between these ideas and their real-world implementation is the desire and willingness of the people, informed of these ideas as they must be, to see them through. If the people are so willing, then I am certain that the production of positive and healthy mental technologies, foremost in the form of philosophical "programs", will have a noticeable and fruitful effect on human life - but not without a firm foundation on which to conduct such a practice in a safe and responsible manner. The greater part of my confidence is fueled by what history has shown us vis-à-vis the power of ideas over politics, culture, and the individual - but a large percentage of this power has not been for the better. This is why it is so important to erect a formal organization of thinkers who can deal with the production of ideas in a positive and non-destructive manner. It is important that we get these ideas, which are profoundly intertwined in human and social nature, under control. But in saying that, it must also be stressed, with equal import, that the foundations must be laid, before anything else is undertaken, upon which the production and regulation of ideas will be practiced safely and with utmost responsibility. There have been many renowned figures who have single-handedly taken on this feat - the control of ideas to shape and drive society - in an irresponsible and utterly dangerous manner. Religious fanatics, fascists, dictators, cult leaders, and other horrible characters around the world and throughout history attest to this fact. There is, of course, the danger of others like this growing out of an organization geared towards the production of ideas, the knowledge and expertise needed to conduct such a practice being abused for sadistic purposes. But if such an organization worked hard, in the beginning, at crafting a reliable and clearly understood system by which the production of subsequent ideas could be built and regulated in a safe and responsible manner, then we would enjoy only the benefits of such a practice and its potential to spawn evil mitigated.
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This shouldn't be as hard as it may at first sound. We drew clear parallels between the way human thought systems influence our behavior and the way programs influence computers and robots. The strength of this parallel is the bridge it forms between abstract and speculative visions like the one proposed in this paper and something concrete and familiar, something we know can be used in a practical sense to get objectively verifiable results. Computer technology is a very solid and undebatable influence over our world. If the human brain, whose structure and dynamics is uncannily similar to computers, can be programmed by social and intellectual indoctrination, then this serves as a conceptual link between the philosophical notion of a mental technology rich society and the objective, concrete, and practical means by which it can be implemented. It is certainly possible for a network of computers to be programmed with applications that prevent any one from downloading and running malicious software - antivirus software being a good example - not only from outside the network but from within it as well - so that no one computer can compromise the whole system. Thus, there is no reason an organization of thinkers dedicated to constructing and disseminating good ideas can't establish the foundation needed to ensure that the fruits of their labors will always be clean and wholesome - a foundation that is robust and self-reinforcing.
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If we can establish such a foundation, then there is no doubt in my mind that the future will hold great promise and enlightenment. It will be a slow process to be sure, but it will be in the right direction. We will begin to heal our wounds and attain health on a mass scale. Having achieved an equilibrium state, whereby optimal levels of health are balanced with the challenges and hurdles of human life, the next phase in mental technology can be undertaken. We can stretch the scope of human experiences beyond those which are familiar, and begin the practice of constructing alternate realities - thus becoming hoppers. If these advancements are truly in store for us, then this allows for a special interpretation of the role MM-Theory takes in history. As we pointed out elsewhere in this website, MM-Theory is not just a theory about what reality consists of, but what reality is - that is, it is a theory about what we mean by "reality". And isn't this one of the fundamental questions of philosophy? Isn't the subject of ontology - the question of being and what it is - just so intrinsic to philosophy that it could be said that it is the ultimate puzzle philosophers grapple with, or at least one of them? If we can get away with saying "yes" to this, then MM-Theory offers a feasible solution to this puzzle. This is not to say that MM-Theory is the final word on the subject, nor that there aren't contending, possibly better, theories, but for a culture that takes MM-Theory to heart, it would regard the question of ontology a settled matter - not so much because they now understand what being essentially is, but that they understand it will never be anything beyond what they feel in their experiences (recall from The Inconceivability of Consciousness the difference between knowing what an experience is and feeling it). It would feel that it finally came to grips with the deepest questions one could pose about reality in general and fundamentally. Well, what would be next for such a culture? Where would a society, having solved a problem that has plagued philosophers for millennia, go from there? Where else? To alternate realities! Like graduating to a higher level, the time for questioning the essence of reality would be over, and the time for exploring new ones begun.
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But the path to this bright and exciting future is dim at best, and the journey towards it precariously unsecure. When we are frightened by the images we see on the news every night - images of terror, cruelty, and war - it instills in us a sense of dread - not only for the immediate victims of such atrocities, but for the fate of all mankind. Our minds are instilled with doomsday scenarios in which the world is overtaken by tyranny, anarchy - or worse - nuclear holocaust. Social and political dangers such as war and terrorism are not the only menaces we our bombarded with, but natural ones as well. We are constantly reminded of the dangers global warming, overpopulation, and the extinction of certain species pose on us. All these things can be greatly influenced by human action - quite easily - if only a significant number of people around the world shared the ideas, attitudes, and values necessary for inducing such influence. It would be the most tragic of tragedies if we were not wise enough to rise above these challenges and adapt to a world changing before our eyes. It would be an utter devastation if these menaces spelt our downfall as a species - perhaps that of other species as well.
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It just may be the case that the root of most of our problems is the imbalance between our physical and mental technologies, between our natural and social sciences. Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, about 300 years ago, our physical technologies have progressed to the point where they have sky rocketed (literally), whereas our mental technologies have lagged behind. This has resulted in the majority of our sociopolitical problems being handled with advanced physical technologies, such as guns and bombs, and relatively few mental technologies such as problem solving skills on an interpersonal and intellectual level, as well as deeper understandings of different perspectives. Maintaining balance may be all that we need, and it is certainly achievable so long as we have the necessary infrastructure for generating and regulating wholesome ideas for the benefit of mankind.
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Qualitative Diversity
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But the possibilities beyond that may be endless. I have expressed elsewhere in this website my love for qualitative diversity, and when I reflect on the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of worlds that our species has been through - that is, from the historical perspective that MM-Theory provides us - I wish not to see it end. The longer we survive, and the more worlds we see, the greater the repertoire of qualitative diversity in our collective memory. I sincerely hope that humanity can make it through the 21st century, for if it can, it can make it through anything, and that means thousands years more of worlds to pass through and explore. This notion may not appeal to everyone, for when we look back on history, many of the worlds we had to endure seem utterly horrible, like Hell itself. If this worries you, then never fear. The elements of these worlds that made them Hell - the oppression, the ignorance, the inequalities - are precisely what we're proposing to eliminate with our mental technologies, and in effect, make way for a bright and glorious future for all mankind.
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Hoppers
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And after that, who knows how far we can take our mental technologies? Who knows how closely we can mimic the hypothetical hoppers described above? Who knows how long it will take? Even if the most we can accomplish is a better set of cognitive programs, propagated through an efficient and far-reaching communication system, this would make a world of difference for the human condition. Imagine, if you will, a world in which we adapt our minds, even if only in the sphere of beliefs and values, in the blink of an eye, as we move in and out of different situations and environments. For example, suppose one was deeply religious and cherished her belief in God, but worked for an employer who was radically atheist. At home, with her family, she could slip comfortably into the theistic frame of mind, and as she left home for another day of work, she could switch gears and adopt, at least for eight hours, an atheistic view. It would be a deplorable boss who discriminates against his workers on religious grounds (not to mention the legal implications), but even if he was exceptionally tolerant, it would certainly pay to play the office politics by adorning a persona that matches the boss's as closely as possible; it nurtures relationships immensely the more easily two people can relate to each other. Of course, a transition such as this - from religious to secular - would be extremely difficult at first, but what I predict for a culture invested in mental technologies and cognitive self-programming is that such transitions could easily become second nature. As it stands in western culture, it is likewise second nature to think objectively, scientifically, and critically. This style of thinking is so deeply engrained in our culture, it can be hard at times to appreciate how foreign and rarely practiced it is by other cultures. As natural as it is for us, however, it still takes training, and we get this training in how we raise and educate our children. If we could channel the skills and perspectives of a mental technologist through the same institutions, we could become a culture just as talented in these skills. For our hard working employee who converts herself to an atheist by day, a theist by night, the transition she takes on would begin by arduous study and philosophical contemplation in the reasoning upholding any perspectives surrounding atheist views, but after having written the fruits of such study and contemplation into her mind like carving in stone, the switch from one perspective to another would be like the switch of a light, each view neatly compartmentalized as separate MODs in her brain readily accessible for the appropriate occasion. With a skill set like this, how could she ever fail to get along with anybody - especial when those whom she interacts with are equally skilled? How could a whole society abundant with citizens skilled in this way ever clash with another society equally abundant and skilled?
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But regardless of whether human culture is this capable, I firmly believe, given that the human race survives long enough, that it is an inevitability. I firmly believe that, in this age of global and immediate communication, of clashing cultures and religions, of varying ethnicities crammed together like sardines, we desperately need a psychological and sociopolitical system by which we work together peacefully, productively, and in harmony, a system that takes into account the psychological roots of our problems, for those, I believe, are the sole roots. The human race is a very resilient and versatile species, and it tends to cling to life, to persist in the evolutionary game, tenaciously enough such that it stands the chance to eventually see itself through a genetic leap whereby we become the sort of species predicted in the section A New Evolutionary Path above. In other words, this need not be punctuated by cultural values and beliefs - it can happen naturally, however long that might take. Either way, I believe, it is our destiny. Of course, I can't prove this. This belief is a matter of faith for me. It is not certain knowledge. But I can say this - that the human mind is capable of extraordinary things - some of which we deliberately bring about, some of which defy our control - and these things are a source of inspiration for me. We know, from the effects of psychedelic drugs and the experiences of schizophrenics, that the human mind can hallucinate and alter its sensory perceptions. The question is whether this can be done by the shear power of our will? An even more intriguing question is whether we can induce experiences that no human has ever had before, experiences that are utterly unimaginable, by will alone. I don't know, with absolute certainty, whether we can or cannot - but I see nothing blocking us.
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© Copyright 2008, 2009, 2010 Gibran Shah.
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